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THE PROSECUTOR'S DILEMMA: BARGAINS
AND PUNISHMENTS
Russell L. Christopher*
Unlike consequentialists, retributivists condemn bargain justice-
plea bargains and immunity deals-as violating a number of
conditions of just punishment. While the difficulties prosecutor-
initiated bargaining poses for prisoners in a consequentialist system
of criminal justice is well known under the rubric of the prisoner's
dilemma, this Article introduces the difficulties prisoner-initiated
bargaining poses for prosecutors in a retributivist system of criminal
justice. Applying four central principles of retributivism to a
prisoner-initiated proposal offering inculpatory testimony on the
prisoner's confederates in exchange for immunity demonstrates that
each principle paradoxically requires, and is violated by, both
acceptance and nonacceptance of the offer. Retributivism's
conflicting principles generate a moral dilemma-the Prosecutor's
Dilemma-in which no matter what a prosecutor does in response to
the offer, retributivism's principles will be violated. According to
the means preferred by retributivists themselves to resolve conflicts
among principles, the Prosecutor's Dilemma is to be resolved by not
accepting the offer and punishing neither the prisoner nor her
confederates. Though perhaps theoretically sound, the resolution is
a practical disaster. It allows prisoners to self-immunize merely by
tendering a dilemmatic immunity offer. While the resolution
perhaps reduces retributivism to the point of absurdity by disabling
retributivism from justifying punishment of either the prisoner or
her confederates, without the resolution of the Prosecutor's
Dilemma retributivism remains internally inconsistent. As a result,
the Prosecutor's Dilemma supplies an indirect defense of bargain
justice.
Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. I am indebted
to George P. Fletcher, Kent Greenawalt, Ken Levy, and Peter B. Oh for their
criticisms of earlier drafts of this Article. I also benefited from discussions with
Charles Adams, Martin Belsky, Montie Deer, Paul Finkelman, Janet Levit, Marla
Mansfield, and Maria Pagano. Any errors are, of course, my own. A previous version
of this Article was presented at a Faculty Colloquy at The University of Tulsa College
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INTRODUCTION
Everybody loves a bargain, except when it concerns crime and
punishment. Commentators widely decry bargain justice' as
1. Bargain justice means here an arrangement between a prosecutor and
purported offender in which each party exchanges something of value with the other
party. Rather than determining what an offender justly deserves by a trial, a
prosecutor and offender bargain as to the terms of what each shall receive from the
other. The two main forms of bargain justice are the plea bargain and the immunity
deal. In both forms, by providing something of value to the prosecutor-a guilty plea
or inculpatory information on another's criminal activity-the offender receives less
punishment than if she went to trial and was convicted. For a discussion of these two
practices, see infra Part I.A.1-2. For the roots of plea bargaining in England, dating
back as far as 1587, see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 12-16 (1979); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical
Perspective, 13 Law & Soc'y Rev. 247, 247-48 (1979); John H. Langbein,
Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 Law & Soc'y Rev. 261, 261-69
(1979). Though their first instances may be unknown, immunity deals apparently
were common in the mid-18th century in Italy and were employed there as early as
1630 in the Italian city of Milan. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments 102 n.1
(David Young trans., 1986) (1764) (citation omitted).
For an example of the negative light in which bargain justice is typically cast,
consider the following account:
For all but the most doctrinaire free market micro-economists, the very term
"plea bargaining" is distasteful. Justice, critics of plea negotiations point out,
is not a matter of bazaar haggling, but of thoughtful adjudication of claims.
"To bargain" is different than "to present reasoned arguments," and to
reach a "bargain" or even an "agreement" is different than to obtain a
"judgment." The more colloquial meaning of "bargain" is even worse. A
"bargain" is a discount, something obtained at a cut-rate. If judges and
scholars squirm at the notion of "bargained justice," the public, especially in
our fearful times, is even more unhappy about defendants who "get off
cheap."
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
2117, 2129-30 (1998). Lynch himself, however, who as a former prosecutor and
defense attorney and currently a federal judge and law professor is well-situated to
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"absolutely and fundamentally immoral, ' 2 "a disaster,"3 "unfair and
irrational,"'4 "outrageous,"5 and unjust.6  Perhaps the single most
influential source of the animus against bargain justice springs from
retributivism.7 Starting in the late eighteenth century with Immanuel
Kant's declaration that "justice ceases to be justice if it can be bought
at any price whatsoever,"' retributivists have nearly uniformly
rejected the wholesale purchase of justice.9 But apparently finding
understand the practice from multiple perspectives, finds the above-quoted account
not entirely apt. Id. at 2130.
2. Marshall J. Hartman & Marianna Koval, The Immorality of Plea Bargaining,
in Legality, Morality, and Ethics in Criminal Justice 70, 70 (Nicholas N. Kittrie &
Jackwell Susman eds., 1979).
3. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979, 2009
(1992) (plea bargaining "can be, and should be, abolished").
4. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargain Debate, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 652,
652-56, 668-69 (1981); Lynch, supra note 1 at 2130 ("no one pictures 'plea bargaining'
as a rational way to determine guilt or innocence").
5. Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 Ethics 93, 105
(1976).
6. R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 141 (1986).
7. Simply stated, under retributivism, "punishment is justified because people
deserve it." Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 343, 347
(1981). John Rawls supplies the following concise account:
What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the
grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a
person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing. That
a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and the severity of the
appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act. The state of
affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the
state of affairs where he does not; and it is better irrespective of any of the
consequences of punishing him.
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3, 4-5 (1955). The common
denominator of other retributivist accounts is to locate the justification of punishment
in relation to a past offense or wrongdoing. E.g., George Fletcher, Rethinking
Criminal Law 416-17 (1978) ("Retribution simply means that punishment is justified
by virtue of its relationship to the offense that has been committed."). Another
approach is to explain retributivism by recourse to a "cluster of moral concepts:
rights, desert, merit, moral responsibility, and justice." Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jules L.
Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence 121 (1990).
Retributivism, "in its most complete form," is claimed to embody the following five
principles:
(1) The moral right to punish is based solely on the offense committed.
(2) The moral duty to punish is also grounded exclusively on the offense
committed.
(3) Punishment ought to be proportionate to the offense (the lex talionis).
(4) Punishment is the "annulment" of the offense.
(5) Punishment is a right of the offender.
Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment 12 (1989). For further discussion of
retributivism, see infra Part I.B.2. For a discussion of five central principles of
retributivism antithetical to bargain justice, see infra Part II.B.
8. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 141 (Mary Gregor ed. and trans.,
1991) (1797). Kant's declaration follows his consideration and emphatic rejection of a
bargain justice proposal. Id. For further discussion of Kant's view of bargain justice,
see infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
9. E.g., R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community 121 n.49
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that the price is right, the actual players in the game-prisoners,
prosecutors and courts-cannot seem to get enough of bargain
justice. ° Today, bargain justice, and not trials, disposes of as much as
ninety percent of criminal cases. 1 "We now live in a world of guilty
pleas [and bargain justice], not trials ...., With the ascent of
bargain justice as the predominant mode of criminal justice
surprisingly coinciding with retributivism's rise as the leading theory
of punishment,13 the gap between practice and theory has rarely been
wider.'4
(2001) ("If the criminal justice system aims to do justice, it should not bribe
defendants to plead guilty .. "); Mark Tunick, Punishment: Theory and Practice 141
(1992) ("[F]or the retributivist, punishment must be deserved, and so plea-bargaining
misses the point of why we punish."). For further discussion of retributivists'
condemnation of bargain justice, see infra Parts I.B.2 and II.B.
10. For a possible explanation, see, for example, Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 71 (1977) (plea bargains "benefit all concerned"). For further discussion of the
benefits of bargain justice, see infra Part I.B.1.
11. See G. Nicholas Herman, Plea Bargaining 1 (1997) (approximately ninety
percent of criminal convictions in the United States result from guilty pleas, the
overwhelming number of which are through plea bargains) (citation omitted); Paul H.
Robinson, Criminal Law 591 (1997) ("Almost 95 percent of all criminal cases are
disposed of through a plea of guilty, and a large portion of these pleas are the result of
plea negotiations." (citation omitted)); Mark Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy:
Interpreting the Practice of Legal Punishment 123 (1992) ("In our own criminal
justice system, a vast majority of cases never go to trial. Perhaps as many as 90
percent of all cases are 'plea bargained."' (citation omitted)); Ernest Van den Haag,
Punishing Criminals: Concerning a Very Old and Painful Question 171 (1975) ("More
than 90 percent of all cases are settled by striking a bargain: the defendant is allowed
to plead guilty to a lesser charge than the one originally brought so that in exchange
for his lower punishment the trial can be avoided." (citation omitted)); see also Daniel
C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1181, 1237 (1996)
("[P]lea bargaining is the dominant mode of adjudication.").
12. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World
of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1100 (2001) (arguing for greater scholarly
attention to guilty pleas and plea bargains).
13. E.g., Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24
Melb. U. L. Rev. 124, 124 (2000) ("Retributivism has been the dominant theory of
punishment in the Western world for the past few decades."); David Dolinko, Three
Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1623, 1623 (1992) ("It is widely
acknowledged that retributivism ... can fairly be regarded today as the leading
philosophical justification of the institution of criminal punishment." (citation
omitted)); Developments in the Law-Alternative Punishments: Resistance and
Inroads, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1967, 1970 (1998) ("[A] 'just deserts' philosophy associated
with retributivism has claimed the mantle of penological predominance." (citation
omitted)). See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated
Review, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 943, 978-81 (1999) (chronicling the rise of retributivism); Nigel
Walker, Modern Retributivism, in Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays 73, 83 (Hyman
Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992) (noting the ascent of retributivism). But see Kyron
Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 943, 955
(2000) (contending that consequentialism "is probably dominant over retributivism in
criminal law scholarship").
14. Because retributivism rejects bargain justice, see supra notes 5, 6, text
accompanying note 8, note 9 and infra Part I.B.2, the leading theory of punishment,
see supra note 13, and the predominant mode by which defendants are rendered
subject to punishment, see supra note 11 and accompanying text, are incompatible.
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Though the legitimacy of bargain justice is widely questioned, 5 the
ramifications of bargain justice for the principal theories of
punishment are globally ignored. 6 The age-old debate over the
justification of punishment, 7 stemming largely from the impasse
between consequentialism 8 and retributivism, 9 tends to presume that
For six months in 1998, the gap between theory and practice narrowed appreciably.
In United States v. Singleton, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
prosecutor granting leniency for testimony against a defendant's confederates
constituted a lesser form of bribe in violation of the federal witness gratuity statute,
see 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994), prohibiting exchanging something of value to obtain
testimony. See 144 F.3d 1343, 1357-58 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1297
(10th Cir. 1999). The ruling triggered shock, Justice System Thrown Off Balance by
Ruling, Omaha World Herald, July 17, 1998, at Al (Albert Alschuler, a notable long-
time critic of plea bargaining, exclaimed, "it's a bombshell, it's nuclear, it's really a big
deal"), and pointed criticism. See, e.g., United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521,
521-22 (D. Md. 1998) (referring to Singleton as "amazingly unsound, not to mention
nonsensical" and venturing that the odds of "the Supreme Court reaching the same
conclusion as the Singleton panel are, in this Court's judgment, about the same as
discovering that the entire roster of the Baltimore Orioles consists of cleverly
disguised leprechauns"). Six months later, however, an en banc panel of the Tenth
Circuit overruled the three-judge panel, thereby perpetuating the gap. Singleton, 165
F.3d at 1298 (holding that prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining do not fall within
the ambit of the federal witness gratuity statute).
15. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to
Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 1048 (1983)
("The impediments to implementation of a plea bargaining prohibition are not worth
a fraction of the paralysis that they have prompted."); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50, 65 n.43 (1968) (plea
bargains "permit situations in which it is to the apparent advantage of innocent men
to plead guilty"); Hartman & Koval, supra note 2, at 82 (terming plea bargaining as
"the major abuse in our criminal justice system"); Kipnis, supra note 5, at 106 ("plea
bargaining falls short of the justice we expect of our legal system"); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1037, 1050-86 (1984)
(describing a study supporting the plausibility of eliminating plea bargaining); Jeffrey
Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1471, 1537-
38 (1993) (prosecutors' overwhelming power in plea bargaining should be weakened).
16. The one notable exception is Mark Tunick, who is the only punishment
theorist to even acknowledge that a theory of punishment could be assessed by its
compatibility with, its ability to justify, or its application to, forms of bargain justice.
Tunick, supra note 11, at 117, 143-45, 185-87.
17. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 7, at 4 ("The subject of punishment.., has always
been a troubling moral question." (citation omitted)); A. John Simmons et al.,
Introduction, in Punishment: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader i, vii (A. John
Simmons et al., eds., 1995) ("The problem of justifying legal punishment has
remained at the heart of legal and social philosophy from the very earliest recorded
philosophical texts to the most recent.").
18. Consequentialism assesses the value of an action or course of conduct by its
consequences. Berys Gaut, Consequentialism, in The Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy 176, 176 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999). A consequentialist theory
justifies punishment by the good consequences generated from punishment. R.A.
Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20
Crime & Just. 1, 5-6 (1996) ("The common feature of all 'consequentialist
accounts' ... is that they justify punishment in terms of its contingent or instrumental
contribution to an independently identifiable good."). For further discussion of the
consequentialist justification of punishment, see infra Part I.B.1.
19. The two main justifications of punishment are retributivism and
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punishment is invariably imposed subsequent to a trial and
conviction.2" Retributivists implicitly assume that the incompatibility
of bargain justice and retributivism warrants rejection of the former.21
But "[r]ather than dismiss such a significant part of our actual practice
[bargain justice] because it violates the retributive ideal, we might
wonder whether the retributivist has got that ideal right. '22  With
bargaining so entrenched, 3 it is time to shift the focus from whether
bargain justice is justified by theories of punishment to whether
theories of punishment are justified as applied to bargain justice.24
consequentialism. See, e.g., C.L. Ten, Crime and Punishment, in A Companion to
Ethics 366, 366 (Peter Singer ed., 1991) (retributivism and consequentialism are the
"two main types of theories of punishment"); Primoratz, supra note 7, at 9-13 (same);
Andrew Oldenquist, Retributive Rationale, in The Philosophy of Law 749, 749
(Christopher Berry Gray ed., 1999) (same); A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, in
Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment 6, 6 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972)
(retributivism and consequentialism "exhaust the possibilities" for justifying
punishment).
20. For example, in Michael Moore's impressive 800-plus-page book, Placing
Blame, devoted to establishing retributivism as the animating principle of criminal
law, Moore allows all of three paragraphs to bargain justice, more specifically
immunity deals. See Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law 156-
58 (1997). And even this is more than most punishment theorists have managed to
muster (to Moore's credit, he is one of the few to attempt to reconcile retributivism
with bargain justice). Perhaps the United Kingdom's foremost punishment theorist,
R.A. Duff, dispensed with plea bargains in one page in his justly acclaimed, and aptly
named, book, Trials and Punishments. See Duff, supra note 6, at 141. Other fine
books on the theory of punishment find literally nothing to say of bargain justice. See,
e.g., Primoratz, supra note 7; C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A
Philosophical Introduction (1987). Out of the forty-five excerpts presented in
Gertude Ezorsky's excellent anthology, Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment,
none address the issue of bargain justice. See supra note 19. Arguably the most
important book on the theory of criminal law since its publication in 1978, George
Fletcher's Rethinking Criminal Law, in over 800 pages, fails to even mention bargain
justice. See Fletcher, supra note 7.
21. Typical of this view is George Fletcher's comment that institutions of bargain
justice, "taken for granted in the United States, stand in considerable tension with
basic principles of equal justice [including retributivism]." George P. Fletcher, The
Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 51, 59 (1999). The
implicit conclusion is that, as a result of the tension, bargain justice, and not
retributivism, is illegitimate.
22. Tunick, supra note 11, at 143.
23. Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 551-52 (1997) ("Plea bargaining
has long ago replaced the trial as the main process by which the state imposes
punishment." (citation omitted)); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109
Yale L.J. 857, 860 (2000) ("[P]lea bargaining has so fast a grip on our institutions of
justice that antagonistic institutions cannot survive.").
24. While discussion of bargain justice is virtually nil in the debate over justifying
punishment, see supra note 20 and accompanying text, even general discussions of
bargain justice suffer from a disproportional inattention paid to it by scholars.
Stephanos Bibas speaks of legal academia's "obsession" and preoccupation with trials
at the expense of guilty pleas. Bibas, supra note 12, at 1183 (decrying the reigning
orthodoxy's "anachronistic obsession with jury trials at the expense of pleas"). Bibas
reports that though there are 24 times the number of guilty pleas than jury trials,
there are only 1/10 the number of articles on guilty pleas as on jury trials. Id. at 1149
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This Article assesses retributivism by its application to bargain
justice-specifically a prisoner-initiated bargain for immunity-and
concludes that retributivism is internally inconsistent.
While the difficulties prosecutor-initiated bargaining poses for
prisoners in a consequentialist system of criminal justice are well
known under the rubric of the "prisoner's dilemma, '25 this Article
n.328. As a result, "the literature is off by a factor of 240." Id.
25. The term "prisoner's dilemma" is generally attributed to the Princeton
Mathematics Professor, and RAND Corporation consultant, Albert Tucker, in a
lecture to the Stanford Psychology Department in May of 1950. Tucker had coined
the term "prisoner's dilemma" to describe the dilemma in a game devised by two
other RAND consultants, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher. The game or dilemma
posed a challenge to game theory as developed by John von Neumann, Oskar
Morgenstern and John Nash. For a fascinating account of the origins of the prisoner's
dilemma and game theory, see William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma: John von
Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb 8, 116-19 (1992).
In the canonical presentation of the prisoner's dilemma, a prosecutor
separately makes the following offer to each of two members of a criminal gang who
have been arrested and are in custody for having jointly committed a criminal offense:
whichever one of the prisoners confesses and inculpates the other will receive
immunity. The catch, however, is that if both confess, then not only will neither
receive immunity but both will receive greater punishment than if neither had
confessed. The prosecutor's offer is made under the following circumstances: (i) the
prisoners are separated, (ii) the prisoners cannot communicate with each other, (iii)
neither prisoner is aware of the other's choice and, (iv) each prisoner is deciding a
course of action based only on generating the optimal individual outcome-
minimizing the length of sentence that he will have to serve-but is neither concerned
with generating the optimal aggregate outcome nor in the morality of betraying his
confederate. See Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 33 (1994);
Poundstone, supra, at 118-20; Lawrence C. Becker, Prisoner's Dilemma, in The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 740, 740 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999).
Different punishments are meted out depending on whether only one, both or
neither confesses. If one confesses (i.e., supplies inculpatory information as to their
crime) and the other does not, the confessor will get immunity from prosecution and
the hold-out will get a severe sentence. If both confess, each will get a moderate
sentence. If neither confesses, each will get light sentences. See Baird, supra, at 33;
Poundstone, supra, at 117-18; Becker, supra, at 740. For a ranking of the four
individual and three aggregate outcomes, see infra note 37.
Rationality seems to dictate that each prisoner should confess to minimize the
amount of punishment received. This is because each prisoner should reason that the
other will either confess or not confess. If one confesses, then the other should also
confess (so as to get the moderate rather than the severe sentence). If the other does
not confess, then he should still confess (so as to get immunity rather than a moderate
sentence). Thus, no matter what the other does, each prisoner should rationally
decide to confess. Yet this generates the aggregate worst outcome and the second
worst individual outcome-each gets a moderate sentence. See Poundstone, supra, at
118, 120-22; Becker, supra, at 740.
As a result, the dilemma, in part, is that there is a basis for each prisoner to
accept the offer (because it is purportedly rational to do so) and a basis for each
prisoner to reject the offer (so as to avoid the bad outcome of both confessing). The
purportedly rational choice of each confessing not only leads to the worst aggregate
outcome but also the second worst individual outcome (only not confessing, while the
other confesses, is a worse individual outcome). At this point, each rational prisoner
might begin to question the rationality of the decision to confess. Since each realizes
that both of them confessing is a worse outcome than neither confessing (both
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introduces the difficulties prisoner-initiated bargaining poses for
prosecutors in a retributivist system of justice.26  Applying
retributivism's central principles to a hypothetical immunity offer-
which a prosecutor paradoxically both cannot refuse and must
refuse-generates the Prosecutor's Dilemma. Suppose that a prisoner
offers to betray her confederates in crime (each has jointly committed
the same crime with the same level of responsibility and thus each
deserves the same punishment27 ) by supplying inculpatory information
and testifying against them in exchange for immunity.28 Without the
inculpatory information and testimony, the prisoner's confederates
can neither be prosecuted nor punished. Thus, if the offer is accepted
the confederates can be punished, but the prisoner cannot. If the
offer is not accepted, the prisoner can be punished, but her
confederates cannot.
Retributivism imposes an absolute duty to punish culpable
wrongdoers whenever the opportunity arises.29 Since the prisoner's
offer supplies the opportunity to punish the confederates,
retributivism's duty to punish requires acceptance of the offer and
punishment of the confederates. But by accepting the offer, the
prosecutor foregoes the opportunity to punish the prisoner, which
violates the duty to punish. Thus, the offer must not be accepted. But
nonacceptance also violates retributivism's duty to punish with respect
to the confederates. Paradoxically, then, a retributivist prosecutor
must both accept and not accept the offer. Retributivism's duty to
collectively and individually), each might realize that perhaps he should not confess.
But, of course, each would subsequently reason that if the other does not confess,
then he should confess (in order to get immunity) which only reintroduces the above
cycle of reasoning. Thus, it seems that there is some support for each prisoner to
accept the offer as well as some basis for each prisoner to reject the offer. See
Poundstone, supra, at 122 ("[It is as hard to justify cooperation [neither confessing]
as it is to accept mutual defection [both confessing] as the logical outcome. Therein
lies the paradox."). More conventionally, the dilemma is described as residing in the
fact that what seems to be the rational choice from an individual perspective leads to
the worst aggregate outcome for the prisoners. See Baird, supra, at 312-13.
26. The prisoner's dilemma, as it involves bargaining for the amount of
punishment the prisoner will receive, cannot arise within a retributivist system of
criminal justice which condemns such bargaining. See infra notes 35, 38 and
accompanying text. The prisoner's dilemma does arise in a consequentialist system of
criminal justice which does justify bargaining. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying
text.
27. For how retributivism determines a culpable wrongdoer's desert and degree of
punishment, see infra Part II.B.2 and note 236.
28. For the full presentation of this hypothetical prisoner-initiated immunity
proposal, termed the Prosecutor's Dilemma, see infra Part I.A.
29. E.g., Kant, supra note 8, at 141 ("The Principle of punishment is a categorical
imperative, and woe to him who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in
order to discover something that releases the criminal from punishment .... ");
Moore, supra note 20, at 156 ("[T]he retributivist regards the punishment of the guilty
to be categorically imperative whenever the opportunity to give such punishment
presents itself."). For a more expansive discussion of retributivism's absolute duty to
punish culpable wrongdoers, see infra Part I.B.1.
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punish at once requires, and is violated by, both acceptance and
nonacceptance of the offer. The difficulty for the prosecutor is that
retributivism's duty to punish requires punishment of both the
prisoner and her confederates, but the terms of the Prosecutor's
Dilemma allow punishment of either only the prisoner or only her
confederates.
Consideration of retributivism's equality principle -culpable
wrongdoers with the same desert must be treated equally30-
compounds the dilemma. Since the terms of the Prosecutor's
Dilemma preclude punishment of both the prisoner and her
confederates, then the only way to treat the prisoner and her
confederates equally is to punish neither the prisoner nor her
confederates.31  As applied to the Prosecutor's Dilemma,
retributivism's duty to punish-requiring at the very least that
someone be punished-conflicts with retributivism's duty of equal
treatment which requires that neither the prisoner nor her
confederates be punished. Applying retributivism's principles to the
prisoner's offer obligates a prosecutor to satisfy the following
conjunctively: (i) accept the offer (thus punishing only the
confederates), (ii) not accept the offer (and punish only the prisoner),
and (iii) not accept the offer (and punish neither the prisoner nor her
confederates). But these options can only be satisfied disjunctively.
The dilemma is that retributivism's conflicting principles obligate a
prosecutor to do all three when only one is possible to attain, and that
30. E.g., C.L. Ten, supra note 20, at 51 (discussing retributivism's "requirement
that similar cases should be treated similarly"); Fletcher, supra note 21, at 59 ("In
view of the fact that all theories of justice are primarily concerned with equality, it
makes sense to ground retributive justice as well in a commitment to bring about
equality.., among [equally culpable] offenders." (citation omitted)). For further
discussion of retributivism's duty to treat equally those culpable wrongdoers with
equal desert, see infra Part II.B.5.
31. To satisfy retributivism's equality principle, culpable offenders of equal desert
must be treated equally. Since the prisoner and her confederates committed the same
crime with the same mens rea, the prisoner and her confederates have equal desert.
See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text. As a result, the equality principle
requires that the prisoner and her confederates be treated equally. Generally, this
can be satisfied in two ways: (i) punish both, and punish them equally, or (ii) punish
neither so that each equally receives no punishment. Under the terms of the
Prosecutor's Dilemma, the first possibility is foreclosed-the prisoner and her
confederates cannot both be punished. The only options under the Prosecutor's
Dilemma are (i) accept the offer and punish only the confederates, or (ii) not accept
the offer and punish only the prisoner, or (iii) not accept the offer and punish neither
the prisoner nor her confederates. The first two options violate the equality principle.
Punishing only the confederates treats the prisoner unequally with respect to the
confederates, and punishing only the prisoner treats the confederates unequally with
respect to the prisoner. The only option which is both available under the terms of
the Prosecutor's Dilemma and which satisfies retributivism's equality principle is to
not accept the offer and punish neither the prisoner nor her confederates.
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any one option a prosecutor adopts will violate retributivism's central
principles.32
Given retributivists' condemnation of bargain justice, it might seem
that a retributivist prosecutor can avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma by
simply refusing to participate in such bargaining. But while a
retributivist prosecutor can (and must) refrain from initiating
bargaining,33 the tendering of prisoner-initiated bargain justice offers
cannot be prevented. Once the offer is made, it must be accepted or
not. And nonacceptance of the offer violates retributivism's central
principles no less than does acceptance of the offer.34
In comparison, the Prosecutor's Dilemma does, but the prisoner's
dilemma35 does not, undermine the system of punishment under which
it arises. The prisoner's dilemma arises only under a consequentialist
system because consequentialism, and not retributivism, justifies
bargain justice.36 Not only does the prisoner's dilemma not discredit
consequentialism, it may serve to enhance the efficacy of a
consequentialist system.37  The Prosecutor's Dilemma, however,
32. For a discussion of other central principles of retributivism which are violated
regardless of which option a prosecutor selects, see infra Part II.B.
33. Since retributivism condemns bargain justice, see infra Parts I.B.2 and IIB, a
retributivist prosecutor must forego initiating bargain justice offers.
34. For example, the option of not accepting the offer (and punishing only the
prisoner) violates retributivism's duty to punish the confederates as well as the duty to
treat equally the prisoner and the confederates.
35. For further discussion of the prisoner's dilemma, see Baird, supra note 25, at
33, 48, 312-13; Neil Duxbury, Random Justice: On Lotteries and Legal Decision-
Making 112-14 (1999); Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Market Economy 12-13 (2000);
Becker, supra note 25, at 740; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. 509, 514-22 (1994); Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the
Evolution of Cooperation, 93 Yale L.J. 1147, 1150-58, 1167-68 (1984); John Shepard
Wiley, Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 86
Mich. L. Rev. 1906, 1914-20 (1988); J. Bradford DeLong, Prisoner's Dilemma, at
http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/economists/prisoners-dilemma.html (last visited
March 7, 2003).
36. See Tunick, supra note 9, at 140 ("That plea-bargaining allows tremendous
savings in resources is a strong 'utilitarian' argument in its favor. By one estimate, if
we took all cases to trial we would have to quadruple the number of court personnel.
But there are compelling retributivist objections to plea-bargaining."); Ralph D. Ellis,
Fairness and the Etiology of Criminal Behavior, 13 Phil. and Soc. Criticism 175, 181
(1987) ("[P]lea bargaining is theoretically more compatible with deterrence than with
retribution.").
37. The prisoner's dilemma, whether understood explicitly or only implicitly by
actual prisoners, may lead to more favorable plea negotiations for the prosecutor.
The more favorable the plea negotiations for the prosecutor, the more favorable the
plea bargain, which may lead to a greater number of criminals being punished for a
greater number of offenses, thereby enhancing some of the deterrent and
incapacitative goals of punishment under consequentialism. To the extent that
prisoners and prosecutors (i.e., society) are in a zero sum game in which the worse the
aggregate outcome for the prisoners the better the consequential benefits of crime
prevention for society, the prisoner's dilemma promotes consequentialist goals by
inducing prisoners to opt for their worst aggregate outcome. See supra note 25. The
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arising only under a retributivist system,38 renders retributivism
internally inconsistent.
Bargain justice weakens retributivism as a theory of punishment in
both its descriptive and prescriptive capacities. By being incompatible
with plea bargaining, retributivism risks irrelevance as a theory that
can describe and explain the mode through which actual legal
institutions mete out the vast majority of punishments.39  And
prisoner-initiated immunity bargaining, in the form of the
Prosecutor's Dilemma, reveals the just conditions of punishment
prescribed by retributivism to be internally inconsistent.
As a result, the Prosecutor's Dilemma supplies an indirect defense
prisoners' worst aggregate outcome is thus the best collective outcome for society.
The four outcomes for an individual prisoner, ranked from best to worst (from the
perspective of the prisoner) are as follows:
1. You (as a prisoner) confess, and the other prisoner does not: you get immunity (0
years imprisonment).
2. Neither you nor the other prisoner confesses: you get a light sentence (e.g., 1
year).
3. Both you and the other prisoner confess: you get a moderate sentence (e.g., 2
years).
4. You do not confess, but the other prisoner does confess: you get a heavy sentence
(e.g., 3 years).
The three outcomes for the aggregate of prisoners, ranked from best to worst, are as
follows:
1. Neither confesses: each gets a light sentence (1+1=2 years).
2. One confesses and the other does not: the confessor gets immunity and the hold-
out gets a heavy sentence (0+3=3 years).
3. Both confess: each gets a moderate sentence (2+2=4 years).
Poundstone, supra note 25, at 118-21; Becker, supra note 25, at 740. Since the
prisoner's dilemma induces each prisoner to confess, which is the worst aggregate
outcome for the prisoners, it leads to the best outcome for society. This argument is,
of course, premised on the assumption that bargain justice does, in fact, advance
consequentialist goals. For a discussion of the consequentialist justification of bargain
justice, see infra Part I.B.1.
With respect to the ranking of the aggregate outcomes, the second outcome is
better than the third and worse than the first only based on arbitrarily assigned terms
of imprisonment assigned to each category of sentence. Altering the arbitrarily
assigned numbers could variously yield one getting immunity and one getting a heavy
sentence as either the best aggregate outcome or the worst. The only necessary,
nonarbitrary ranking of the aggregate outcomes is that neither confessing and each
getting a light sentence is preferable, in the aggregate, to both confessing and each
getting a moderate sentence.
38. The Prosecutor's Dilemma arises only under retributivism because
retributivism imposes an absolute duty to punish culpable wrongdoers and requires
the equal treatment of equally culpable offenders. Lacking these principles,
consequentialism supplies a clear answer to the offer: accept. See infra text
accompanying notes 178-79. In contrast, the prisoner's dilemma arises under
consequentialism because of its support and justification for bargain justice, see infra
Part I.B.1, but would not arise under retributivism because of its condemnation of
bargain justice.
39. For a discussion of retributivism's rejection of bargain justice, see infra Parts
I.B.2 and II.B. For a discussion of the prevalence of punishments imposed
subsequent to some form of bargain justice, as opposed to a trial, see supra note 11
and accompanying text.
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of bargain justice. Ironically, that which retributivism rejects as
illegitimate-bargain justice-is that which reveals retributivism as
unsound. Retributivism's incompatibility with bargain justice is no
longer an indictment of bargain justice, but rather is an indictment of
retributivism.
After Part I sketches a brief overview of bargain justice and
theories of punishment, Part II applies consequentialism and
retributivism to a hypothetical prisoner-initiated offer of immunity-
the Prosecutor's Dilemma. While consequentialism supplies a clear
basis to accept the offer, retributivism's response is indeterminate.
An analysis of four central principles of retributivism reveals that each
principle paradoxically requires, and is violated by, both acceptance
and nonacceptance of the offer. An additional retributivist
principle-the equality principle-conflicts with the other four
retributivist principles by requiring nonacceptance of the offer (and
punishing neither the prisoner nor her confederates).
Part III analyzes retributivism's indeterminate response to the offer.
The indeterminacy stems not only from inconsistency within, but also
among, retributivism's principles. In turn, retributivism's internal
inconsistency generates a moral dilemma in which any option a
prosecutor selects will violate retributivism's central principles. After
situating the Prosecutor's Dilemma within the typology of moral
dilemmas and assessing its comparative gravity, this part examines
two attempts to avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma.
Part IV considers two alternative versions of retributivism which
attempt to forge a reconciliation with bargain justice. While their
embrace of consequences is conceptually questionable, these radical
forms of retributivism to a varying degree do make retributivism more
compatible with bargain justice. But they neither restore
retributivism to consistency nor satisfactorily avoid the Prosecutor's
Dilemma.
Part V canvasses possible means of restoring retributivism to
consistency and resolving the Prosecutor's Dilemma. In accordance
with the method of dilemma resolution preferred by retributivists
themselves, the theoretically sound resolution is not accepting the
offer and punishing neither the prisoner nor her confederates. In a
practical sense, however, this is disastrous in that it allows prisoners
to, in effect, self-immunize by the mere tender of a dilemmatic bargain
justice offer. While the resolution is a practical disaster, without a
resolution of the Prosecutor's Dilemma retributivism remains
internally inconsistent. Either way-with or without the resolution-
the incompatibility of retributivism and bargain justice now renders
illegitimate not bargain justice, but rather retributivism.
2003]
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I. BARGAIN JUSTICE AND THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
This part supplies a brief overview of the two principal forms of
bargain justice: plea bargains and immunity deals. After explicating
the consequentialist4 ° and retributivist4' accounts of punishment, this
part presents their justification and critique, respectively, of bargain
justice.
A. Bargain Justice
Rather than determining what the defendant justly deserves by a
trial, the prosecutor and defendant may bargain, either formally or
informally, as to the terms of what each shall receive from the other.42
While "offers of... immunity are ... a form of plea bargaining, ''43
they are also distinguishable. If the plea bargain' represents
"condemnation without adjudication, ' 45 the immunity deal constitutes
freedom from both condemnation and adjudication.46
40. Since the focus of this Article will be the difficulties sustained by retributivism
as applied to bargain justice, the account of consequentialism will be comparatively
less extensive.
41. For an examination of the principles of retributivism in greater depth, see
infra Part II.B.
42. This conception of bargain justice excludes pardons because they typically do
not entail a quid pro quo exchange of things of value between the offender and the
state. For an illuminating discussion of pardons in connection with the purposes of
punishment, with particular emphasis on retributivism, see Kathleen Dean Moore,
Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest (1989). For a defense of
retributivism's compatibility with various forms of mercy, see Dan Markel, Against
Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004). For a discussion of the role of
presidential pardons in the development of statutory immunity, see infra note 70 and
accompanying text.
43. Standen, supra note 15, at 1474 n.5.
44. Albert Alschuler notes that informal accounts of plea bargaining and the
preferable conception diverge:
The term plea bargaining is sometimes used informally to refer to every
form of discussion between the prosecution and the defense in a criminal
case that might lead to disposition of the case without trial or to any sort of
concession on the part of the defendant.... [B]ut plea bargaining probably
can best be defined as the exchange of any actual or apparent concession for
a plea of guilty.
Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 829, 829
(Sanford Kadish ed., 1983). For more expansive definitions of plea bargaining, see
Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core
Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 Emory L.J. 753, 755-57 (1998); Schulhofer,
supra note 15, at 1037; Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1909 (1992); Standen, supra note 15, at 1474 n.5.
45. John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It,
78 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 204 (1979).
46. For a discussion of the varying degrees of protection from prosecution that a
purported offender receives in an immunity deal, see infra notes 78-88 and
accompanying text.
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1. Plea Bargain
In perhaps the first reported domestic case addressing plea
bargaining,47 the court in Commonwealth v. Battis, in 1804, reluctantly
allowed a guilty plea to a capital crime, but not until the court satisfied
itself that "there had not been tampering with him, either by
promises ... [or] persuasions ... if he would plead guilty."48 Since at
least 1970,49 however, with the Supreme Court's first endorsement of
plea bargaining,5" prosecutors and defendants openly exchange both
promises and persuasions. To obtain an accused's guilty plea, a
prosecutor offers two principal forms of consideration: sentence
bargaining and charge bargaining.51  In sentence bargaining, a
47. Though plea bargaining may have its roots in long-entrenched practices of
rewarding cooperation by defendants dating back as far as 1587 in England, Fisher,
supra note 23, at 860 n.1, plea bargaining was mostly discouraged in the United States
prior to the Civil War. Alschuler, supra note 1, at 16-18.
48. Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 94, 95 (1804). In addition, the court
inquired as to the sanity of the prisoner. Id.
49. After the Civil War, the incidence of plea bargaining began to increase,
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 19-26, until the 1920s when it became relatively
commonplace. Id. at 26-33. But sustained support for plea bargaining did not
commence until the late 1960s and early 1970s. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining
and Its History, 13 Law & Soc'y Rev. 211, 236-38 (1979) (noting that in 1967, both the
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice as
well as the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice gave their blessings to plea bargaining). In 1973, however, "[p]ublic
disenchantment with the practice of plea bargaining probably reached its peak."
Samuel Walker, Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice
1950-1990, at 93 (1993). Former Vice President Spiro Agnew entered a nolo
contendere plea to a lesser charge of federal tax evasion in exchange for federal
prosecutors' promise not to prosecute him on the more serious charges of bribery and
extortion. Bart Barnes, Nixon Vice President Spiro T. Agnew Dies, Wash. Post, Sept.
19, 1996, at B7; Tom Stuckey, 20 Years Later, A Life of Obscurity for Spiro Agnew,
Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1993, at Md.7. And the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended the abolishment of plea
bargaining, in all its forms, no later than 1978. See Jeff Palmer, Note, Abolishing Plea
Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 505, 511
(1999).
50. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (upholding the
constitutionality of a guilty plea under a statute permitting the death penalty only
after a jury trial, in part, because plea bargains benefit both the prosecution and the
defendant). Later that same year, in North Carolina v. Alford, the Court upheld a
guilty plea, as part of a plea bargain, entered to avoid the possible imposition of the
death penalty-notwithstanding the defendant's claim of innocence. 400 U.S. 25, 27-
29, 39 (1970).
51. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 829 (reducing the number or severity of the
charges and reducing the sentence). A plea bargain might consist of both charge and
sentencing bargaining. See, e.g., Eleanor Randolph, A Contrite Wachtler Apologizes:
Former N.Y. Judge Faces Prison Term, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 1993, at A3. New York
State's then-highest ranking judge, Sol Wachtler, agreed to a plea bargain in which, in
exchange for his pleading guilty to a single lesser charge of making threats against his
ex-lover and her daughter, prosecutors agreed to drop a five-count extortion
indictment. Id. In addition, the prosecutor agreed to sentencing concessions.
Although Wachtler faced a maximum of five years and a $250,000 fine, the prosecutor
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prosecutor promises to recommend a lenient sentence or not oppose
the defendant's sentencing recommendation.52 In charge bargaining, a
prosecutor promises to reduce the severity of the crime charged,53
reduce the number of crimes or counts charged,54 or both. Other
forms of consideration include promising to "provide leniency to a
defendant's accomplices,"56 not prosecute a defendant's friend or
relative,57  recommend (or not oppose) early release from
imprisonment through probation58 or parole,59 recommend (or not
oppose) the conditions of the offender's punishment,6" or to
recommended twelve to eighteen months. Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd
en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (to secure an accomplice's testimony against a
co-accomplice, the prosecutor promised to inform the sentencing court of the nature
and extent of the cooperating accomplice's valuable assistance which presumably
might influence the court to lessen his sentence); United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d
192, 194 (1st Cir. 1985) (in exchange for an offender's guilty plea and testimony
against a co-conspirator, the prosecutor agreed to recommend a lenient sentence of
twenty years; and if the offender's testimony was particularly valuable, the prosecutor
agreed to recommend a sentence of only ten years).
53. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) (allowing a
cooperating witness to plead guilty to a lesser charge); United States v. Fallon, 776
F.2d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 1985) (as part of the plea bargain, the prosecutor agreed, in
part, to reduced charges).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Waterman, 704 F.2d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 1983) (to
obtain the offender's guilty plea to three charges in connection with an arson for
profit scheme, the government agreed to drop fifteen out of the eighteen charges for
which the offender was indicted).
55. Michael Milken, the junk bond titan of the 1980s, agreed to a plea bargain
with federal prosecutors and the Securities and Exchange Commission in which, in
partial exchange for his guilty plea to six felonies (including tax, securities and mail
fraud), prosecutors agreed, in part, to drop a 98-count indictment which included the
comparatively more serious charges of racketeering. See Laurie P. Cohen, Plea
Bargains Must Balance Rewards v. Risks in Settlements Such as Milken's, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 24, 1990, at B1; Laurie P. Cohen, Public Confession: Milken Pleads Guilty to Six
Felony Counts and Issues an Apology, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1990, at Al [hereinafter
Cohen, Public Confession].
For an interesting debate on the merits of charge bargaining, see Ronald Wright &
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (2002); Gerard
E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55
Stan. L. Rev. 1399 (2003) (replying to Wright & Miller, supra); Ronald Wright &
Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1409 (2003)
(replying to Lynch, supra).
56. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 829.
57. See, e.g., Cohen, Public Confession, supra note 55, at A6 (as part of Michael
Milken's plea bargain, prosecutors agreed not to seek criminal charges against his
brother, Lowell Milken, who was a co-defendant in the indictment).
58. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 49, at B7 (in exchange for a guilty plea, the
prosecutor agreed to a sentence of three years unsupervised probation for former
Vice President Spiro Agnew).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd
en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (to secure an accomplice's testimony against a
co-accomplice, the prosecutor promised to inform the parole board of the nature of
the cooperating accomplice's valuable assistance which presumably might lead to an
earlier grant of parole).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Fallon, 776 F.2d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 1995) (in exchange
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recommend that credit be given for time served while awaiting trial.6'
In addition to pleading guilty, an offender may offer further
consideration including testifying against accomplices,62 cooperating
with other ongoing or future government investigations, 63 arranging
for the offender's father to testify against an accomplice,64 making
restitution to victims, 65 or relinquishing a professional license that
facilitated the crime.66
2. Immunity Deal
The early American roots of inducing reluctant witnesses to
testify,67 despite their assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination,68 lie not in statutory grants of immunity,69
but in presidential pardons.7 ° Today, a federal prosecutor's authority
for pleading guilty and supplying testimony against a co-defendant, the prosecutor
agreed to recommend that incarceration should not be part of the offender's
punishment). In addition, a prosecutor might promise to "arrange for a defendant to
be sent to a particular correctional institution." Alschuler, supra note 44, at 829.
61. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 829. Still other forms of consideration might
include the promise to:
withhold damaging information from the court, influence the date of a
defendant's sentencing, . . . attempt to have charges in other jurisdictions
dismissed, arrange for sentencing in a particular court or by a particular
judge, provide immunity for crimes not yet charged, or simply remain silent
when his recommendation otherwise might be unfavorable.
Id. at 829-30.
62. See supra note 53.
63. See, e.g., Cohen, Public Confession, supra note 55, at Al (as part of Michael
Milken's plea bargain, Milken agreed to be available to federal investigators and to
"fully and truthfully disclose all information with respect to Drexel-related activities
[i.e., activities related to his investment firm]").
64. In return for convicted spy John Walker's testimony against his accomplice,
Jerry Whitworth, the potential sentence of life imprisonment for Walker's son was
reduced to 25 years. See Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using
Criminals as Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1426 (1996) (citing Ruth Marcus,
"Israeli Defense" Rejected by Whitworth Spy Jury, Wash. Post, July 26, 1986, at A6.).
65. As part of Michael Milken's plea bargain, Milken agreed to pay $400 million
into a victims restitution fund administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Cohen, Public Confession, supra note 55, at Al.
66. See, e.g., id. (as part of Michael Milken's settlement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Milken, and his brother Lowell Milken, are barred from
working in the securities business for life).
67. For a discussion of immunity deals in Italy dating as far back as 1630, see
supra note 1.
68. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, as follows: "No person shall
be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...." U.S.
Const. amend. V.
69. The first congressional immunity statute was enacted in 1857. See Act of Jan.
24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155 (1859).
70. The Constitution explicitly grants the President the power to grant pardons:
"The President shall.., have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
For speculation that part of the basis for granting the President the power to pardon
was to compel witnesses to testify despite their invocation of the Fifth Amendment
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to grant statutory immunity to a witness currently stems from the 1970
federal witness immunity statutes. 71 If, in a prosecutor's "judgment,' 72
a witness's testimony "may be necessary to the public interest '73 and
the witness has refused, or is likely to refuse, to provide such
information based on her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination,74 the court shall, upon the prosecutor's request,75 grant
immunity from prosecution to the witness and order 76 the witness to
testify.7 7 Broader than use immunity but narrower than transactional
immunity, 8 the statute confers "use and derivative use immunity. 79
right against self-incrimination, see Leonard N. Sosnov, Separation of Powers Shell
Game: The Federal Witness Immunity Act, 73 Temp. L. Rev. 171, 176 n.21 (2000).
Presidents have sought to compel the testimony of witnesses with particularly
valuable information. E.g., United States v. Burr (In re Willie), 25 F. Cas. 38, 40
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e) (compelling witness, after receiving President
Thomas Jefferson's pardon, to testify against Aaron Burr despite witness's invocation
of Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). As a tool to compel testimony,
however, the pardon's effectiveness diminished when the Supreme Court, in Burdick
v. United States, ruled that President Woodrow Wilson's pardon offer could be
refused by the recipient because its acceptance "carries an imputation of guilt." 236
U.S. 79, 94 (1915). In contrast, the other source of compelling testimony, the
congressional statute of 1857 authorizing immunity, see supra note 69, entailed no
such imputation. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 94-95.
71. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (2000).
72. Id. § 6003(b).
73. Id. § 6003(b)(1).
74. Id. § 6003(b)(2).
75. Although the prosecutor must request the court to formally grant statutory
immunity and order the witness to testify, the court's role is largely that of a rubber
stamp. It is the prosecutor, not the court, who controls whether immunity is granted.
See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616-17 (1984) ("Congress expressly left [the
decision to immunize a witness] exclusively to the Justice Department."); Pillsbury
Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1983) (acknowledging that the authority to grant
immunity lies not with the courts, but with the Department of Justice); United States
v. Stewart, 122 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) ("The district court did not have the
authority to grant ... immunity because this court has consistently refused to
recognize the concept of judicial immunity."); United States v. Lugg, 892 F.2d 101,
104 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The cases are legion and uniform that only the Executive can
grant statutory immunity, not a court.").
76. Even without explicit bargaining, imposed immunity may still constitute an
instance of bargain justice. The offender is receiving less punishment (than she might
have received if tried and convicted) because she is supplying something valuable
(more valuable than her conviction and punishment), that is, her inculpatory
testimony, to the prosecutor. That a bargain is forced does not preclude it from
being, in some sense, a bargain.
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03.
78. The 1857 federal immunity statute, see supra note 69, authorized
"transactional immunity" until an amendment in 1862 implemented a narrower form
of immunity, "use immunity." See, e.g., Howard R. Sklamberg, Investigation Versus
Prosecution: The Constitutional Limits on Congress's Power to Immunize Witnesses,
78 N.C. L. Rev. 153, 158-59 (1999). In 1892, however, the Court found the narrower
use immunity unconstitutional by not affording adequate protection of a witness's
right against self-incrimination. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86
(1892) (rejecting use immunity and requiring transactional immunity). While in
transactional immunity a witness is immunized from criminal prosecution for all the
transactions or conduct discussed in the testimony, in use immunity the witness only
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That is, neither information provided nor derived therefrom may be
used against the witness in a criminal prosecution.8" The Court, in
Kastigar v. United States, upheld the constitutionality of use and
derived use immunity81 by reasoning that it leaves the witness in
essentially the same position as if he had relied on the privilege
against self-incrimination and not testified.82
In addition to statutory immunity, a defendant may secure a
prosecutor's promise not to prosecute.83 While less beneficial to
offenders,84 such informal immunity agreements,85 or "cooperation
has immunity from her testimony being used against her but may be prosecuted for
the conduct referred to in the testimony based on independent evidence. Id. For
example, Monica Lewinsky received transactional immunity from Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr in return for agreeing to supply information regarding her
relationship with President Clinton. Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, Lewinsky Gets
Immunity for Her Testimony; Sources Say Ex-Intern to Tell of Clinton Bid to Hide
Affair, Wash. Post, July 29, 1998, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Immunity Coverage is
Extensive, Lying to Grand Jury Is Only Exception, Wash. Post, July 29, 1998, at A8.
In contrast, Linda Tripp received a type of use immunity, use and derived use
immunity, see infra notes 79-82, 84 and accompanying text, from Starr in return for
furnishing the tape-recorded conversations she had with Monica Lewinsky, but Tripp
was nonetheless prosecuted in the state of Maryland. See Raja Mishra & Katherine
Shaver, Immunity for Tripp Wiretap Attacked: Judge to Issue Key Ruling Today on
Use of Tapes, Wash. Post, Dec. 14,1999, at B1.
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002(3).
80. Id. The provision does, however, carve out a number of exceptions. The
testimony or information supplied by the witness may be used against the witness in a
criminal prosecution "for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order" compelling testimony. Id.
81. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (holding that use and
derived use immunity adequately protected a witness's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination because it is broader than mere use immunity).
82. Id. at 458-59. Use and derived use immunity, as interpreted by Kastigar, may
be broad enough, as a practical matter, to sufficiently protect a witness's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination:
As a practical matter, application of the Kastigar rule may make any
subsequent prosecution impossible. For example, Oliver North's conviction
was overturned, and the government declined to retry him because of the
exceedingly exacting test that would have been required to establish an
independent source apart from his immunized congressional testimony.
Adam Harris Kurland, Lurking Pitfalls of Successive Prosecutions: Immunity, Plea
Agreements, Promises Not to Prosecute, and Cooperation Agreements, 14 Crim. Just.
4, 7 (2000) (citing United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
83. E.g., United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1357-58 (10th. Cir. 1998), rev'd
en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (to secure an accomplice's testimony against a
co-accomplice for cocaine distribution and money laundering, the government
promised not to prosecute the cooperating accomplice for any other violations of the
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act arising from his activities currently under
investigation).
84. Such informal agreements, whether of plea or immunity, may provide no
protection from a different sovereign. This concern may have led Terry Nichols to
refuse to cooperate in the Oklahoma City bombing case:
[A] jury convicted Terry Nichols on several charges. U.S. District Judge
Richard Matsch told Nichols he would sentence him to life in prison-the
maximum possible sentence-unless Nichols provided information and
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agreements, 86 allow a prosecutor to "maintain [more] control... [of
the witness than a statutory, or] 'cold' grant of immunity."87  Not
surprisingly, "we have seen a gradual, but substantial, shift in
prosecutorial tactics away from compulsion of testimony [via statutory
helped resolve several lingering questions about the bombing. Nichols
rejected the offer to exchange leniency for information, largely from concern
that any statements made pursuant to that agreement could be used against
him in the Oklahoma state murder trial, where state authorities sought the
death penalty.
Kurland, supra note 82, at 9-10. Testimony subsequent to a promise not to prosecute
from a federal prosecutor may not shield the witness from the testimony being used in
a prosecution in a state jurisdiction and vice-versa. See, e.g., Taylor v. Singletary, 148
F.3d 1276, 1283 n.7 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that testimony pursuant to federal
prosecutor's informal immunity agreement does not constitute compelled testimony,
and thus witness cannot claim that a state used the testimony as the basis of state
prosecution against the witness); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 611 (5th
Cir. 1989) (state prosecutor's informal immunity agreement promising not to
prosecute cannot bind federal prosecutor without consent); State v. Barone, 689 A.2d
132, 139 (N.J. 1997) (federal prosecutor's informal immunity agreement "cannot bind
state prosecutors and vice-versa").
Only formal statutory immunity may prevent a successive prosecution by a
different sovereign utilizing the testimony against the witness. Kurland, supra note 82,
at 7. For example, Linda Tripp entered into an informal immunity agreement with
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, in return for Tripp turning over her tape-
recorded conversations with Monica Lewinsky. Five weeks later, Tripp received
statutory immunity. Despite this federal immunity, Tripp was prosecuted in the state
of Maryland on two charges: (i) recording a conversation with Lewinsky without her
knowledge, and (ii) disclosing its contents to a magazine. A crucial issue in the
Maryland prosecution was whether the tapes could be used as evidence against Tripp.
The state judge ruled that the tapes were not protected by Tripp's federal immunity
because they were turned over to Starr subsequent to her informal immunity
agreement, but prior to her statutory immunity. See Raja Mishra & Katherine Shaver,
Md. Judge Denies Immunity to Tripp; Ruling Deals Blow to Wiretap Defense, Wash.
Post, Dec. 15, 1999, at Al; Mishra and Shaver, supra note 78, at B1. Ultimately, the
charges were dismissed because key testimony by Monica Lewinsky was suppressed
on the basis that it relied on the use of information protected by Tripp's statutory
immunity. See Mary Otto, Md. Judge Dismisses Tripp Wiretap Case, Wash. Post, June
1, 2000, at A10; Michael E. Ruane & Mary Otto, Md. Case Against Tripp Weakened;
Lewinsky Not Allowed to Authenticate Tape, Wash. Post, May 23, 2000, at B1.
85. Such informal immunity agreements are treated as contracts between the
prosecutor and the witness. E.g., United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1562 (11th
Cir. 1994) (informal immunity agreements are governed by "basic principles of
contract law"); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 803-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(informal immunity agreements constitute contracts which are subject to contractual
remedies).
86. John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 Colum. L. Rev.
1797, 1811 (2001).
87. Id. Douglass explains the advantages of an informal cooperation agreement
over a formal, statutory grant of immunity: "The prosecutor purchases not only the
testimony, but also the opportunity to prepare the accomplice to testify. And an
accomplice who undergoes hours of pretrial preparation is more predictable, and
hence more valuable, than one who is forced to testify under a simple [i.e., formal]
grant of immunity." Id. at 1826-27 (citation omitted). Another advantage is that the
immunity may be conditioned on the witness fulfilling his duty to cooperate fully or
"testif[y] truthfully." Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
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immunity] and toward purchase of testimony [via informal, bargained
agreements]."88
B. Assessing Bargain Justice via the Theories of Punishment
Punishment89  requires justification 9  because it involves the
deliberate infliction of pain, suffering, and deprivation which is prima
facie wrong.9 Although most agree that punishment is justifiable,92
the form and content of that justification is contentious. 93
88. Douglass, supra note 86, at 1811 n.48. Douglass notes that requests from
federal prosecutors for statutory immunity increased every year from 1973 to 1986,
when they peaked at 2,550. Thereafter, statutory immunity requests declined every
year until 1996, when there were only 1,493 requests. Id. (citing Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 418, tbl.5.1
(1996)).
89. H.L.A. Hart supplies perhaps the most influential conceptual definition of
punishment:
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered
unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the
offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a
legal system against which the offence is committed.
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 4-5
(1988). For other notable examples of definitions of punishment, see Antony Flew,
The Justification of Punishment, in The Philosophy of Punishment: A Collection of
Papers 83, 85-87 (H.B. Acton ed., 1973); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in
Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 1336, 1341 (Sanford Kadish ed., 1983).
90. E.g., Duff, supra note 6, at 1 ("It is agreed that a system of criminal
punishment stands in need of some strenuous and persuasive justification .. ");
Gertrude Ezorsky, The Ethics of Punishment, in Philosophical Perspectives on
Punishment xi, xi (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) (noting that "the need to justify
punishment is obvious"); Richard Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty?, 20 Princeton
U. Mag. 14 (1964), reprinted in Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment 328, 337
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) ("Punishment is an evil, an unpleasantness; it requires
that someone suffer. Its infliction demands justification.").
91. See, e.g., Primoratz, supra note 7, at 7 ("To punish means to inflict an evil. But
to inflict evil on someone is something that, at least prima facie ought not to be
done."); C.L. Ten, supra note 20, at 3 ("We are not normally justified in depriving
people of the things which they value, such as their liberty or their property."); Jeffrie
G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 217 (1973), reprinted in
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy 93, 96-102 (1979) (punishment is
a form of coercion by the state, which is prima facie, wrong).
92. E.g., Rawls, supra note 7, at 4 ("The trouble about it [punishment] has not
been that people disagree as to whether or not punishment is justifiable. Most people
have held that, freed from certain abuses, it is an acceptable institution. Only a few
have rejected punishment entirely .... ); Simmons et al., supra note 17, at vii
("[Miost of us are confident that something like our current practice of punishment
can be justified."). For arguments that punishment should be abolished, see Duff,
supra note 9, at 30-34 (distinguishing between contingent abolitionism which requires
the abolition of punishment until certain changes in society are made and absolute
abolitionism which insists that punishment be eliminated under all circumstances).
93. E.g., Ezorsky, supra note 90, at xi ("[I]f the need to justify punishment is
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Consequentialism justifies punishment, not because the offender
deserves it, but because of the good consequences generated by
punishment.94 In contrast, retributivism justifies punishment not by
recourse to the good consequences promoted, but solely because the
offender deserves it.95
1. Consequentialist Justification
The leading influence on, and most well-known version of,96 the
consequentialist justification of punishment is Jeremy Bentham's
utilitarianism.97 Punishment is an evil98 which may be justified only if
the good consequences generated by punishment outweigh the evil. 99
That is, punishment is justified if it generates more utility, happiness,
pleasure, benefit, or good consequences than disutility, suffering, pain,
expense, or bad consequences. 100  Although the utility or good
obvious, the manner of doing so is not."); Rawls, supra note 7, at 4 ("The difficulty is
with the justification of punishment: various arguments for it have been given by
moral philosophers, but so far none of them has won any sort of general acceptance;
no justification is without those who detest it."); Simmons et al., supra note 17, at vii
("[P]hilosophers (and other theorists) have yet to approach any general agreement
about how legal punishment is to be justified.").
94. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
96. Primoratz, supra note 7, at 13 ("[T]he most comprehensive and thoroughly
developed formulation of the theory in philosophical literature is still to be found in
the writings of Bentham.").
97. For general discussions of Bentham's account of punishment, see A.C. Ewing,
The Morality of Punishment 53-54, 59 (1929); Hart, supra note 89, at 18-20, 40-41; Ted
Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications 51-52, 59 (1969); Matt
Matravers, Justice and Punishment: The Rationale of Coercion 13-16 (2000);
Primoratz, supra note 7, at 15-31; C.L. Ten, supra note 20, at 87-89, 143-46.
98. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
170 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1781) ("[AIll punishment is mischief: all punishment
in itself is evil.").
99. Id. (punishment "ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude
some greater evil").
Punishment of an offender is impermissible if the cost of punishment
outweighs its good consequences. According to Bentham, punishment should not be
inflicted at all under either of the following four conditions, where punishment would
be: (i) "groundless" because there is no crime or harm, (ii) "inefficacious" because the
crime cannot be deterred, (iii) "unprofitable," or too "expensive" because the evil of
the punishment would exceed the crime, and (iv) "needless" because the crime may
be deterred by other means than punishment or does not require deterrence. Id. at
171-77, 314-23.
100. For Bentham, conduct is to be judged according to the principle of utility, id.
at 2 ("By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves
of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party." (citation omitted)), the
maximization of pleasure or happiness and the minimization of pain, id. at 1 ("Nature
has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to
determine what we shall do."), "the greatest happiness principle," id. at 5 n.1, "the
greatest happiness of the greatest number," id., and whether a particular course of
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consequences promoted by punishment generally entails crime
prevention, 10' punishment more specifically may promote the good
consequences of rehabilitating the offender so that she will not
commit future crimes, 1°2 incapacitating the offender so that she cannot
commit crimes during the term of imprisonment, 03 deterring the
offender from committing future crimes (i.e., specific deterrence) and,
deterring others in society from committing future crimes (i.e., general
deterrence).'" The most important of these consequences of
punishment that prevents crime is the general deterrent effect.105
Perhaps the first punishment theorist to weigh the benefits of the
state entering into bargains with defendants 6 was Cesare Beccaria,0 7
a precursor to Bentham's utilitarianism. 8 Writing in 1764, Beccaria
found both "advantages" and "disadvantages" to immunity deals.10 9
The cited disadvantages sound quaint to the modern sensibility:
immunizing a defendant for inculpating a confederate promotes
conduct attains more happiness than pain, id. at 3 (an action or governmental action is
"conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when... the tendency which it
has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to
diminish it").
101. For Bentham, "[t]he immediate principal end of punishment is to control
action." Id. at 170 n.1. "General [crime] prevention ought to be the chief end of
punishment as it is its real justification." Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in
1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 396 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
102. Influence of an offender, by punishment, is exerted on his "will, in which case
it is said to operate in the way of reformation." Bentham, supra note 98, at 170-71 n.1.
103. Influence of an offender, by punishment, is exerted on his "physical power, in
which case it is said to operate by disablement." Id.
104. Regarding others in the community, punishment influences "their wills; in
which case it is said to operate in the way of example." Id. at 171 n.1.
105. Id. (punishment's general deterrent effect on others in the community, for
example, as he terms it, "is the most important end of all"); Murphy & Coleman,
supra note 7, at 118 ("While incapacitation and reform may sometimes figure in the
[consequentialist] justification of punishment, deterrence has always been the
mainstay .... "); Primoratz, supra note 7, at 10 ("The most important consequences of
punishment are its preventive effects .... ).
106. Although commentators pay comparatively greater attention-with respect to
the purposes and justifications of punishment-to plea bargaining than to immunity
deals, much of the discussion of plea bargaining substantially applies to immunity
deals as well (and vice-versa). This applies not only to the consequentialist
justification, but also the retributivist critique. See infra Part I.B.2.
107. Though Beccaria's theory of punishment is considered utilitarian and a
significant influence on Bentham, Beccaria sought to fuse elements of both utility and
justice (i.e., consequentialism and retributivism). See, e.g., Beccaria, supra note 1, at
60 ("[A] punishment for a crime cannot be deemed truly just.., unless the laws have
adopted the best possible means.., to prevent that crime."); id. at 43 ("[E]ven if
punishments produce a happy result, they are not therefore just, for, in order to be
just, they must be necessary. A useful injustice cannot be tolerated .... ").
108. H.L.A. Hart distinguishes Beccaria's theory of punishment from Bentham's:
"there is in Beccaria a respect for the dignity and value of the individual person which
is absent in Bentham." H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence
and Political Theory 50 (1982).
109. Beccaria, supra note 1, at 69-70.
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"cowardly crimes '"" ' and rewards "betrayal"11' by breeding dishonor
among thieves."2  The advantages of immunity deals noted by
Beccaria resound in the more familiar currency of the promotion of
deterrence and societal security."3
For a hodgepodge of reasons, modern commentators generally
maintain that consequentialism justifies bargain justice."4  Plea
bargaining, some argue, must produce the best state of affairs, at least
for the parties who enter them, otherwise they would not enter into
them."5 As opposed to a trial, bargaining will reduce the expense and
110. Offenders who accept offers of immunity commit two crimes: first, the "crimes
of courage," for which the offender has been apprehended and, second, the "cowardly
crimes" of testifying against their partners in crime. Id. at 69. As Beccaria explains,
the "crime" of accepting an immunity deal supplying inculpatory evidence against
one's confederates in crime may be an even graver crime than the initial, more
conventional, crime (in Beccaria's term, the "crimes of courage") for which one was
apprehended. "[Cirimes of courage are less fatal to a nation than cowardly crimes,
for courage is not common, and it needs only a benevolent guiding hand to make it
work for the public good. Cowardice, however, is more common and contagious, and
it is always more self-centered and self-sustaining." Id.
111. Id. (by granting immunity "the nation authorizes betrayal, which is detestable
even among scoundrels").
112. A further disadvantage of immunity deals noted by Beccaria, which perhaps
rings more true to our modern sensibility, is that, by proffering such deals, "the court
shows its own uncertainty and the weakness of the law by imploring the aid of those
who break it." Id.
113. Beccaria explains the benefits of immunity deals:
The advantages of offering immunity from prosecution are that it prevents
serious offenses and that it reassures the people who are frightened by
crimes whose effects are apparent and whose perpetrators are unknown.
Moreover, it helps to show that a person who breaks faith with the laws
(which is to say, with public conventions) will probably not keep faith in his
private dealings.
Id. at 69-70. These advantages may be furthered, and some of the disadvantages
minimized, by a general statute authorizing immunity deals rather than courts
authorizing them on a case-by-case basis:
It would seem to me that a general statute promising impunity to an
accomplice who gives information about any crime whatever would be
preferable to a special declaration in a particular case, for the mutual fear of
taking a risk by himself that each accomplice would have would prevent
association in crime. The court would not encourage the audacity of
criminals by letting them see that their help was needed in a specific
instance.
Id. at 70.
114. E.g., Tunick, supra note 11, at 123 ("There are persuasive utilitarian reasons
for plea bargaining."). See Van den Haag, supra note 11, at 171 ("The risk, the cost,
the time-wasting procedures, and the uncertainties of our legal process cause the
interests of justice to be prosecuted best by avoiding trial if the accused is willing to
plead guilty to a lesser charge."); Alschuler, supra note 44, at 832 ("[P]rosecutors
enter plea agreements primarily because these bargains seem to them to offer greater
benefit to the state than the alternative of trial.").
115. See Van den Haag, supra note 11, at 172 (plea bargaining "may well be in the
best interests of all concerned"); Alschuler, supra note 44, at 834 (noting as a possible
defense of plea bargaining that "if a plea bargain did not improve the positions of
both the defendant and the state, one party or the other would insist upon a trial");
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time the state must expend to process a defendant.116 "'Without plea
bargains ... you'd have to multiply resources fifty fold to get the job
done that's being done today."' 7 Without inducing accomplices to
testify against each other through immunity and plea agreements,
many crimes would go unprosecuted." 8 Securing testimony by one
accomplice against another by promising not to prosecute the
cooperating accomplice may "be necessary to the public interest.""' 9
An offender who has bargained for a guilty plea "may manifest
remorse or a willingness to enter the correctional system in a frame of
mind that may afford hope for rehabilitation over a shorter period of
time than would otherwise be necessary. '"120 Exchanging the
possibility of a greater, but uncertain, punishment for a lighter, but
certain, punishment, achieves greater deterrence.'' The idea that
"'half a loaf is better than none"'122 underscores the consequentialist
premise of bargain justice: some certain punishment is better than the
risk of none.
Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 309
(1983) ("If defendants and prosecutors (representing society) both gain, the process is
desirable.").
116. Tunick, supra note 9, at 138-39 (plea bargaining "is a quick and easy way to
avoid the costs of trials and cope with heavy caseloads" (citation omitted)); Tunick,
supra note 11, at 123 ("Plea bargaining allows tremendous savings in resources. The
prosecutor (the state) avoids the cost of trial, and the defendant gets off with a lighter,
though certain, sentence."); Van den Haag, supra note 11, at 171 ("Since it is difficult,
chancy, expensive, and far too time-consuming to obtain conviction through trial in
our courts, prosecutors must resort to plea-bargaining."); Michael Gorr, The Morality
of Plea Bargaining, 26 Soc. Theory & Practice 129, 146 (2000) ("[I]t must be conceded
that defenders of the efficiency argument [supporting the practice of plea bargains]
have a strong prima facie case for their view."); Hartman & Koval, supra note 2, at 73
("The economic efficiency of plea bargaining is the strongest argument in favor of
maintaining the system.").
117. David E. Rovella & Gail Daine Cox, Fallout from Singleton Bribe Ruling,
Nat'l L. J., Aug. 24, 1998, at IA (quoting former prosecutor Martin H. Belsky).
118. See, e.g., United States v. White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D.N.C. 1998)
(without the capacity to purchase testimony through plea and immunity agreements
"the government would be unable to ... effectively proceed in the thousands of cases
each year in which it relies on witnesses who testify in return for leniency"); United
States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (acknowledging the
government's reliance on bargaining for testimony to secure convictions).
119. U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual, § 9-27.600(A)
(authorizing federal prosecutors to secure testimony by offering immunity when it is
otherwise unavailable and is in the public interest), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
(last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
120. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 834 (noting this rationale as a possible defense of
plea bargaining).
121. E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 115, at 309. Cf Gorr, supra note 116, at 141
("The likelihood that a system of plea bargaining would result in a higher conviction
rate within the class of factually guilty defendants also serves to cast doubt on the
objections [to plea bargaining] based on deterrence and social protection.").
122. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 832 (ascribing to prosecutors the view that in light
of the significant possibility that a defendant might well be acquitted at trial, some
punishment through a plea bargain is better than no punishment subsequent to a
trial).
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The Supreme Court supplies perhaps the most important
consequentialist defense of bargain justice.123 According to the Court,
plea bargaining is not merely permissible, but is "essential," '24 "to be
encouraged,'115 "highly desirable,' 1 26 and "benefit[s] all concerned.' 1 27
In utilizing plea bargains, as opposed to trials, the state achieves
greater efficiency in the criminal justice system at a significantly lower
cost.12 Not only do defendants secure a possibly more lenient
punishment, but they also "avoid extended pretrial incarceration and
the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial.' 1 29  And plea bargaining
"protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to
continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release."'130 In
addition, plea bargaining enhances the prospects for successful
rehabilitation of the offender.'
2. Retributivist Critique
The theories of Immanuel Kant 3 2 and G.W.F. Hegel exert the
greatest historical influence on retributivism.133 Kant'3 4 articulates the
123. See Alan Wertheimer, Freedom, Morality, Plea Bargaining, and the Supreme
Court, 8 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 203, 230 (1979) ("[Tlhe Court's principal defense of plea
bargaining is consequentialist.").
124. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,260 (1971).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 261.
127. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). Accord Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (citing the mutuality of benefit to both prosecutors and
defendants because of their "'relatively equal bargaining power' (quoting Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970))).
128. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71 ("Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce
resources."); Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (same).
129. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71.
130. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261; see Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71 ("The public is
protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at
large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings.") (citation omitted).
131. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71 (the defendant "gains... a prompt start in
realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation"); Santobello, 404 U.S. at
261 ("[B]y shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever
may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned."); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (the willingness of the
accused to enter into plea negotiations may demonstrate some "hope for success in
rehabilitation"). But see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1970)
(rejecting the rehabilitation rationale for plea bargaining).
132. See George Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 36 (1998) (referring to
Kant as "the leading philosopher of retributive punishment").
133. Primoratz, supra note 7, at 13 ("The most important and influential among
classical retributivists are Kant and Hegel.").
134. For general discussions of Kant's theory of punishment, see, for example,
Ewing, supra note 97, at 15-21; Jeffrie Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right 140-44
(1970); Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory 243-44 (1989); George
Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 533, 551-52
(1987) (Symposium on Kantian Legal Theory). See generally Thomas Hill, Kant on
Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 Law and Phil. 407 (1999); Donald Scheid,
Kant's Retributivism, 93 Ethics 262 (1983).
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essential retributivist thesis: 135 punishment "must always be inflicted
on him [an offender] only because he has committed a crime. 136
Punishment's consequences must not be the source of its justification
because this would disrespect the offender by treating her as a mere
means whose punishment is meant to benefit society. 137 And even if
no good consequence may be extracted from it, "punishment is a
categorical imperative,"138 or absolute duty.
If retributivism "is the notion that there is a mystic bond between
wrong and punishment,"13  Hegel's account1 40 supplies retribution as
the logical bond.' Hegel explains that both crime and punishment
are coercive which, in the abstract, is "contrary to right." '142 Because
crime precedes punishment, crime is the initial coercion 143 and thus
135. Moore, supra note 20, at 88 ("The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the
moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or her."); Hugo
Bedau, Concessions to Retribution in Punishment, in Justice and Punishment 51, 53
(J.B. Cederbloom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977) ("[A] retributivist holds that a
punishment is just if and only if the offender deserves it."); Greenawalt, supra note 7,
at 347 (retributivism is the view that "punishment is justified because people deserve
it"); Quinton, supra note 19, at 7 ("The essential contention of retributivism is that
punishment is only justified by guilt."). See Bedau, supra, at 52 ("Probably the most
widely held assumption about retribution in punishment is the idea that it makes
desert the central feature of just punishment." (citation omitted)).
136. Kant, supra note 8, at 140 (emphasis omitted).
137. Id. (punishment "can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some
other good for the criminal himself or for civil society"); id. ("a man can never be
treated merely as a means to the purposes of another").
138. Id. at 141; id. at 145 ("[Flailure to punish (impunitas criminis) is the greatest
wrong against his [a sovereign's] subjects.").
139. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 42 (reprint ed. 1991) (1881).
140. For general discussion of Hegel's theory of punishment see, for example,
Ewing, supra note 97, at 21-26; Honderich, supra note 97, at 45-48; Alan W. Norrie,
Law, Ideology and Punishment: Retrieval and Critique of the Liberal Ideal of
Criminal Justice 65-88 (1991); Primoratz, supra note 7, at 67-81. See generally Tunick,
supra note 11; Jami L. Anderson, Annulment Retributivism: A Hegelian Theory of
Punishment, 5 Legal Theory 363 (1999); Peter J. Steinberger, Hegel on Crime and
Punishment, 77 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 858 (1983). For the view that Hegel has developed
a "richer" and more "systematic" account of retributivism than Kant, see Primoratz,
supra note 7, at 13. Contra Honderich, supra note 97, at 45 (dismissing Hegel's
account as "obscure" and "of very secondary interest").
141. See G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right 129 (Allen W. Wood
ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) ("Retribution is the
inner connection and the identity of two determinations [the value and character of
an offender's crime and punishment] which are different in appearance and also have
a different external existence [Existenz] in relation to one another." (bracketed text in
original)); id. ("[P]unishment is merely a manifestation of the crime, i.e. it is one half
which is necessarily presupposed by the other."); id. (committing the criminal "deed
brings its own retribution with it"); Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's
Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1577, 1581 (1994) (reviewing
Mark Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy: Interpreting the Practice of Legal
Punishment (1992)). "Hegel developed the deontological foundations of Kant's
theory into an all-encompassing theory of the logical connection between crime and
punishment." Id.
142. Hegel, supra note 141, at 120 (emphasis omitted).
143. Id. at 121 ("The initial use of coercion, as force employed by a free agent in
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the first wrong, whereas punishment is merely (in the abstract) the
second wrong.'" But because punishment follows crime and
"coercion is cancelled by coercion; it [punishment] is therefore not
only conditionally right but necessary-namely as a second coercion
which cancels an initial coercion."'45 Since crime is a negation of the
right,I46 and punishment negates crime, 47 punishment is, in Hegel's
famous phrase, "the negation of the negation."'48 That is, rather than
two wrongs making a right, the two wrongs (crime and punishment)
restore the right.'49
The retributivist rejection of bargain justice perhaps begins with
Kant's consideration of a hypothetical proposal to commute the death
sentence of a prisoner in return for the prisoner agreeing to undergo
medical experiments that might yield information beneficial to
society. 5 ' Concluding "a court would reject with contempt such a
proposal,'' 1 Kant declares that "justice ceases to be justice if it can be
bought for any price whatsoever."'52  If reductions in deserved
punishment for the societal benefits of advancements in medical
science were antithetical to justice, then Kant presumably would find
the reductions in deserved punishment entailed by bargain justice also
unjust. George Fletcher, a leading exponent of Kant among legal
scholars,'53 concurs:
It is patently unjust, in Kant's view, to punish some offenders less
because they are willing to cooperate in some way with the state.
Kant would turn over in his Koenigsberg grave if he knew about the
modern American and growing European practice of plea
bargaining, under which the prosecution makes special deals with
certain susyTects in return for their providing evidence against other
suspects.
such a way as to infringe the existence [Dasein] of freedom in its concrete sense-i.e.
to infringe right as right-is crime." (bracketed text in original)).
144. Primoratz, supra note 7, at 69 (interpreting Hegel's view to be that
"retribution is a kind of coercion").
145. Hegel, supra note 141, at 120 (emphasis omitted).
146. Id. at 122 ("Right, whose infringement is crime .....
147. Id.
148. Id. at 123.
149. Id. at 124 (referring to punishment of crime as "the restoration of right"); see
also id. at 252 (the law "restores and thereby actualizes itself as valid through the
cancellation [punishment] of the crime").
150. Kant, supra note 8, at 141. The proposal, set out in full, is as follows:
What, therefore, should one think of the proposal to preserve the life of a
criminal sentenced to death if he agrees to let dangerous experiments be
made on him and is lucky enough to survive them, so that in this way
physicians learn something new of benefit to the commonwealth?
Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See generally Fletcher, supra note 134.
154. Fletcher, supra note 132, at 36-37.
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Thus, according to Fletcher, Kant would reject bargain justice.'55
Though Hegel says nothing of bargain justice,156 scholars construe his
writings as supporting its condemnation.157
Illustrating that bargain justice is illegitimate for violating the
retributivist principle of giving offenders what they deserve, 158
Kenneth Kipnis analogizes between "grade bargain[ing]' '59 and plea
bargaining. Suppose a professor, facing a huge stack of exams to
grade, looks at your exam very quickly and decides that you probably
would receive a grade of D.16° Looking to reduce her workload, the
professor offers you the following bargain: if you forego your right to
a careful assessment of your exam and to receiving the grade that you
actually deserve (which possibly might be an A, but will more
155. Id.
156. Mark Tunick explains one possible reason is that Hegel's "Prussia no doubt
had no such practice [plea bargaining]." Tunick, supra note 11, at 124 n.82. This
explanation, however, may not be entirely persuasive since Hegel cited and discussed
Beccaria's writings on punishment, Hegel, supra note 141, at 126-27, and Beccaria
considered arguments both pro and con concerning bargain justice. See supra, notes
109-13 and accompanying text.
157. See Tunick, supra note 11, at 124 ("Hegel insists that we punish for the sake of
justice, and he would strictly scrutinize a penal system that sacrificed justice for some
other purpose."). Tunick anticipates the objection Hegel might have mounted against
bargain justice had the practice been prevalent in his time:
[W]hen we punish someone who cops a plea, we are punishing them for
something they did not do. If we think that the point of punishing at all is to
express our condemnation of an act we regard as wrong and to vindicate
right, we might think plea bargaining misses the point of why we punish.
Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted). Hegel does, however, criticize a jury for
intentionally convicting a defendant of a lesser offense not committed rather than the
greater offense which the jury knew the defendant actually did commit:
The closest he [Hegel] comes [to criticizing plea bargains] is in a passage in
the lectures critical of a jury that fudged the facts of a case by finding a theft
that was in fact greater than forty shillings, and therefore punishable by
death according to English law, to have been a theft of less than forty
shillings, and therefore not subject to capital punishment. Hegel does not
condone the law that imposes death for a relatively trivial crime, but neither
does he condone the mixing of legal consequences with a determination of
facts; the investigation of facts should be "pure."
Id. at 124 (citation omitted). Since Hegel found this objectionable, we might also
expect Hegel to object to defendants pleading guilty to lesser offenses not actually
committed:
If Hegel is willing to condemn a jury for punishing a defendant for a lesser
offense not actually committed, albeit for benevolent purposes, perhaps he
would condemn a prosecutor whose plea bargain, offered not even out of
benevolence but merely to clear court dockets, results in the punishment of a
person for a lesser offense not actually committed.
Id. at 124. For a critical response to Tunick's attempt to infer that Hegel would have
opposed bargain justice, see Dubber, supra note 141, at 1600-01.
158. Kipnis rejects bargain justice because our criminal justice system should be
"one in which persons are justly given, not what they have bargained for, but what
they deserve, irrespective of their bargaining position." Kipnis, supra note 5, at 104.
For a critique of Kipnis's argument, see Gorr, supra note 116, at 140-41.
159. Kipnis, supra note 5, at 104.
160. Id.
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probably be a D), the professor will agree to give you a grade of B. 11
Despite the consequentialist benefits to such a bargain and to a
university that systematically institutionalized such a grade bargaining
procedure, 62  for Kipnis grade bargaining, no less than plea
bargaining, is simply "outrageous.' 1 63  Both grade and plea
bargaining,1" Kipnis concludes, are "out of place ... [because] grades,
like punishments, should be deserved.' 165
Although retributivists condemn bargain justice for a variety of
other reasons, 66 the discussion of them here is abbreviated because
the next part examines in comparative depth five central duties of
retributivism antithetical to bargain justice: (i) the duty to punish
culpable wrongdoers, (ii) to give them their just deserts, (iii) to honor
their right to punishment, (iv) to treat them as ends rather than as
mere means, and (v) to treat those with equal desert equally.167
II. ASSESSING RETRIBUTIVISM VIA BARGAIN JUSTICE
This part applies the competing theories of punishment to a
hypothetical immunity offer-the Prosecutor's Dilemma. Given
consequentialism's justification of bargain justice, 68  that
consequentialism justifies acceptance of the offer fails to surprise.
161. Id. at 104-05.
162. Kipnis suggests the following benefits for the student, the professor, and the
university:
[Grade bargaining] permits more students to be processed by fewer
instructors. Teachers can be freed from the burden of having to read and
criticize every paper .... [A] quick assignment of a grade is a more effective
influence on the behavior of students,... [and] grade bargaining is necessary
to the efficient functioning of the schools. There can be no doubt that
students who have negotiated a grade are more likely to accept and to
understand the verdict of the instructor. .. . Finally, a quickly assigned grade
enables the guidance personnel and the registrar to respond rapidly and
appropriately to the student's situation.
Id. at 105.
163. Id.
164. For a criticism of the analogy between grade and plea bargaining, see Tunick,
supra note 9, at 141 n.66.
165. Kipnis, supra note 5, at 105. Kipnis explains the incongruity of bargaining and
desert:
Justice in retribution, like justice in grading, does not require that the end
result be acceptable to the parties. To reason that because the parties are
satisfied the bargain should stand is to be seriously confused. For bargains
are out of place in contexts where persons are to receive what they deserve.
And the American courtroom, like the American classroom, should be such
a context.
Id.
166. See, e.g., Tunick, supra note 9, at 140 ("Punishment, the purpose of which is to
express our condemnation of a wrong, loses its meaning when applied to a person
who cops a plea, because it fails to take seriously the nature of that wrong."). For
additional rationales, see infra Part II.B.
167. See infra Part II.B.1-5, respectively.
168. See supra notes 113-31 and accompanying text.
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And, in light of retributivists' criticisms of bargain justice,169 we would
expect a retributivist prosecutor 170 to refuse, as would Kant, such a
proposal with "contempt[,] ... for justice ceases to be justice if it can
be bought for any price whatsoever." '71  Paradoxically, however,
retributivism requires both acceptance and nonacceptance of the
offer.
A. The Prosecutor's Dilemma: A Hypothetical Immunity Offer
In the Prosecutor's Dilemma, suppose only one member of a group
of three culpable wrongdoers who have committed a serious crime is
apprehended by the authorities. All three deserve the same degree of
punishment because each committed the same wrongdoing with the
same culpability.172  The one culpable wrongdoer in custody (the
"One") offers to inculpate the other two (the "Two") in exchange for
immunity from prosecution and punishment.7 3 The Two cannot be
apprehended (or convicted and punished) without the One's
inculpatory information and testimony. 174 If the offer is accepted, two
culpable wrongdoers will be convicted and receive their just deserts,
but one will not. If the offer is not accepted, at most one culpable
wrongdoer will be convicted and receive her just deserts, but at least
two will not.175  Under the terms of the Prosecutor's Dilemma, the
only way to punish the One is by not accepting the offer; and, the only
169. See supra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
170. Of course, there are probably very few, if any, purely retributivist prosecutors.
The construct of a purely retributivist prosecutor is merely a device by which to test
whether the theory of retributivism would justify acceptance or nonacceptance of the
offer.
171. Kant, supra note 8, at 141.
172. In addition to obtaining convictions of two rather than merely one wrongdoer,
a prosecutor might also wish to engage in bargain justice to obtain the convictions of
an offender who has committed a more grave crime as opposed to an offender who
has committed a less serious crime. See Moore, supra note 20, at 156-58.
173. In the prisoner's dilemma, the prosecutor makes the immunity or leniency
offer. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. In contrast, here, in the Prosecutor's
Dilemma, the prisoner initiates the offer because, given retributivists' criticisms of
bargain justice, see supra notes 150-67 and accompanying text, a retributivist
prosecutor would presumably never tender such an offer.
174. In the interests of simplicity and clarity the bargain justice offer by which
retributivism will be demonstrated to sustain internal inconsistencies has been cast as
an offer of immunity. But casting the hypothetical bargain justice offer as a plea
bargain could, with more complications, serve the same purpose. Suppose the three
culpable wrongdoers' criminal scheme renders them liable for a number of criminal
charges. The One makes an offer to the prosecutor to plead guilty to all of the
charges but one and to testify-providing inculpating evidence-against the Two. In
return for the One's guilty plea and his agreement to testify against the Two, the One
requests immunity (or the prosecutor's promise not to charge him) for the remaining
crime.
175. Not accepting the offer encompasses two distinct options: (i) punishment of
the One or (ii) punishment of neither the One nor the Two. Thus, nonacceptance of
the offer entails punishment of at most one offender.
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way to punish the Two is by accepting the offer. Thus, punishing both
the One and the Two is impossible. The resulting situation is that the
offer presents the following three, and only these three, possibilities to
a prosecutor: (i) accept the offer and punish only the Two, (ii) not
accept the offer and punish only the One or, (iii) not accept the offer
and punish neither the Two nor the One. 76
Based on their differing views of bargain justice, we would expect
consequentialism and retributivism to justify different responses to
the offer.1 77 Under consequentialism, the choice is clear-accept the
offer so as to maximize the number of persons punished (two versus
one), maximize deterrence, 17 and save the expense of a trial.179 But,
the choice is far from clear under retributivism.
B. Retributivist Principles Applicable to the Immunity Offer
Whether or not retributivism justifies acceptance or nonacceptance
of the offer implicates five central principles or duties18° of
retributivism. 1 1 Their application to the offer reveals retributivism to
176. The resulting difficulties for retributivism as applied to the Prosecutor's
Dilemma arise not only under the specific terms of the Prosecutor's Dilemma but also
under a number of its variations. For these variations, see infra text accompanying
note 298, infra notes 299, 337.
177. See supra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2, respectively.
178. See supra notes 121, 122 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 116, 117, 128 and accompanying text.
180. For the five principles or duties, see supra text accompanying note 167.
181. There are other principles of retributivism antithetical to bargain justice, in
addition to the five enumerated, but these other principles do not specifically pertain
to the Prosecutor's Dilemma. For example, some retributivists argue that plea
bargains undermine the duty not to punish the innocent. E.g., Tunick, supra note 9, at
143 (in some instances, "the result of the negotiated plea is to punish an innocent
person, which violates the weak 'negative retributive principle"'). Some argue that
plea bargains make punishment of the innocent more likely than in trials:
While the conviction of the innocent would be a problem in any system we
might devise, it appears to be a greater problem under plea bargaining....
Plea bargaining substantially erodes the standards for guilt and it is
reasonable to assume that the sloppier we are in establishing guilt, the more
likely it is that innocent persons will be convicted.
Kipnis, supra note 5, at 105-06; see Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 2007 ("[C]onvicting
the innocent is unequivocally easier in a world that permits plea-bargaining."). Contra
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (asserting that, given adequate
counsel and existing procedural safeguards, a defendant "was unlikely to be driven to
false self-condemnation"); Gorr, supra note 116, at 140-41 (arguing there is no
evidence that more innocents plead guilty under a plea bargain than are mistakenly
convicted in a trial). Cf. Wertheimer, supra note 123, at 233 ("That plea bargaining
induces some innocent defendants to plead guilty is not, in itself, a decisive moral
objection to the practice. Any system will occasionally punish innocent persons
unintentionally."). For the argument that retributivism justifies the intentional
punishment of particular, identifiable innocents, see Russell L. Christopher, Deterring
Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 843, 880-88
(2002).
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paradoxically require, and be violated by, both acceptance and
nonacceptance of the offer.
1. Categorical Duty to Punish Culpable Wrongdoers
One of retributivism's most important principles is the duty to
punish culpable wrongdoers. 8 2 As Kant famously expounded, "[t]he
Principle of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him
who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to discover
something that releases the criminal from punishment." '83  Hegel
agrees that "it would be impossible for a society to leave a crime
unpunished." '84 Though some modern forms of retributivism conceive
punishment to be merely permissible, 85 the view that punishment of
wrongdoers is obligatory remains the "dominant" '86 and "standard
retributive view. ' Thus, "the retributivist regards the punishment of
the guilty to be categorically imperative whenever the opportunity to
give such punishment presents itself.' '1 88
Michael Moore suggests that the conception of retributivism as
embodying an absolute duty to punish each and every wrongdoer
precludes a retributivist from engaging in immunity bargaining.1 89 As
Moore explains,
it might be thought that we rightly refuse to punish some guilty
persons in order to be able to punish other, more seriously guilty
persons-as when we give immunity, in order to extract testimony
needed to convict the latter. How can the retributivist
accommodate these practices, given that the retributivist regards the
punishment of the guilty to be categorically imperative whenever
the opportunity to give such punishment presents itself?' 90
182. Primoratz, supra note 7, at 12 ("[t]he moral duty to punish" is one of the five
central tenets of retributivism (emphasis omitted)).
183. Kant, supra note 8, at 141. Kant also declared that the "failure to punish
(impunitas criminis) is the greatest wrong against his [a sovereign's] subjects." Id.
184. Hegel, supra note 141, at 251; see id. at 127 ("Both the nature of crime and the
criminal's own will require that the infringement [crime] for which he is responsible
should be cancelled [punished]." (emphasis added)).
185. See, e.g., H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 8
Inquiry 249 (1965), reprinted in Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment 119, 132
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972). For general discussions of retributivist accounts of
punishment as not obligatory, but merely permissible, see Richard Brandt, Ethical
Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics 501-03 (1959); H.J.
McCloskey, Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment, 64 J. Phil. 91 (1967).
186. Primoratz, supra note 7, at 110.
187. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
961, 1229 n.660 (2001).
188. Moore, supra note 20, at 156. For a similar view, see Michael Moore, The
Moral Worth of Retribution, in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions 179, 182
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) ("For a retributivist, the moral culpability of an
offender also gives society the duty to punish.").
189. Moore, supra note 20, at 156.
190. Id.
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Thus, retributivism's absolute duty, or "categorical imperative,' ' 91
to punish seemingly constitutes sufficient reason to reject an offer of
bargain justice which foregoes the opportunity to punish a culpable
wrongdoer.92
If the duty to punish culpable wrongdoers at every opportunity
requires nonacceptance of the offer, then it equally requires
acceptance of the offer. Not accepting the offer entails foregoing
punishment of the Two.193 Since there is an opportunity to punish the
Two,'94 foregoing that opportunity violates the duty to punish the
Two. Thus, not accepting the offer violates the absolute duty to
punish. Only acceptance of the offer affords fulfillment of the duty to
punish with respect to the Two. On this basis, then, the duty to punish
requires acceptance of the offer. But accepting the offer entails
foregoing punishment of the One,1 95 thereby violating the duty to
punish with respect to the One. The only option affording
punishment of the One is nonacceptance of the offer. On this basis,
then, retributivism's duty to punish requires nonacceptance of the
offer. But nonacceptance of the offer violates the duty to punish the
Two. Therefore, fulfilling the duty to punish with respect to the One
(not accepting the offer) violates the duty with respect to the Two;
and that fulfilling the duty to punish with respect to the Two
(accepting the offer) violates the duty to punish with respect to the
One. The duty to punish culpable wrongdoers paradoxically requires,
and is violated by, both acceptance and nonacceptance of the offer.
196
191. Kant, supra note 8, at 141 (stating that "punishment is a categorical
imperative"). See Moore, supra note 20, at 156.
192. Moore himself, however, argues that two special, controversial forms of
retributivism, apparently not entailing a duty to punish, would justify acceptance of
such an offer of bargain justice. Moore, supra note 20, at 156-59. For a discussion of
these alternative forms of retributivism, see infra Part IV.A-B.
193. Nonacceptance of the offer entails either punishing the One or punishing
none, but precludes punishing the Two. For a discussion of the three options which
the Prosecutor's Dilemma presents to a retributivist prosecutor, and the ramifications
of each option, see supra Part II.C.
194. Just as there is an opportunity to punish the One, so also there is an
opportunity to punish the Two. The One's offer to supply information and testimony
inculpating the Two presents the retributivist system of punishment with an
opportunity to punish the Two. Retributivism imposes a duty to punish culpable
wrongdoers whenever the opportunity arises. See supra notes 189-90 and
accompanying text. Thus, the duty to punish applies to the Two no less than to the
One.
195. Under the terms of the Prosecutor's Dilemma hypothetical, acceptance of the
offer includes punishing the Two but precludes punishing the One.
196. Fulfillment of the duty requires a prosecutor to both accept and not accept the
offer. But this is logically impossible. See infra note 249. The offer can only be
accepted or not accepted. But either acceptance or nonacceptance of the offer
violates the duty to punish.
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2. Giving Culpable Wrongdoers Their Just Deserts
Integral to retributivism is the notion that punishment must be in
proportion to, and to the extent of, an offender's just deserts.'97
Retributivism "insists that the punishment must fit the crime."'98 As
Kant explained the lex talionis of an eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-
tooth,'99 "what is done to him [the offender] in accordance with penal
law is what he has perpetrated on others."" Hegel articulates a more
sophisticated version of Kant's lex talionis.2 1' Rather than the literal
or specific equality of crime and punishment embodied in Kant's
principle- "that what the criminal has done should also happen to
him,"2 ' which may easily be reduced to an absurdity203-for Hegel,
punishment need only be generally equal or comparable to the
crime.1°4  Under either view, however, retributivism requires
197. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the
retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal offender."); Primoratz, supra note 7, at 12
(identifying the principle that "[p]unishment ought to be proportionate to the offense"
as one of the five main tenets of retributivism).
198. Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 29, 32 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1972).
199. The lex talionis was first expressed in the Bible as follows: "If any harm follow,
then thou shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe." Exodus 21: 23-25.
200. Kant, supra note 8, at 169. As Kant further explains the principle of equality
between crime and punishment,
whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that
you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal
from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike yourself; if
you kill him, you kill yourself. But only the law of retribution (ius
talionis)... can specify definitely the quality and the quantity of
punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and unsuited for a sentence
of pure and strict justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into
them.
Id. at 141.
201. See Primoratz, supra note 7, at 13; Dubber, supra note 141, at 1581. But see
Honderich, supra note 97, at 45.
202. Hegel, supra note 141, at 127 (emphasis omitted).
203. Hegel points out the absurd ramifications of taking Kant's principle literally:
[I]t is very easy to portray the retributive aspect of punishment as an
absurdity (theft as retribution for theft, robbery for robbery, an eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth, so that one can even imagine the miscreant as
one-eyed or toothless); but the concept has nothing to do with this absurdity,
for which the introduction of that [idea of] specific equality is alone to blame.
Id. at 128 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
204. Whereas the simple version of the lex talionis requires a specific equality
between the crime and the punishment (e.g., theft as retribution for theft), Hegel
requires merely that the crime and punishment be comparable in character or value.
Hegel defines value as "the inner equality of things [Sachen] which, in their existence
[Existenz], are specifically quite different." Id. (bracketed text in original). That is,
the two must be generally equal, or comparable:
[E]quality remains merely the basic measure of the criminal's essential
deserts, but not of the specific external shape which the retribution should
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punishment to be proportional to, and reflective of, an offender's just
deserts.205
Given retributivists' criticisms of bargain justice's failure to give
culpable wrongdoers their just deserts,206 one might expect the
principle to require nonacceptance of the offer. While only
nonacceptance of the offer (and punishing only the One) allows
fulfillment of the principle with respect to the One, it foregoes
punishment of the Two and thus violates the principle with respect to
the Two. While only acceptance of the offer fulfills the principle with
respect to the Two, nonetheless by foregoing punishment of the One
it violates the principle with respect to the One. The resulting
situation is that which enables the One to receive her just deserts (not
accepting the offer) precludes the Two from receiving their just
deserts; and that which enables the Two to receive their just deserts
(accepting the offer) precludes the One from receiving her just
deserts. The retributivist principle that offenders receive punishment
proportional to their just deserts paradoxically requires, and is
violated by, both acceptance of the offer and nonacceptance of the
offer.207
3. Culpable Wrongdoers' Right to Punishment
Regarded as a central principle of retributivism," 8 an offender's
right to punishment is, in fact, defended by only a handful of
retributivists, albeit prominent ones. Hegel declared that "[t]he injury
[Verletzung] which is inflicted on the criminal is not only just in itself
... it is also a right for the criminal himself."2 9  Contemporary
retributivists Herbert Morris and Jeffrie Murphy (though perhaps
Murphy is now only an ex-retributivist 10) acknowledge Hegel's
take. It is only in terms of this specific shape that theft and robbery [on the
one hand] and fines and imprisonment etc. [on the other] are completely
unequal, whereas in terms of their value, i.e. their universal character as
injuries [Verletzungen], they are comparable.
Id. at 129 (bracketed text in original).
205. Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 347-48 (for retributivism "the severity of
punishment should be proportional to the degree of wrongdoing").
206. See supra notes 150-55, 157-65 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 196.
208. Primoratz, supra note 7, at 12 (identifying the principle that "[plunishment is a
right of the offender" as one of the five principal tenets of retributivism).
209. Hegel, supra note 141, at 126 (emphasis omitted) (bracketed text in original).
Hegel explains further how punishment is a right of the offender:
For it is implicit in his action, as that of a rational being, that it is universal in
character, and that, by performing it, he has set up a law which he has
recognized for himself in his action, and under which he may therefore be
subsumed as under his right.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
210. Jeffrie Murphy, Retribution Reconsidered: More Essays in the Philosophy of
Law ix-x (1992). Murphy explains his retreat from retributivism: "I no longer have
the total confidence in either retributivism or Kantianism that I once had .... " Id. at
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principle by linking the right of punishment to, and as reflecting, the
wrongdoer's status as an autonomous and responsible agent. 1
Satisfying a culpable wrongdoer's right to punishment requires both
nonacceptance of the offer and acceptance of the offer. Honoring the
One's right to punishment requires nonacceptance of the offer. But
not accepting the offer violates the Two's right to punishment.
Honoring the Two's right to punishment requires acceptance of the
offer. But accepting the offer violates the One's right to punishment.
Therefore, fulfilling the One's right to punishment (not accepting the
offer) violates the Two's right to punishment; and fulfilling the Two's
right to punishment (accepting the offer) violates the One's right to
punishment. The principle that culpable wrongdoers have a right to
punishment paradoxically requires, and is violated by, acceptance of
the offer as well as nonacceptance of the offer.2 12
4. Treating Culpable Wrongdoers Not as Mere Means But as Ends
Kant demanded that one must "[a]ct so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or that of another, always as an end and
never as a means only." 13  Kant's maxim also applies to the
punishment of offenders:
Punishment by a court.., can never be inflicted merely as a means
to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil
society.... For a man can never be treated merely as a means for
the purposes of another or be put among the objects of rights to
things .....21
Though commentators consider Kant's maxim notoriously unclear,215
its importance is considerable.216 Using someone as a mere means is
thought to belong to the same family as the concepts of
ix.
211. Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and
Moral Psychology 41 (1976) ("[A] person has a right to be punished, meaning by this
that a person had a right to all those institutions and practices linked to
punishment."); Jeffrie Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy, 82
Ethics 284, in Retribution, Justice, and Therapy 128, 134 (1979) ("The right to be
punished and regarded as a responsible agent, though sometimes painful when
honored, at least leaves one's status as a moral person intact.").
212. See supra note 196.
213. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 46 (Lewis White
Beck trans., 2d ed. 1990) (1785).
214. Kant, supra note 8, at 140-41.
215. See, e.g., Duff, supra note 6, at 178 (Kant's maxim is "notoriously obscure");
Honderich, supra note 97, at 60 ("vague"); Nancy Davis, Using Persons and Common
Sense, 94 Ethics 387, 389 (1984) ("elusive"); Dolinko, supra note 13, at 1631
("unclear"); Onora O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 252, 252
(1985) (there is "little agreement" as to its meaning).
216. See, e.g., Duff, supra note 6, at 178 (Kant's maxim "generates a crucial
objection" to consequentialist theories); Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 1341 (the
maxim is the source of "[t]he most fundamental objection" to consequentialism).
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"manipulation, dehumanization, exploitation, and disrespect. '217
Other common conceptions include treating someone as a thing,218
instrument,219 tool, 2 0 or animal.
2 1
The duty to treat persons as ends and not as mere means contains
both negative and positive components.222 The negative duty is to not
use persons as mere means; the positive duty is to affirmatively treat
persons, at least in part, "as ends-in-themselves. '223  According to
Hegel, retributivism avoids treating an offender "simply as a harmful
animal which must be rendered harmless, or punished with a view to
deterring or reforming him '224 (thereby satisfying the negative duty);
and, by conceiving of punishment as "embodying the criminal's own
right, the criminal is honoured as a rational being" (thereby satisfying
the positive duty).225  Under a modern account, retributivism
purportedly satisfies the negative duty by not using the punishment of
a wrongdoer as a means to attain some societal benefit and satisfies
the positive duty by giving offenders the punishment that they
deserve.226
If treating culpable wrongdoers not as mere means, but as ends,
requires nonacceptance of the offer, it equally requires acceptance of
the offer. Treating the One not as a mere means, but as an end,
217. Davis, supra note 215, at 387 (citation omitted).
218. Kantian scholar Onora O'Neill explains how using someone as a mere means
is akin to how things are treated:
To treat something as a mere means is to treat it in ways that are appropriate
to things. Things, unlike persons, are neither free nor rational; they lack the
capacities required for agency. They can only be props or implements, never
sharers or collaborators, in any projects. Things cannot act.., so cannot
consent to or dissent from the ways in which they are used.
Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy
138 (1989).
219. O'Neill, supra note 215, at 252 ("Making another into a tool or instrument in
my project is one way of failing to treat that other as a person ....").
220. Robert Nozick explains the principle of using another as a mere means by the
metaphor of a tool, which is apt because there are no moral constraints on how we
may use a tool:
There is no side constraint on how we may use a tool, other than the moral
constraints on how we may use it upon others. There are procedures to be
followed to preserve it for future use ("don't leave it out in the rain"), and
there are more and less efficient ways of using it. But there is no limit on
what we may do to it to best achieve our goals.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 31 (1974).
221. See infra text accompanying note 224.
222. According to Kant, "it is not enough that he is not authorized to use either
himself or others merely as means (since he could still be indifferent to them); it is in
itself his duty to make man in general his end." Kant, supra note 8, at 198.
223. O'Neill, supra note 218, at 113.
224. Hegel, supra note 141, at 126. For a similar view, see Jeffrie Murphy,
Retributivism and the State's Interest in Punishment, in Nomos XXVII: Criminal
Justice 156, 158-59 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985).
225. Hegel, supra note 141, at 126 (emphasis omitted).
226. See Duff, supra note 18, at 10.
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requires nonacceptance of the offer. 227 But nonacceptance of the offer
foregoes punishment of the Two who thereby fail to receive the
punishment that they deserve. By failing to receive the punishment
that they deserve, the Two fail to be affirmatively treated as ends228
(thereby violating the positive component of the duty with respect to
the Two). Thus, not accepting the offer (and punishing only the One),
violates the positive component of the duty.229 But acceptance of the
offer entails treating the One as a mere means thereby violating the
negative component of the duty.230 As a result, that which allows
treating the One as an end (not accepting the offer) precludes treating
the Two as ends; and that which allows treating the Two as ends
(acceptance of the offer), precludes treating the One as an end. The
duty to treat culpable wrongdoers as ends, and not as mere means,
paradoxically requires, and is violated by, both acceptance and
nonacceptance of the offer.231
5. Treating Culpable Wrongdoers with Equal Desert Equally
Though not always articulated as an express tenet of
retributivism,232 treating equally situated culpable wrongdoers equally
227. Accepting the offer constitutes using the One as a mere means to secure the
punishment of the Two, thereby violating the negative component of the duty with
respect to the One. In addition, by not punishing the One, the One would not be
given the punishment that she deserves, thereby violating the positive component of
the duty-affirmatively treating the One as an end in herself.
228. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
229. Nonacceptance of the offer (and punishing only the One) fulfills the positive
component of Kant's maxim with respect to the One, but not with respect to the Two.
230. Even if we were to assume arguendo that the One being treated as a mere
means by acceptance of the offer constituted a sufficient basis to not accept the offer
in the Prosecutor's Dilemma, it would not be a sufficient basis in, and would not
resolve the difficulties presented by, variations of the Prosecutor's Dilemma. Suppose
the situation is the same as in the Prosecutor's Dilemma except that instead of the
One making the offer, an outside party makes the offer. The outside party, let us call
her 'Informant,' informs the authorities that she will provide conclusive evidence of
the Two's guilt in return for the prosecutor granting immunity to the One. As
opposed to the One being treated as a mere means by acceptance of the One's offer,
acceptance of Informant's offer does not constitute using the One as a mere means in
order that the Two may be treated as ends by giving them their just deserts. If
Informant's offer is accepted, the One is neither being used as a mere means nor
being used at all. Therefore, even if the Kantian principle might be able to resolve
the dilemma for a retributivist system as applied to some bargain justice offers, it does
not provide a resolution for all such offers.
231. See supra note 196.
232. C.L. Ten finds that the equality of treatment among offenders to be either a
form of, or a reason supporting, retributivism. C.L. Ten, supra note 20, at 50-51. Ten
considers a hypothetical of whether a person should be punished even if no
consequentialist benefit may be attained by doing so: "[Suppose] a Nazi war
criminal.., escapes to an uninhabited island where.., he is found leading an 'idyllic
existence.' While he is still unrepentant for what he has done, he has no desire to
cause further harm. (Let us also assume that his punishment would have no general
deterrent effect on the behavior of others.)" Id. at 47 (citing to the hypothetical of
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is implicit in, or presupposed by, retributivism.233 As Moore declares,
"[l]ike cases should indeed be treated alike. '234 Additionally, treating
equally those offenders with equal desert may be derived from the
principle that offenders must receive punishment proportionate to
their desert.235 Since an offender's desert or degree of culpable
wrongdoing is the only determinant for the degree of deserved
punishment, then retributivism must require that offenders with the
same degree of desert and culpability receive equal treatment. 236
Fletcher construes Kant's commitment to equality of treatment
among offenders with equal desert as not a derivative, 23 7 but rather an
John Kleining, Punishment and Desert 67 (1973)). Although no good consequences
may be drawn from punishing the Nazi war criminal, as the hypothetical stipulates,
Ten proposes that a retributivist principle-equality of treatment of offenders-may
nonetheless support punishment of the Nazi:
[Equality of treatment of offenders] supports the belief that the Nazi...
should be punished even though his particular punishment cannot be
defended on purely utilitarian grounds. This consideration rests on a
comparison of the position of the Nazi and those of other offenders who are
punished for committing crimes similar to, or even much less serious than,
those of the Nazi. For example, an ordinary murderer is punished for his
crime. His punishment, let us assume, is justified on utilitarian grounds.
Similarly there are sufficient utilitarian reasons for punishing those who
have committed lesser offences like assault and theft. But if all these
offenders are punished, then it is unfair that the Nazi should not also be
punished for a similar, or even much worse, offence.... Part of the appeal
here is to a requirement that similar cases should be treated similarly, where
the similarity is based on intrinsic features of the act, defined in terms of the
intention of the agent and the natural and foreseeable consequences.
C.L. Ten, supra note 20, at 50-51. Ten, however, cautions that the retributivist
principle of punishing similar offenders similarly does "not in [itself] dictate the
punishment of the Nazi." Id. at 51. It only "give[s] rise to a conditional demand that if
similar, or lesser, offenders are justifiably punished, then so must the Nazi." Id.
233. See Fletcher, supra note 21, at 58-59. Fletcher maintains that, since "all
theories of justice are primarily concerned with equality, it makes sense to ground
retributive justice.., in a commitment to bring about equality ... among offenders."
Id. at 59. Fletcher explains that retributive justice contains elements of both
corrective and distributive justice: "The distributive dimension of punishments
consists in the legal imperative to punish all offenders [of equal desert] equally." Id. at
58.
234. Moore, supra note 20, at 90.
235. Duff derives the principle in just this way: "[T]he principle of proportionality
is a principle of relative proportionality. Doing justice to individual offenders is
therefore a matter of doing justice between offenders. We punish this offender justly
by ensuring that her sentence is proportionate to her crime, relative to the sentences
imposed on other offenders." Duff, supra note 9, at 156 (citation omitted).
236. E.g., C.L. Ten, supra note 20, at 51 (discussing retributivism's "requirement
that similar cases should be treated similarly, where the similarity is based on intrinsic
features of the act, defined in terms of the intention of the agent and the natural and
foreseeable consequences").
237. Kant's formulation determines desert and the degree of punishment based on
the specific equality between the crime and punishment, or the lex talionis: "what is
done to him [the offender] in accordance with penal law is what he has perpetrated on
others." Kant, supra note 8, at 169. For Kant's account of how the lex talionis
determines the degree of a culpable wrongdoer's punishment, see supra note 200. As
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express tenet.238  Fletcher grounds Kant's demand that equally
situated offenders be treated equally in concerns of distributive
justice.239  "For this reason [distributive justice], the leading
philosopher of retributive punishment, Immanuel Kant, stressed the
imperative of maintaining strict equality among offenders. 2 40  As
Fletcher explains, "Kant was so firm in his commitment to equality
among offenders that he regarded any deviation from equality for the
sake of practical advantage as illustrative of the principle: 'if justice
goes, there is no longer any value in men's living on earth.' '2 4
1
Since retributivists criticize bargain justice for violating this
principle,242 it might seem that a retributivist prosecutor must, on this
basis, not accept the offer (and punish only the One). Not accepting
the offer (and punishing only the One) violates the principle and
treats the One and the Two unequally.2 43 Accepting the offer also
a result, if two offenders commit the same crime (with the same culpability), each
must receive the same punishment as the other. In this way, we may derive Kant's
support for equal punishment among equally culpable wrongdoers from his principle
of equality between crime and punishment.
238. See George P. Fletcher, Punishment and Responsibility, in A Companion to
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 514, 517 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999)
(interpreting Kant as criticizing utilitarianism because it "leads invariably to breaches
in the principle of equality").
239. Fletcher, supra note 132, at 36-37. Fletcher explains how distributive justice is
integral to retributivism:
The distinctive feature of [retributive] punishment is that it also has a
distributive dimension. Distributive justice means that the benefits and
burden[s] of living together in a society are distributed to each according to
his due. Unless there is a sound basis for punishing some offenders more
than others, distributive justice mandates equality in the distribution of the
burden that punishment represents. Because the state is responsible for
distributing the burdens of fines and imprisonment (not to mention the
death penalty), it is critical that the state abide by criteria of distributive
justice. This obligation implies that it may not discriminate in selecting some
people and not others to suffer for their crimes.
Id. at 36.
240. Id.; see id. at 37 ("Kant was committed to the principle of equality among
offenders.").
241. Id. at 37 (quoting Kant, supra note 8, at 141).
242. E.g., Fletcher, supra note 21, at 58-59 (bargain justice conflicts with "basic
principles of equal justice"); Kipnis, supra note 5, at 105; Wertheimer, supra note 123,
at 233 ("To the extent to which sentences are determined by factors unrelated to
appropriate retributive or correctional considerations, plea bargaining entails that
people in relevantly similar circumstances are treated differently only because some
are prepared to waive their constitutional rights." (citation omitted)); id. at 234 (plea
bargaining "may well involve 'unjust' discrimination between 'persons in similar
circumstances').
243. Arguably, the One and the Two are not equally situated in at least two
respects. First, the Two can only be punished with the One's cooperation. The One
can be punished without the Two's cooperation. Second, the One has expressed an
interest in cooperating with the prosecutor, whereas the Two have not. Although
these are differences between the situation of the One and the Two, nonetheless they
are not morally relevant differences-at least not under retributivism. The only
relevant basis on which retributivism justifies punishment is the offender's moral
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violates the principle-punishing the Two but not the One treats them
unequally. Both accepting and not accepting the offer violate, as they
do the other four principles, the principle of treating equally culpable
wrongdoers equally. Unlike the other four principles, however, there
is an option which fulfills the principle-not accepting the offer and
punishing neither the One nor the Two. That is, by punishing none of
the three culpable wrongdoers, all three are treated equally.
C. Three Options
The Prosecutor's Dilemma presents three options to a prosecutor:
(i) accept the offer and punish only the Two, (ii) not accept the offer
and punish only the One, or (iii) not accept the offer and punish none.
Analysis of the five central principles of retributivism suggests that the
offer, paradoxically, must be both accepted and not accepted. Given
the uncertainty regarding which option a retributivist prosecutor
should select, let us consider each of the three options separately.
1. Accepting the Offer and Punishing Only the Two
While satisfying some of retributivism's principles with respect to
the Two,2" accepting the offer violates them all with respect to the
One. By foregoing punishment of the One, acceptance of the offer
violates the following duties: to (i) punish the One, (ii) give the One
her just deserts, (iii) honor the One's right to punishment, (iv) treat
the One as an end-in-herself, and (v) treat equally the One and the
Two. 245 As a result, accepting the offer is not a viable option.
2. Not Accepting the Offer and Punishing Only the One
While satisfying some of retributivism's principles with respect to
the One,246 nonacceptance of the offer (and punishing only the One)
and/or legal desert. See supra notes 197-205. Desert is based on the culpable
commission of moral wrongdoing and/or the culpable violation of a criminal offense.
See supra note 236. The desert of the One and Two is based on their culpable
wrongdoing which constituted a serious criminal offense. It is not based on whether a
wrongdoer can be successfully prosecuted independently of, or dependently on, the
assistance of a confederate in crime. Similarly, a wrongdoer's willingness to bargain
with the prosecutor and inculpate a partner in crime in exchange for immunity does
not alter his or her desert. If cooperation did reduce the level of desert, then
retributivists would have little basis to oppose plea bargaining and immunity deals.
For retributivist criticisms of bargain justice, see supra Part I.B.2. Thus, despite some
differences that might be pointed out between the respective situations of the One
and the Two, the differences are not relevant under retributivism. As a result, in all
relevant respects, the One and the Two are equally situated under retributivism.
244. By accepting the offer, a retributivist prosecutor could discharge the duty to
punish the Two, give the Two their just deserts, satisfy the Two's right to punishment
and, treat the Two not as mere means but as ends-in-themselves. See supra Part II.B.
245. See supra Part II.B.
246. By not accepting the offer and punishing only the One, a retributivist
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violates them all with respect to the Two. By foregoing punishment of
the Two, not accepting the offer violates the following duties: to (i)
punish the Two, (ii) give the Two their just deserts, (iii) honor the
Two's right to punishment, (iv) treat the Two as ends-in-themselves,
and (v) treat equally the One and the Two. 247  As a result, not
accepting the offer (and punishing only the One) is also not a viable
option.
3. Not Accepting the Offer and Punishing None
Since punishing either only the One or only the Two violates
retributivism's principles, perhaps the only viable option remaining is
not accepting the offer (and punishing neither the One nor the Two).
This option satisfies the principle of treating equally situated culpable
wrongdoers equally. That is, by punishing neither the One nor the
Two, a retributivist prosecutor treats equally the One and the Two.
But punishing none violates, with respect to both the One and the
Two, four other retributivist duties: to (i) punish them, (ii) give them
their just deserts, (iii) honor their right to punishment, and (iv) treat
them as ends-in-themselves. 248 As a result, not accepting the offer and
punishing none is also not a viable option.
D. Conclusion
This part applied five central principles of retributivism to a
hypothetical immunity offer-the Prosecutor's Dilemma. With
respect to four of the five principles, each one paradoxically requires,
and is violated by, both acceptance and nonacceptance of the offer.
Only the fifth principle-the equality principle-can be satisfied
without violating itself. As a result, no matter which option is chosen
retributivist principles will be violated.
III. INCONSISTENCY AND MORAL DILEMMA
Applying retributivism to the Prosecutor's Dilemma reveals
retributivism's internal inconsistency. The inconsistency is of two
types: (i) inconsistency within retributivism's principles and, (ii)
inconsistency among, or between, retributivism's principles. As a
result of retributivism's inconsistency, both within and among its
principles, retributivism generates a moral dilemma in which any
option a retributivist prosecutor selects will be wrong. Finally, this
part considers two attempts to restore retributivism to consistency and
avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma.
prosecutor satisfies the duty to punish the One, give the One his just deserts, uphold
the One's right to punishment and treat the One as an end. See supra Part II.B.
247. See supra Part II.B.1-5, respectively.
248. See supra Part II.B.1-4, respectively.
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A. Inconsistency
1. Inconsistency Within Retributivism's Principles
Each of the five retributivist principles applicable to the immunity
offer, except the equality principle, are internally inconsistent.
Fulfilling each one of these principles requires punishment of both the
One and the Two which, in turn, requires both acceptance and
nonacceptance of the offer. But this is logically impossible;249 the offer
can only be either accepted or not accepted, but not both. Each one
of these principles is violated by acceptance of the offer as well as
nonacceptance of the offer. Yet, a retributivist prosecutor is caught in
a zero-sum game. The offer can only be accepted or not accepted, it
cannot be neither accepted nor not accepted.250 Each one of the
principles paradoxically requires, and is violated by, both accepting
the offer and not accepting the offer.251
2. Inconsistency Among Retributivism's Principles
The fifth principle-the equality principle-is internally
consistent, 252 but nevertheless is inconsistent with the other four
249. The joint assertion that the offer must be accepted and that the offer must not
be accepted violates the principle of contradiction. The principle of contradiction
holds that a "statement and its negation cannot both be true." Richard Purtill,
Principle of Contradiction, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 737, 737
(Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999). For a similar account, see Simon Blackburn, The
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 81 (1996) ("The conjunction of a proposition and its
negation [cannot be true]."). The principle of contradiction is alternatively termed
"the principle of non-contradiction," Purtill, supra, at 737, or the "law of non-
contradiction," Blackburn, supra, at 81. Thus, the statement that the offer must be
accepted and the negation of the statement-the offer must not be accepted-
constitutes a contradiction which cannot be true. Thus, retributivist principles entail a
contradiction, which cannot be true. As a result, retributivism is internally
inconsistent. Id. ("The standard proof of the inconsistency of a set of propositions or
sentences is to show that a contradiction may be derived from them.").
250. The assertion that the offer must be neither accepted nor not accepted violates
the logical principle of excluded middle. The principle, or law, of excluded middle
holds that for any statement, either the statement or its negation must be true. See
Blackburn, supra note 249, at 129 ("[t]he logical law asserting [that for any
proposition p] p or not-p" must be true); Richard Purtill, Excluded Middle, Principle
(or Law) of, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 738, 738 (Robert Audi ed.,
2d ed. 1999) ("[T]he disjunction of any (significant) statement with its negation is
always true."). Thus, under the law of excluded middle it must be the case that the
offer be accepted or not accepted. The statement that the offer must be neither
accepted nor not accepted violates the law of excluded middle by denying that the
offer must be accepted or not accepted. The following example exemplifies the law of
excluded middle: "'Either there is a tree over 500 feet tall or it is not the case that
there is such a tree'." Id. That retributivist principles seem to require that the offer
should be neither accepted nor not accepted is similar (in form) to saying that there is
neither a tree over 500 feet tall nor is there a tree under 500 feet tall.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 196, 207, 212, and 231.
252. The duty to treat equally those culpable wrongdoers who have equal desert is
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principles. The equality principle requires that a prosecutor not
accept the offer (and punish neither the One nor the Two).253 In
contrast, the other four principles of retributivism require, at the very
least, punishment of either the One or the Two. In that way, the four
principles may at least be partially satisfied. Punishing only the One
at least satisfies the principles with respect to the One; punishing only
the Two at least satisfies the principles with respect to the Two. But
punishing neither the One nor the Two, as the equality principle
.requires, completely violates the four principles with respect to both
the One and the Two. Thus, satisfaction of the four principles-to the
greatest extent possible-requires punishment of (at least) either the
One or the Two. But doing so entails treating the One and the Two
differently. Inconsistency among retributivism's principles exists
because fulfillment of the four principles (to the greatest extent
possible) requires unequal treatment of the One and the Two, but the
equality principle requires their equal treatment.
B. Moral Dilemma
So what is a retributivist prosecutor to do when faced with the offer
in the Prosecutor's Dilemma? As a result of retributivism's internal
inconsistency, any option a retributivist prosecutor selects violates
several retributivist principles. Thus, a retributivist prosecutor's
choice constitutes a moral dilemma.254 Because different types of
moral dilemmas pose difficulties to a varying degree, understanding
the gravity of the Prosecutor's Dilemma for retributivism requires
situating it within the typology of moral dilemmas.
Narrowly defined moral dilemmas are more serious than those that
are broadly defined.255 Perhaps the broadest, and thus least serious,
conception is any situation in which moral reasons conflict (whether
with other moral reasons or nonmoral reasons256), or in which it is not
internally consistent as applied to the Prosecutor's Dilemma because it can be
fulfilled without requiring incompatible courses of action. It can be fulfilled by one of
the options-not accepting the offer and punishing neither the One nor the Two.
That option fulfills the equality principle by treating the One and Two equally (or,
rather, not treating them unequally).
253. See supra Part II.B.5.
254. See Christopher W. Gowans, Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable
Moral Wrongdoing 4 (1994) (defining moral dilemmas, in general, as "situations in
which an agent morally ought to (and can) take one course of action and morally
ought to (and can) take another course of action, even though the agent cannot take
both courses of action").
255. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemma, in The Cambridge Dictionary
of Philosophy 584, 584 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999) (supplying seven different, on a
continuum from broadest to narrowest, conceptions of what constitutes a moral
dilemma).
256. Arguably the prisoner's dilemma could be forced into this category. If we
consider one prisoner betraying his confederate so as to obtain a lighter sentence to
be a moral wrong, then the prisoner faces a moral dilemma of this broad variety. The
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known what, if anything, is the morally right thing to do.257 A
comparatively narrower conception is when "an agent morally ought
to do each of two acts, but cannot do both. ' 258  In a well-known
example of this type, from the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul
Sartre, a student during World War Two believes that he ought to go
abroad and fight the Nazis but at the same time believes that he ought
to stay home to care for his mother, but cannot do both.259  This
conception is still too broad to pose serious problems in that the
"ought" refers to ideal actions (as in one ought to donate money to
charities 260 ) and not moral obligations.26 1 The novel Sophie's Choice26 2
supplies perhaps the best-known recent example of a still narrower
moral dilemma. A Nazi doctor in a World War Two concentration
camp informs Sophie that she must choose which one of her children,
Jan or Eva, to send to a gas chamber. 263  Although Sophie has an
obligation to save Jan and Eva, if Sophie fails to choose,2 6 the Nazi
doctor will send both Jan and Eva to die.265
The relationship of the moral principles or obligations in conflict,
and whether or not the choice of incompatible actions arises through
the fault of the agent, also serve to distinguish moral dilemmas. In
"symmetrical" 266 or equal267 dilemmas, the choice of incompatible
prisoner must choose between loyalty to his confederate and self-interest. But
perhaps confessing and aiding the state in the prosecution of crime-even if it means
betraying one's confederate-is the morally preferable course of action. In any event,
the prisoner's dilemma is not conventionally viewed as a moral dilemma, but rather as
a dilemma of rationality or as a dilemma of self-interest versus collective interest. See
Baird, supra note 25, at 312-13.
257. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 255, at 584.
258. Id.
259. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, in Existentialism (1947),
reprinted in Reason and Responsibility 431, 435 (Joel Feinberg ed., 5th ed. 1981). The
recent war with Iraq has generated a similar example of tragic choice. Prior to
departing to Kuwait to join his troops, a U.S. commander faced the choice of staying
home to care for his infant who needed a heart transplant or going to Kuwait to
prepare and train his troops. NBC Evening News with Tom Brokaw (NBC television
broadcast, Mar. 6, 2003).
260. Although one (ideally) ought to donate money to charities, the failure to do so
does not violate a moral obligation. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 255, at 584.
261. Id.
262. William Styron, Sophie's Choice (1980).
263. Id. at 589.
264. The reason for choosing to save Jan is equally applicable as a basis for
choosing to save Eva. So, there seems to be no basis to choose one over the other.
But if Sophie fails to choose, neither will be saved. While consequentialism would
endorse choosing either child as opposed to making no choice and both being killed,
some argue that the morally preferable course of action is to refuse to choose so as to
avoid cooperating "in the evil project of another." Gowans, supra note 254, at 62 n.7.
265. Styron, supra note 262, at 589.
266. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas 54 (1988).
267. Christopher Gowans refers to symmetrical dilemmas as "the equality
argument." Gowans, supra note 254, at 50.
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actions is generated by the same obligation(s).268 For example, in
Sophie's choice, the twin incompatible duties to save Jan and to save
Eva stem from the same obligation-saving her children.269 In
contrast, different principles giving rise to the duty to perform
incompatible actions generate "incomparable" dilemmas.2 70  For
example, the different principles of aiding one's country and caring for
one's mother, neither of which overrides the other, are incomparable
and generate the dilemma for Sartre's student.2 71 A dilemma which
arises through no fault of the agent confronted with the dilemma is a
"perplexity simpliciter.'2 72  The dilemmas facing both Sophie and
Sartre's student are examples of this type.273 In contrast, a dilemma
arising through the fault of the agent constitutes a "perplexity
secundum quid."'274 The typical, if prosaic, example of the latter type
is when one makes incompatible promises. One is morally obliged to
keep both promises, at least under Kantian ethics,275 but one cannot
because they are incompatible. The resulting dilemma was avoidable
and arose only through the fault of the promisor.2 76  A dilemma
268. In dilemmas in which the moral obligations or principles in conflict are equal
or symmetrical, the same moral obligation or obligations require two (or more)
incompatible courses of action (or non-action). Id. at 49-52; Sinnott-Armstrong, supra
note 266, at 54-58. For an example of an equal or symmetrical dilemma, see supra
text accompanying notes 262-63.
269. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
270. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 58. Gowans refers to incomparable
dilemmas as "The Incomparability Argument." Gowans, supra note 254, at 52. In
dilemmas in which the moral obligations are not equal or symmetrical, but rather
"incomparable," two (or more) different moral obligations, neither of which overrides
the other, require two (or more) incompatible courses of action (or non-action). Id. at
52-57; Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 58-60.
271. See supra text accompanying note 259.
272. Gowans, supra note 254, at 222; Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 102. In
a perplexity simpliciter, or more simply a dilemma simpliciter, the dilemma arises
through no fault of the actor confronted with being obliged to perform two (or more)
incompatible courses of action (or non-action). The actor did not commit avoidable
wrongdoing which precipitated the dilemma. Gowans, supra note 254, at 221-22;
Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 102-06.
273. The dilemma facing Sophie arises, not through any fault of her own, but
because of the Nazi doctor's order compelling her to choose. This choice is made
under penalty of both children being killed if she failed to choose which child would
be saved and which would not. Sartre's student is also not responsible for his
dilemma. It is through no fault of his own that his country needs him to fight the
Nazis and it is also not his fault that his mother needs his care.
274. Gowans, supra note 254, at 222; Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 102. In
a perplexity secundum quid, or more simply a dilemma secundum quid, the dilemma
facing an agent arises because of the agent's prior, avoidable wrongdoing. Gowans,
supra note 254, at 221-22; Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 102-06.
275. For the view that Kant held that keeping one's promises was an important
moral obligation, see, for example, H.J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study
in Kant's Moral Philosophy 152-54 (1948); Sullivan, supra note 134, at 167-170.
276. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions 53, 74 (1979) (citing the making of
incompatible promises as an example of a dilemma, or perplexity, secundum quid in
which the dilemma arises through the fault of the actor).
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simpliciter poses comparatively greater difficulties than a dilemma
secundum quid.277
The Prosecutor's Dilemma is of the most serious type and
particularly thorny. It satisfies the narrowest conception of a moral
dilemma: "a situation where an agent has a strong moral obligation or
requirement to adopt each of two alternatives, and neither is
overridden, but the agent cannot adopt both alternatives. '278  And by
containing both a symmetrical and an incomparable dilemma,279 the
Prosecutor's Dilemma is not merely a dilemma but a trilemma.2 8 °
277. Alan Donagan recognizes that dilemmas secundum quid are quite possible,
but finds dilemmas simpliciter to be so troubling as to declare that such dilemmas do
not exist. Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality 144-45 (1977); Alan Donagan,
Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious: A Comparative Anatomy, in Moral
Dilemmas and Moral Theory 12, 13 (H.I. Mason ed., 1996) [hereinafter Donagan,
Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious]; Alan Donagan, Consistency in Rationalist
Moral Systems, 81 J. of Phil. 291, 305-06 (1984) [hereinafter Donagan, Consistency].
Although few state the case as strongly as Donagan, there is a widespread, albeit not
uniform, belief among moral dilemma scholars that dilemmas, or perplexities,
simpliciter create considerably greater difficulties for a moral theory giving rise to
them than dilemmas, or perplexities, secundum quid. Gowans, supra note 254, at 221.
Noting that an innocent person is in a situation in which there is no choice but to
commit wrong, Gowans explains the comparatively greater gravity of a dilemma
simpliciter:
The ideal of moral innocence explains the thought that there is an important
difference between the two situations. Cases of perplexity secundum quid
are brought about by oneself, they are not imposed by the world. When I
cannot escape wrongdoing on account of previous wrongdoing I have only
myself to blame. I could have acted in such a way that wrongdoing would
not now be inescapable. Innocence, a life free from all wrongdoing, was a
possibility for me. But I chose another path. All this seems quite
compatible with the ideal of innocence, and so from this standpoint is
unproblematic. On the other hand, cases of perplexity simpliciter are
imposed by the world. Here wrongdoing is unavoidable, not because I have
already done something wrong, but because of what happens to me.... If we
are committed to this ideal [of innocence], "our intuitions rebel" at the idea
of perplexity simpliciter in a way that they do not rebel at the idea of
perplexity secundum quid.
Id. at 221-22 (quoting Nagel, supra note 276, at 74 (in contrast to dilemmas secundum
quid, with respect to dilemmas simpliciter "[olur intuitions rebel" with the prospect
that "the world itself.., could face a previously innocent person with a choice
between morally abominable courses of action.")).
278. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 255, at 584.
279. The Prosecutor's Dilemma combines an equal or symmetrical moral dilemma
with an incomparable moral dilemma. In the symmetrical portion of the dilemma,
four principles of retributivism require a prosecutor to accept the offer and punish
only the Two. But the same four principles also require the prosecutor not to accept
the offer and punish only the One. This portion of the dilemma is symmetrical or
equal because it is the same principles which require the incompatible courses of
action (or non-action). The incomparable portion of the Prosecutor's Dilemma is the
conflict between the equality principle and the four principles which require
incompatible courses of action (or non-action). The equality principle differs from
the four principles; however, they are neither greater, weaker nor equal to the
other-they are incomparable.
280. See Blackburn, supra note 249, at 105. Trilemmas are also referred to as
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That is, a retributivist prosecutor has a strong moral obligation to
adopt each of three alternatives -none of which are overridden-but
the prosecutor cannot adopt all three (or even two) of the
alternatives.2 1 ' Furthermore, since the Prosecutor's Dilemma arises
through no fault of the prosecutor, it constitutes the more troubling
dilemma simpliciter.282
Theories generating serious moral dilemmas are widely, albeit not
uniformly,283  considered inadequate, 8" inconsistent, 85  false,28 6
indeterminate, 287  and irrational.28  Regardless of the differing
three-horned or three-pronged dilemmas. Julian Baggini & Peter S. Fosl, The
Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods 93
(2003) (explaining that a dilemmatic choice situation may be described by reference
to the number of incompatible choices which are referred to as horns or prongs).
281. Four retributivist principles require that only the One be punished; the same
four principles require that only the Two be punished; and, the equality principle
requires that neither the One nor the Two be punished. Under the terms of the
Prosecutor's Dilemma, neither all three nor even two of the alternatives can be
adopted by a retributivist prosecutor. Only one of the three alternatives can be
adopted: (i) accept the offer and punish the Two, (ii) not accept the offer and punish
the One, or (iii) not accept the offer and punish neither the One nor the Two. And
no matter which alternative is chosen, strong moral obligations of retributivism will be
violated.
282. Perhaps this is because a dilemma secundum quid, arising through the fault of
the agent confronted with the dilemma, see supra notes 274-76 and accompanying
text, may be blamed on the agent and not the theory generating it. In contrast, a
dilemma simpliciter, arising through no fault of the agent, see supra notes 272-73, may
only be blamed on the theory generating it. For other explanations, see supra note
277 and accompanying text.
283. Curiously, some commentators suggest that perhaps theories which generate
moral dilemmas are not necessarily inferior to those which fail to produce them. E.g.,
Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 181-82 (discussing the claim that the existence
of moral dilemmas is valuable in that they motivate us to avoid the situations in which
they arise); Ruth Marcus, More About Moral Dilemmas, in Moral Dilemmas and
Moral Theory 23, 28 (H.I. Mason ed., 1996) (the situations giving rise to moral
dilemmas should be avoided and the occurrence of moral dilemmas are helpful by
identifying the ways in which the world requires change to prevent their occurrence).
For a critique of this view, see Terrance C. McConnell, Moral Residue and Dilemmas,
in Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory 36, 44 (H.I. Mason ed., 1996) (agents would
still be motivated to avoid situations which generate moral dilemmas even if moral
dilemmas were resolved). A further difficulty of this view is that it seems naive to
suppose that agents can, in fact, with sufficient motivation, avoid all moral dilemmas.
This might be true with dilemmas secundum quid which arise only through the fault of
the agent, but is not true with respect to dilemmas simpliciter. Was it lack of
motivation that precluded Sophie and Sartre's student from being able to avoid
situations, like World War Two, that engendered their respective dilemmas? Should
prosecutors avoid the prosecution of criminals so as to avoid dilemmatic situations
like the Prosecutor's Dilemma or just avoid embracing retributivist principles?
284. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 169; McConell, supra note 283, at 36.
285. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 169; Donagan, Moral Dilemmas,
Genuine and Spurious, supra note 277, at 13 (regarding dilemmas simpliciter).
286. Donagan, Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious, supra note 277, at 13.
287. Thomas E. Hill Jr., Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues: A Kantian
Perspective, in Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory 167, 176-83 (H.I. Mason ed., 1996)
(explaining that moral dilemmas create gaps and indeterminacies in moral theories in
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conceptions of the significance of moral dilemmas for the theories
which generate them, nearly all agree that either avoiding or resolving
serious moral dilemmas is paramount.289
C. Attempts to Avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma
This section presents two attempts to avoid the Prosecutor's
Dilemma.29°  First, a retributivist might choose to declare bargain
offers as unjust or immoral, and refuse to participate in them. Second,
narrowing the scope of the duty to punish culpable wrongdoers to
only those who have been convicted might preclude the dilemma from
arising. However, neither of these attempts successfully avoids the
Prosecutor's Dilemma.
1. Refusal to Participate in Bargain Justice Because It Is Unjust
Moore suggests that perhaps a "retributivist might simply deny the
propriety of the practice [of bargain justice]." '291  As such, a
retributivist prosecutor might simply refuse to participate in bargain
justice. A retributivist system that neither initiated nor even
entertained bargain offers, one might argue, avoids the grip of the
Prosecutor's Dilemma.
which they fail to provide guidance to an agent as to the morally preferable course of
action). See id. at 176 (noting the importance for Kant that morality always provide
guidance as to the proper course of action).
288. Id. at 173 (interpreting Kant as maintaining that morality is based on reason
and that a rational moral system cannot contain serious, unresolvable moral
dilemmas).
289. E.g., Donagan, Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious, supra note 277, at 15
(rationalist moral theories, like those of Kant and St. Thomas Aquinas, cannot allow
moral dilemmas to stand); Hill, supra note 287, at 182 (noting that "what we would
need to do [is] use all permissible means to prevent those situations [moral dilemmas]
from arising"); Marcus, supra note 283, at 23-28 (as rational agents we must avoid the
occurrence of moral dilemmas).
290. For other attempts to avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma, see infra Part IV. For
attempts to not merely avoid, but rather resolve the Prosecutor's Dilemma, see infra
Part V.
291. Moore, supra note 20, at 158. Here Moore is referring to a general, or
deontological, retributivist, rather than a consequentialist retributivist. For the
distinction between the two types of retributivist, see infra notes 310, 312 and
accompanying text. The reason why a (deontological) retributivist might simply
reject the legitimacy of bargain justice and refuse to participate in it is that, according
to Moore,
it might be thought that we rightly refuse to punish some guilty persons in
order to be able to punish other, more seriously guilty persons-as when we
give immunity, in order to extract testimony needed to convict the latter.
How can the retributivist accommodate these practices, given that the
retributivist regards the punishment of the guilty to be categorically
imperative whenever the opportunity to give such punishment presents
itself?
Id. at 156.
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But denying the "propriety" 292 of such bargains does not allow
retributivism to escape. Of course, a retributivist prosecutor could
(and must) refrain from tendering offers of bargain justice. But that
fails to preclude culpable wrongdoers from initiating such offers. And
once the offer is made, it must be either accepted or not. Refusing to
participate in, or even ignoring, offers of bargain justice nonetheless
constitutes not accepting the offer. And by nonacceptance, a
retributivist prosecutor is foregoing punishment of culpable
wrongdoers where there is an opportunity to punish them. 93
Nonacceptance of the offer in the Prosecutor's Dilemma violates, at
least, four central retributivist principles.2 94 As a result, a retributivist
system cannot avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma by declaring that
offers of bargain justice are unjust, and refusing to participate in them.
2. Duty to Punish Limited to Convicted Offenders
The scope of retributivism's duty to punish (as well as its other
principles), one might argue, does not extend to all culpable
wrongdoers, but only to convicted (including those who plead guilty)
culpable wrongdoers. Since neither the One nor the Two are
convicted culpable wrongdoers, neither acceptance nor nonacceptance
of the offer violates such a narrowed duty to punish. Thus, limiting
the duty to punish, one might argue, avoids the Prosecutor's Dilemma.
Limiting the scope of the duty to punish in this way, however, does
not satisfactorily avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma. First, the argument
proves too much. Such a limited duty to punish reduces to a nullity.
No culpable wrongdoer, in a bargain justice situation or not, would
ever need to be prosecuted. Without a concomitant duty to prosecute
cases of suspected culpable wrongdoing, retributivism's limited duty to
punish might never need to be actually carried out.2 95 This would
frustrate retributivism itself. As Moore explains, in construing the
duty to punish: "Retributivism, in other words, is truly a theory of
justice such that, if it is true, we have an obligation to set up
292. Id. at 156.
293. By not accepting the offer, a prosecutor is foregoing the opportunity to punish
the Two-the Two can only be punished if the offer is accepted. The tender of the
One's offer to inculpate the Two in return for immunity supplies the opportunity to
punish the Two.
294. Nonacceptance of the offer entails two distinct options. Nonacceptance of the
offer (and punishing only the One) violates five duties: the duty to punish the Two,
give the Two their just deserts, honor the Two's right to be punished, affirmatively
treat the Two as ends, and treat the One and the Two equally. The other option, not
accepting the offer (and punishing neither the One nor the Two), violates the former
four duties. See supra Part II.C.2-3.
295. Until prosecuted and convicted, no culpable wrongdoer deserves punishment
inflicted by the state. But without a duty to prosecute, there might not be any
convicted culpable wrongdoers. And with no convicted culpable wrongdoers, there
would be no one to punish. The limited duty to punish thereby reduces itself to a
nullity.
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institutions so that retribution is achieved. '296  Since retribution
cannot be attained without punishment and punishment cannot be
attained without prosecution,297 an obligation to attain retribution
entails an obligation to punish, as well as an obligation to prosecute.
Second, even assuming arguendo that the limitation is tenable, it
fails to avoid the following variant of the Prosecutor's Dilemma.298
Suppose that three culpable wrongdoers, who together committed
serious wrongdoing, are apprehended, tried and convicted. After
their conviction, but before their punishment, they escape and elude
capture by the authorities. After an extensive search for a number of
years, the authorities give up. Though safe from the reach of the law,
one of the three no longer wishes to live in hiding, turns herself in and
offers to disclose the location of, and inculpate, the other two in
return for immunity for herself.299
Even if the duty to punish is limited to only those convicted, and
even if the duty did not apply in the Prosecutor's Dilemma, in this
variation the duty would apply. Here, all three are convicted culpable
wrongdoers. And the variation poses the same difficulties for
retributivism as the original Prosecutor's Dilemma.3"0 Thus, even if
296. Moore, supra note 188, at 182; see also Benn, supra note 198, at 30 (for
retributivism "the punishment of crime is right in itself, that it is fitting that the guilty
should suffer, and that justice, or the moral order, requires the institution of
punishment"). For an alternative grounding of the duty to prosecute under
retributivism, see Fletcher, supra note 21, at 60-63.
297. If there was no duty to prosecute, the obligation to attain retribution could not
be satisfied.
298. This is the difficulty with unprincipled, ad hoc arguments. By attacking an
incidental feature of a problem, but not its root, they are typically subject to
counterexamples. By simply eliminating the incidental feature, the problem recurs.
Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2181, 2181
n.1 (1996) (terming such arguments as "lawyers' [unprincipled] ad hocery").
299. In yet another variation, we might suppose that after conviction, but before
incarceration, the three culpable wrongdoers escape to a country which does not have
an extradition treaty with the United States. Though safe from the reach of the law,
one of the three gets homesick, returns to America, and turns herself in to the
authorities. She offers to lure the other two back into the United States and disclose
their location so that they can be apprehended in return for immunity for herself.
Since all three are convicted culpable wrongdoers, there is a duty to punish them even
under the proposed limited duty to punish. Acceptance of the offer affords
punishment of two of the three, but precludes punishment of the offeree.
Nonacceptance of the offer affords punishment of the offeree, but precludes
punishment of the other two. Should the offer be accepted or not? Since there are
incompatible opportunities to punish all three, and all three are convicted, a
retributivist prosecutor will violate the limited duty to punish no matter what option is
chosen. Thus, even if limiting the duty to punish only to convicted culpable
wrongdoers avoids the Prosecutor's Dilemma in its original form, it cannot avoid
variants.
300. Acceptance of the offer violates all five retributivist duties with respect to the
offeree. Nonacceptance of the offer (and punishing only the offeree) violates all five
retributivist duties with respect to the other two culpable wrongdoers.
Nonacceptance of the offer (and punishing none) violates all of the retributivist duties
except the equality principle. Any option a retributivist prosecutor selects violates at
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limiting the duty to punish avoids the original Prosecutor's Dilemma,
it does not avoid variants of the Prosecutor's Dilemma.
D. Conclusion
The inconsistency among, and within, retributivism's principles
reveals retributivism to be internally inconsistent. Four of
retributivism's central principles require nonacceptance of the offer
(and punishment of only the One); but the same four principles also
require acceptance of the offer (and punishment of only the Two). A
fifth principle-the equality principle-requires nonacceptance of the
offer (and punishment of neither the One nor the Two). As a result,
retributivism generates a serious moral dilemma. When faced with
the offer, a retributivist prosecutor has a strong moral obligation to
adopt each of three alternatives, none of which are overridden, but
the prosecutor cannot adopt all three (or even two) of the
alternatives. No matter what a retributivist prosecutor does in the
Prosecutor's Dilemma, it will be wrong. Consideration of two
attempts to avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma failed to yield a
satisfactory solution.3"'
IV. ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE RETRIBUTIVISM WITH BARGAIN
JUSTICE
This part considers two controversial forms of retributivism
advanced, in part, as an effort to make retributivism compatible with
bargain justice. Reconciling retributivism with bargain justice is an
important project for retributivists because unless retributivism can
accommodate the mode in which up to ninety percent of punishments
are imposed,302 retributivism risks irrelevance as a descriptive theory
of punishment-one which can explain what legal institutions of
punishment actually do. As evidenced by the few retributivists to
undertake this project, retributivists are apparently willing to stand
pat with retributivism as largely a prescriptive theory-one which
prescribes what legal institutions of punishment should do by
delineating the conditions for morally just punishment. But as seen in
least four of retributivism's duties.
301. Another perhaps obvious way to attempt to avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma is
by invoking Kant's dictum that ought implies can. See infra note 377. That is, one is
morally obligated to do only that which one can do. Applying it to the Prosecutor's
Dilemma, a retributivist prosecutor is only obligated to do that which she can do.
Since she cannot punish both the One and the Two, she is not obligated by
retributivism's principles to punish both the One and the Two. But she can punish
either the One or the Two. And thus she is still obligated, even under Kant's dictum,
to punish either the One or the Two. The problem, however, just as in Sophie's
choice, see supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text, is in deciding (nonarbitrarily)
which one of the two incompatible courses of action to adopt.
302. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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the previous part, bargain justice, in the form of the Prosecutor's
Dilemma, poses serious difficulties for retributivism even as a merely
prescriptive theory."3
Since bargain justice poses a substantial threat to retributivism in
both its descriptive and prescriptive capacities, then retributivists
might profitably shift from the conventional form of retributivism °4 to
some new form which is not only compatible with bargain justice but
also avoids the Prosecutor's Dilemma. The two alternative versions of
retributivism-"'consequentialist' retributivism"3 5  and threshold
retributivism3°6-attempt to incorporate the consequences of
punishment into a retributivist framework. Although conventional
retributivism eschews (and retributivists criticize) the use of
consequences to justify punishment,3"7 the utilization of consequences
allows these new versions of retributivism to be comparatively more
compatible with bargain justice, thereby accruing greater descriptive
power. This part demonstrates, however, that retributivists' embrace
of consequences not only further undermines retributivism's
prescriptive power, but also fails to avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma.
A. Consequentialist Retributivism
"'Consequentialist' retributivism,"3 might supply a clear answer to
the Prosecutor's Dilemma-accept the offer.3"9  Before considering
whether consequentialist retributivism satisfactorily avoids the
Prosecutor's Dilemma, a brief account and critique of this alternative
version of retributivism is necessary.
1. Deontological v. Consequentialist Retributivism
The conventional conception of retributivism, which Moore terms
"deontological retributivism,"31 demands the punishment of each and
303. It reveals the just conditions of punishment prescribed by retributivism to be
internally inconsistent. See supra Part III.A.
304. For a discussion of the conventional form of retributivism, see supra Parts
I.B.1 and II.B.
305. See infra Part IV.A.
306. See infra Part IV.B.
307. See Duff, supra note 6, at 2, 186 (explaining that the moral defects of
consequentialism are due to its utilization of contingent consequences to justify
punishment).
308. Moore, supra note 20, at 155.
309. According to Moore, the problems for retributivism in justifying the
acceptance of offers of bargain justice might be alleviated under a consequentialist
form of retributivism. Id. at 156 ("[I]f a retributivist may be a consequentialist, these
are obviously non-problems for his theory of punishment.").
310. Moore distinguishes "deontological versus consequentialist retributivism," id.
at 159, as follows:
The 'deontological' or 'agent-relative' retributivist regards the act of
punishing the guilty as categorically demanded on each occasion, considered
separately; the 'consequentialist' or 'agent-neutral' retributivist regards the
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every guilty person even if doing so foregoes greater opportunities to
punish the guilty. 31' In contrast, consequentialist retributivism seeks
to maximize the number of culpable wrongdoers punished even if
doing so foregoes punishment of some culpable wrongdoers.1 2
Although both versions of retributivism value a culpable wrongdoer
receiving his just deserts as an intrinsic good, 13 only consequentialist
state of the guilty receiving punishment as a good state to be maximized
even when this means that some guilty persons are intentionally allowed to
escape punishment.
Id. at 156. Moore concludes that "both are recognizable versions of retributivism."
Id. at 159. Simply stated, deontology is a view in which morally "right action is...
independent.., of goodness .... Some principles of right and wrong, notably
principles of justice and honesty, prescribe actions even though more evil than good
would result from doing them." John Deigh, Ethics, in The Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy 284, 287 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999). John Rawls supplies a concise
account of deontology by contrasting it with teleology:
[A] deontological theory... [is] one that either does not specify the good
independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing
the good. (It should be noted that deontological theories are defined as non-
teleological ones, not as views that characterize the rightness of institutions
and acts independently from their consequences.)
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 30 (1971). At the risk of oversimplification,
deontology is concerned with the right more so than with the good, and is generally
associated with a Kantian view of morality as well as retributivism. Teleology is
comparatively more concerned with the good than the right and is typically associated
with consequentialism and utilitarianism. See Nancy (Ann) Davis, Contemporary
Deontology, in A Companion to Ethics 205, 205 (Peter Singer ed., 1991).
311. Moore, supra note 20, at 156.
312. Id. Moore illustrates the distinction between these two forms of retributivism
by the following example:
Take Kant's old example of the last murderer in an island society that is
about to disband and leave its island. A retributivist believes that the
murderer should be punished because he deserves it, even though no other
good will thereby be achieved. The guilty, in other words, must be punished.
If one construes this retributivist norm as an agent-relative norm
[deontological retributivism], then the members of Kant's island society are
obligated to punish the last murderer even if by doing so other murderers
elsewhere will go unpunished. (We might imagine, for example, that if we
punish this murderer, he will not testify against other guilty murderers who
will thereby escape conviction and punishment.) Alternatively, if one
construes this retributivist norm as a norm describing a state of affairs that is
to be maximized, then the members of Kant's island society should not
punish the last murderer but should maximize the punishment of the guilty
by their actions.
Id. at 155-56 (citation omitted).
313. Moore asserts that both forms of retributivism share that which is distinctive
to retributivism in general:
[W]hat is distinctively retributivist is the view that the guilty receiving their
just deserts is an intrinsic good. It is, in other words, not an instrumental
good-good because such punishment causes other states of affairs to exist
that are good. Even if punishing the guilty were without any further effects,
it would be a good state to bring about, on this intrinsic view of punishing
the guilty.
Id. at 157.
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retributivism seeks to maximize the generation of that intrinsic
good.314
2. Untenable Form of Retributivism
In perhaps the only assessment of Moore's consequentialist
retributivism, David Dolinko argues that "to be both a
consequentialist and a retributivist is not, after all, a tenable position;
it is well-nigh impossible, given a standard account of retributivism
(such as Moore himself presents)."3"5  According to Moore, under
retributivism, "the beneficial consequences [of punishment] other
than giving offenders their just deserts... [must] form no part of what
makes punishment just. '316  But Dolinko contends that a
consequentialist, or even a consequentialist-retributivist, must
necessarily view offenders receiving their just deserts as only one
among many good consequences to promote.3"7  That is, a
consequentialist or consequential-retributivist would necessarily
recognize a plurality of good consequences or good states of affairs to
314. Moore argues that both forms of retributivism are valid and that some of the
purported problems of deontological retributivism are not sufficient to warrant a shift
to consequentialist retributivism. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text. But
as Moore concedes, "[t]he same cannot be said about the intentional forgoing of any
opportunity to punish a guilty offender in order to obtain the conviction and
punishment of an even more guilty offender, which is why this common prosecutorial
practice is more of a problem for the deontological version of retributivism." Moore,
supra note 20, at 158. Though Moore acknowledges that deontological retributivism
has difficulty accommodating bargain justice, nonetheless he asserts that a
deontological retributivist still has a number of moves: "[T]he deontological
retributivist might simply deny the propriety of the practice. More plausibly, if he is a
'threshold deontologist', as am I, he might more qualifiedly disavow the practice
except when it is needed to punish some very deserving criminals." Id. (citation
omitted). For a discussion as to why the former option does not provide a satisfactory
solution to the difficulties sustained by retributivism as applied to offers of bargain
justice, see supra Part III.C.1. For a discussion of why Moore's latter solution is
unsatisfactory, see infra Part IV.B.3.
315. David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of
Punishment, 16 Law & Phil. 507, 513 (1997).
316. Moore, supra note 20, at 153.
317. Otherwise, according to Dolinko, an absurdity would result. That is, if
consequentialists or consequential retributivists recognized only one good
consequence or state of affairs-offenders receiving their just deserts-the following
absurdity would ensue:
What consequentialist, for example, would rank a state of affairs in which all
guilty persons receive their just deserts but everyone else dies painfully by
age 30 as better than one in which only one guilty person escapes deserved
punishment and all non-criminals lead long and happy lives? Indeed, to
insist that only the quantity of "the guilty receiving punishment" affects the
goodness of a state of affairs implies the absurd conclusion that a state of
affairs wherein no one ever commits any crime at all lacks goodness
altogether.
Dolinko, supra note 315, at 514.
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be promoted." ' Since Moore's own requirement for retributivism
insists on the relevance of only one beneficial consequence in
justifying punishment, but consequentialism necessarily considers a
plurality of good consequences, Dolinko concludes that "a
consequentialist version of retributivism appears impossible." '319
3. Applicability to Offer
Assuming arguendo that consequentialist retributivism is tenable, it
might avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma. Since punishing the Two
maximizes the intrinsic good of retributive punishment,
consequentialist retributivism provides a clear basis to accept the
offer.32 And because consequentialist retributivism does not feature
the duty to punish a culpable wrongdoer on each occasion the
opportunity presents itself,3 1 there is no inconsistency within the duty
to punish.
But accepting the offer, even under consequentialist retributivism,
still yields conflicts among retributivism's central principles. By
foregoing punishment of the One, acceptance of the offer fails to give
the One her just deserts, violates the One's right to punishment, uses
the One as a mere means, and treats the One and the Two
unequally.322 One might argue, however, that these central principles
of retributivism, which conflict with the duty to maximize retributive
punishment, are not principles of consequentialist retributivism. A
version of retributivism lacking these principles eliminates the
possibility of their conflict;3 23 with no inconsistent principles,
retributivism, albeit the consequentialist version, is restored to
consistency.
Consequentialist retributivism attains consistency, however, at a
heavy price. Its justification of the unequal treatment of equally
culpable wrongdoers may be too much even for consequentialist
318. Id. ("The consequentialist-retributivist, then, presumably believes that there
exist a plurality of distinct 'good-making' features of states of affairs, of which the
guilty receiving deserved punishment is simply one.").
319. Id. at 515; see id. (stating that consequentialist retributivism is incoherent "if
we insist [as Moore does] that the meting out of just deserts is the only beneficial
consequence of punishment relevant to its justification").
320. Moore, supra note 20, at 157 ("For the consequentialist-retributivist, no
matter how intrinsically good it is that the guilty receive their deserts, more of that
good is to be preferred to less of it.").
321. Id. ("[T]he consequentialist-retributivist will intentionally refuse to punish
guilty persons whenever more guilty persons (or greater guilt) will be punished
thereby.").
322. Thus consequentialist retributivism's duty to maximize retributive punishment
conflicts with other central values of retributivism.
323. If these principles are not constituent elements of consequentialist
retributivism, then, of course, they can no longer be in conflict. The simple but
effective tack of consequential retributivism might be simply to eliminate the
inconsistent principles.
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retributivism's proponent, Michael Moore.3 24 By declaring that "[l]ike
cases should indeed be treated alike,' 3 25 and criticizing another
punishment theory for violating the principle of equality,3 26 Moore
himself is apparently unwilling to embrace consequentialist
retributivism's unequal treatment of equally culpable wrongdoers.
Thus, even a consequentialist retributivist might not be willing to
abandon the equality principle. If so, accepting the offer creates a
conflict within consequentialist retributivism -between the duty to
maximize retributive punishment and treating equally culpable
wrongdoers equally.327
Furthermore, presumably even consequentialist retributivists would
be loath to abandon the duty to treat offenders as ends and not as
mere means.328 Elimination of the duty, to avoid inconsistency,329
renders consequentialist retributivism subject to the same criticisms
used to condemn consequentialism.330  Retributivists themselves
condemn consequentialism for this very failing-using persons as
mere means-terming it the "primary," '331 and "fundamental," '332
problem of consequentialism. As a result, consequentialist
retributivism would be unlikely to divest itself of this fundamental
principle. But inclusion of this principle renders consequentialist
324. Moore does not champion it but merely recognizes it as a possible form of
retributivism. See supra note 309.
325. Moore, supra note 20, at 90 (while subscribing to the equality principle, Moore
is careful to note that retributivism should not be reduced to merely that principle).
326. Moore criticizes a victims' rights version of retributivism as untenable, in part,
because it would violate the principle of equality:
In a truly victim-oriented system, if a wrongdoer has the good luck to injure
one of the New Testament types, instead of one of those Old Testament
types, then that wrongdoer is going to receive less punishment-because he
is always going to get the turn-your-other-cheek forgiveness response from
his victim. That is not equality. The propensity of a victim to forgive her
transgressor is irrelevant to retributive desert. Two offenders, one of whom
injures a resentful victim and the other of whom injures a forgiving victim,
seem equally deserving of punishment, but a rights-based retributivism
would not achieve that result.
Id. at 77. In critiquing a purported form of retributivism as an illegitimate form of
retributivism, because it would violate the principle of equality, Moore seems to
endorse the principle of equality as an integral component of a legitimate form of
retributivism.
327. For a discussion of the duty to treat equally culpable wrongdoers equally, see
supra Part II.B.5.
328. For a discussion of the duty to treat persons as ends rather than as mere
means, see supra Part II.B.4.
329. For the conflict between the duty to maximize retributive punishment and the
duty to treat persons as ends, rather than as mere means, see supra text accompanying
note 322.
330. Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 1341 (noting that using offenders as mere means
is the "most fundamental" difficulty with consequentialism).
331. See Morris, supra note 211, at 46.
332. See Duff, supra note 6, at 149.
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retributivism internally inconsistent as applied to the Prosecutor's
Dilemma.
3 3
In conclusion, consequentialist retributivism does not satisfactorily
avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma. First, even apart from its application
to bargain justice, consequentialist retributivism may be conceptually
"impossible. 334  Second, consequentialist retributivism's duty to
maximize retributive punishment conflicts with core retributive
principles. 335 Third, while it could avoid inconsistency by divesting of
most of retributivism's central principles, consequentialist
retributivism would scarcely be a retributive theory at all. And it
would share with consequentialism those fundamental failings pointed
out by retributivists themselves.336  And fourth, even if
consequentialist retributivism avoids the Prosecutor's Dilemma, it
cannot avoid variants of the Prosecutor's Dilemma.337
B. Threshold Retributivism
Another alternative form of retributivism, threshold retributivism,
might avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma. After explaining the relation
between this alternative form of retributivism and the broader
philosophical view from which it stems, threshold deontology,338 this
333. See supra text accompanying note 322.
334. Dolinko, supra note 315, at 513, 515.
335. To maximize the intrinsic good of retributive punishment, a consequentialist-
retributivist prosecutor must accept the offer and punish the Two. But by doing so,
the consequentialist retributivism system (i) fails to give the One his just deserts, (ii)
violates the One's right to punishment, (iii) uses the One as a mere means, and (iv)
fails to treat the One equally with the Two.
336. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
337. Assuming arguendo that consequentialist retributivism avoids internal
inconsistency and avoids the Prosecutor's Dilemma, it cannot avoid the following
variant. Suppose that all of the same facts obtain except that instead of three co-
culpable wrongdoers, there are only two, A and B; A is in custody and offers to
inculpate B in return for immunity. Unlike our original offer, there is nothing to
maximize in this variation. Acceptance as well as nonacceptance of the offer only
nets a consequentialist retributivist system the intrinsic good of punishing one
culpable wrongdoer. From a maximizing perspective neither acceptance nor
nonacceptance is preferable.
In the variation, the same internal conflicts arise as in the Prosecutor's
Dilemma. By not accepting A's offer (and foregoing punishment of B), a
consequentialist retributivist system violates the duty to punish B, fails to give B her
just deserts, fails to treat B equally with respect to the similarly situated A, violates
B's right to punishment, and fails to affirmatively treat B as an end in herself. Thus, it
would seem that the offer should be accepted. But accepting the offer violates the
very same four principles of retributivism. By accepting A's offer (and foregoing
punishment of A), a consequentialist retributivist system violates the duty to punish
A, fails to give A his just deserts, fails to treat A equally with respect to the similarly
situated B, violates A's right to punishment and, uses A as a mere means in order to
properly punish B. Thus, it would seem that the offer in the variation should be both
accepted and not accepted.
338. For an account of the philosophical view of (non-threshold) deontology, see
supra note 310.
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section indirectly assesses the validity of threshold retributivism by
considering criticisms of threshold deontology. Even assuming
arguendo that threshold retributivism is tenable, it fails to dispel the
Prosecutor's Dilemma.
1. Threshold Retributivism's Relation to Threshold Deontology
Threshold retributivism stems from threshold deontology, which
combines deontology and consequentialism.339 As Moore explains,
"[a] 'threshold' deontologist refuses to violate a categorical norm of
morality until not doing so produces sufficient bad consequences as to
pass some threshold-then, he will override such categorical
norms.""34  That is, unlike consequentialism, an act that is morally
wrong should not be committed merely because it produces, on
balance, good consequences.341 And unlike deontology, the same
morally wrong act may, or must, be committed if the good
consequences of doing so become sufficiently great.
342
339. Moore is not alone in endorsing threshold deontology. See, e.g., Donagan,
Consistency, supra note 277, at 306-07. Charles Fried explains the special case in
which the prohibition against intentionally harming innocents should be violated to
avoid sufficiently adverse consequences:
[W]e can imagine extreme cases where killing an innocent person may save a
whole nation. In such cases it seems fanatical to maintain the absoluteness
of the judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall. And so the
catastrophic may cause the absoluteness of right and wrong to yield, but
even then it would be a non sequitur to argue (as consequentialists are fond
of doing) that this proves that judgments of right and wrong are always a
matter of degree, depending on the relative goods to be attained and harms
to be avoided. I believe, on the contrary, that the concept of the
catastrophic is a distinct concept just because it identifies the extreme
situations in which the usual categories of judgment (including the category
of right and wrong) no longer apply.
Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 10 (1978). Thomas Nagel suggests the difficulties of
adhering to an absolutist position in which consequences never override the violation
of norms:
While not every conflict between [deontological] absolutism and
utilitarianism creates an insoluble dilemma, and while it seems to me
certainly right to adhere to absolutist restrictions unless the utilitarian
considerations favoring violation are overpoweringly weighty and extremely
certain-nevertheless, when that special condition is met, it may become
impossible to adhere to an absolutist position.
Nagel, supra note 276, at 56. See also Nozick, supra note 220, at 30 n.*
(acknowledging that consequentialist concerns might override deontological duties at
a certain threshold).
340. Moore, supra note 20, at 158 n.13.
341. See infra note 371 and accompanying text.
342. As Moore explains,
[i]t just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or
torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the
destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or
torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme
actions seem to me to be justified.
Moore, supra note 20, at 719.
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Threshold retributivism is merely threshold deontology applied to
the punishment arena.343 Under threshold retributivism, the good
consequences of punishment are insufficient in justifying punishment
until the good consequences become sufficiently great as to reach
some threshold.3" In other words, retributivist considerations control
whether punishment is justified below the threshold level; but, at and
above the threshold level, consequentialist considerations determine
whether punishment is justified.345
Moore maintains that threshold retributivism, or threshold
deontology, justifies offering and/or accepting immunity deals.346 The
conventional "retributivist might simply deny the propriety of the
practice" of the intentional foregoing of any opportunity to punish a
guilty offender in order to obtain the conviction of an even more
guilty offender.3 4' But if the retributivist "is a 'threshold deontologist',
as am I, he might more qualifiedly disavow the practice except when it
is needed to punish some very deserving criminal(s). 3 4 That is, the
duty to punish culpable wrongdoers whenever the opportunity arises
precludes retributivism from justifying immunity deals.3 49 But when a
certain threshold is reached-some very deserving criminal(s) would
otherwise escape punishment-then threshold retributivism would
purportedly justify violating the duty to punish one offender in order
to secure her testimony inculpating a criminal who is substantially
more deserving of punishment.
2. Untenable Form of Retributivism
Before applying threshold retributivism to the Prosecutor's
Dilemma, let us briefly present the serious criticisms leveled at
threshold deontology.350 Nancy Davis argues that though threshold
343. Though no theorist employs the term "threshold retributivism," our discussion
of it will be based on Moore's threshold deontology as it applies, and as Moore
applies it, to the punishment context.
344. For example, perhaps unlike consequentialism, the intentional punishment of
a known innocent would not be justified merely because it would generate deterrence
sufficient to prevent two innocents from being murdered. But if it would prevent the
murders of, for example, 500 innocent victims, and this reached the threshold, then
presumably threshold retributivism would justify the intentional punishment of a
known innocent.
345. Threshold retributivism might also be stated in the negative: the bad
consequences of failing to punish are insufficient to justify not punishing until they
become sufficiently grave as to reach some threshold at which point the bad
consequences become sufficient to justify not punishing.
346. Moore, supra note 20, at 158.
347. Id.
348. Id. (citation omitted).
349. In an immunity deal, the prosecutor foregoes the opportunity to punish one
culpable wrongdoer to obtain the punishment of some other culpable wrongdoer(s).
See supra Part I.A.2.
350. So far as I know, no commentator has addressed threshold retributivism. But
commentators have addressed threshold deontology. The criticisms of threshold
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deontology saves deontology from "fanaticism" and implausibility,
utilization of the threshold undermines deontology as a consistent and
sound theory.351  Left unexplained, according to Davis, is why
violating deontological norms below the threshold is absolutely wrong
but permissible at, or above, the threshold.3 52 Anthony Ellis argues
persuasively that setting the threshold is inevitably and irretrievably
arbitrary.353 Larry Alexander entertainingly points out a number of
deontology may be relevant in assessing the plausibility of threshold retributivism.
351. Davis, supra note 310, at 215-16 ("Though allowing that we may violate
deontological constraints in dire circumstances saves deontological views from the
appearance of fanaticism, and thus confers greater normative plausibility on them, it
may well undermine them as theories."). Davis further explains the difficulties with
threshold deontology:
It is hard to see how one can justify the view that a decision about whether
or not to take the action that is necessary to save the nation (an action that
would, in less extreme circumstances, be counted.., as being wrongful) is
not a moral decision. Such a view carries the suggestion that terrible
circumstances somehow relieve us of the obligation (though surely not the
need!) to act morally .... The view that concepts of right and wrong do not
apply in extreme situations is one that encourages complacency, if not actual
passivity. It is one that any responsible moral agent ought to reject.
Id. at 216.
352. Id. ("The addition of a 'catastrophe clause' is particularly problematic. Why
do the effects of our acts on others' weal and woe acquire relevance only at the
'catastrophic' level?").
Moore has a reply to this sort of criticism. He denies that consequences are
irrelevant to deontology prior to the threshold being reached. Consequences are
relevant, but are outweighed by other principles, prior to the threshold. At the point
of the threshold, consequences outweigh the other principles. Moore gives the
following account of the role that consequences play both prior to, and at, the
threshold:
[F]or a threshold deontologist consequences always 'count'. For behaviour
violating deontological constraints, however, until the threshold is reached
the principle that makes such consequences count-the consequentialist
principle itself-is outweighed by other moral principles. As the
consequences get more and more severe, the consequentialist principle
becomes of greater weight as applied to this situation, until at some point
(the threshold) the consequentialist principle outweighs competing
principles of morality. Even before such a threshold was reached,
consequences counted but were of insufficient weight to determine the
rightness of actions.
Moore, supra note 20, at 723. For a criticism of Moore's reply, see Larry Alexander,
Deontology at the Threshold, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 893, 907-10, 912 (arguing that for
consequences to be relevant and outweighed below the threshold and outweigh
deontological prohibitions above the threshold requires deontology and
consequentialism to be commensurable; but, in fact, they are incommensurable).
353. Anthony Ellis, Deontology, Incommensurability and the Arbitrary, 52 Phil. &
Phenomenological Res. 855, 859-70 (1992). A full exposition of Ellis's argument is
beyond the scope of this Article. In short, Ellis argues that the specification of any
threshold will inevitably and necessarily be arbitrary because to locate the threshold
one must locate the precise point at which the bad consequences of conforming to the
deontological norm outweigh the wrongness of violating the deontological norm. But
there is no scale upon which to comparatively weigh the badness of consequences
versus the wrongness of violating deontological duties. According to Ellis, the
badness of consequences and the wrongness of actions are incommensurable. Id. at
2003] THE PROSECUTOR'S DILEMMA
moral anomalies that would occur at the edges of the threshold35 4 and
concludes that threshold deontology is "erroneous '355  and
"implausible."356
861-62. As a result, locating the threshold is necessarily arbitrary. Id.; cf Davis, supra
note 310, at 216 ("And to what (clear and practicable) features can agents appeal to
distinguish a 'catastrophic' situation in which 'right' and 'wrong' do not apply from a
merely dreadful one in which they do?").
Moore anticipates this objection:
[T]he worry may be that any point we pick for a threshold beyond which
consequences determine the rightness of an action may seem arbitrary. Do
we need there to be 500 people in a building about to be blown up by a
bomb before we may torture an innocent to find the bomb's location, or will
450 do?
... [T]his worry.., is not the basis of any powerful objection to threshold
deontology as a moral theory. For this is no more than the medieval worry
of how many stones make a heap. Our uncertainty whether it takes three, or
four, or five, etc., does not justify us in thinking that there are no such things
as heaps. Similarly, preventing the torture of two innocents does not justify
my torturing one, but destruction of an entire city does.
Moore, supra note 20, at 724. Even if we accept that at some point sufficiently bad
consequences should outweigh adherence to deontological norms, just as we accept
that some sufficient number of stones will constitute a heap, nevertheless whatever
level of bad consequences is chosen will be no less arbitrary than the number of
stones that comprise a heap. And furthermore, while nothing of significance rests on
whether the number of stones chosen as comprising a heap is arbitrary, the dividing
line between what is morally right and wrong should not be arbitrary. Ellis, supra at
859.
354. In the following hypothetical Alexander asks us to assume that the threshold
at which one has an affirmative duty to undertake a rescue is when twenty lives are at
risk:
Twenty people are clinging to a housetop surrounded by rapidly rising
floodwaters. Rescuer, who has a large boat that can easily and safely hold
the threatened twenty, understands himself to have an affirmative duty to
rescue them. As he pulls alongside the housetop, one of the stranded people
jumps off and into Rescuer's boat. Rescuer, realizing that there are now
only nineteen people in harm's way, turns away from the housetop and
ignores the desperate pleas of the nineteen left behind.
Alexander, supra note 352, at 901. Alexander concludes that Rescuer violates no
duty under threshold deontology in saving only the one because the nineteen at risk
were under the threshold. Id. But what is disturbing is that "the other lives at risk
[the nineteen] are pure moral ballast, serving no purpose other than to create a duty
to save someone else." Id. And, in effect, this seems to violate the very essence of
threshold deontology:
[O]nce the single life is saved... Rescuer is relieved of his affirmative duty
to rescue. By hypothesis, however, one may not be tortured or placed under
an affirmative duty to rescue for the sake of one life. So cases at, or just
above, the threshold seem paradoxical: the very deontological constraints
that protect one from straight consequentialist trade-offs below the
threshold disappear above it, so that one then can be killed, tortured, or
forced to rescue merely to save one person.
Id.
355. Id. at 911.
356. Id. at 912.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
3. Applicability to Offer
Despite the criticisms leveled at threshold deontology, let us assume
arguendo that threshold retributivism is tenable. Does the failure to
punish "some very deserving criminal(s) 35 7 generate sufficiently bad
consequences so as to reach the threshold level where threshold
retributivism could justify immunity deals? Though Moore fails to
supply a test as to precisely where the threshold should be set, and
concedes the difficulty of doing so,358 the common denominator of
accounts of what clearly meets the threshold is that of a catastrophe." 9
Moore himself variously uses the standards of "extraordinary
harms,"36  "horrendous consequences,"36' and "exceptionally awful
consequences."362 Specific examples satisfying the threshold include
the demise of a nation,363 "if the heavens will in fact fall,"'3" "nuclear
war, ' 365 and the "destruction of a sizeable city by a terrorist nuclear
device. 366 For Moore, "the destruction.., of a lifeboat or building
full of people" only "perhaps" rises to the level of the threshold.
367 If
such abhorrent consequences merely perhaps rise to the level of the
threshold, then a fortiori it does not seem that foregoing punishment
of a criminal who is "very deserving ' 36 of punishment would satisfy
the "horrendous consequences '369 standard necessary for reaching the
threshold.
Even assuming arguendo that failing to punish a very deserving
offender meets the threshold (and thus threshold retributivism would
justify at least some immunity deals), threshold retributivism would
not justify a prosecutor accepting the offer in the Prosecutor's
Dilemma. There, each of the three offenders are equally culpable and
equally deserving of punishment.37' No offender is more deserving of
punishment than the other. According to Moore, "preventing the
torture of two innocents does not justify my torturing one, but
destruction of an entire city does. 371  Thus, if the torture of two
357. Moore, supra note 20, at 158.
358. Id. at 724 (setting the threshold "give[s] rise to quite genuine perplexity and
anxiety when we make practical decisions").
359. See Fried, supra note 339, at 10 (using the term "catastrophic" as a measure of
the threshold); Alexander, supra note 352, at 897 ("moral catastrophes"); Davis,
supra note 310, at 216 (referring to the threshold as the "'catastrophe clause').
360. Moore, supra note 20, at 719.
361. Id. at 721.
362. Id. at 722.
363. See Fried, supra note 339, at 10.
364. Id.
365. Moore, supra note 20, at 719.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 721-22.
368. Id. at 158.
369. See supra text accompanying note 361.
370. See supra text accompanying note 172.
371. Moore, supra note 20, at 724. In contrasting threshold deontology from
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innocents does not meet the threshold whereby threshold deontology
would justify the torture of one innocent to prevent the torture of the
two, then similarly the failure to punish two offenders does not meet
the threshold whereby threshold retributivism would justify foregoing
punishment of one offender in order to punish two. 37 2  Since a
necessary condition for threshold retributivism is not met (the
threshold), threshold retributivism fails to avoid the Prosecutor's
Dilemma.
C. Conclusion
This part considered two alternative versions of retributivism-
consequentialist and threshold retributivism-propounded, in part, to
accommodate bargain justice. Consequentialist retributivism can
justify bargain justice. But the cure may be worse than the malady.
By gutting retributivism of its core values, consequentialist
retributivism is a form of retributivism in name only. And it shares
consequentialism's most fundamental problem (as pointed out by
retributivists). While consequentialist retributivism can avoid the
Prosecutor's Dilemma, it cannot avoid its variants. Threshold
retributivism fares no better. Except in extreme circumstances,
threshold retributivism cannot justify bargain justice and, under no
circumstances, can it avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma.
Consequentialist retributivism's purchase of descriptive power comes
at the very high price of eviscerating retributivism's ability to
prescribe the just conditions for punishment. Threshold retributivism
only gains modest descriptive power while still not avoiding the
Prosecutor's Dilemma. By resolving the internal inconsistency
revealed by the Prosecutor's Dilemma, retributivists might more
profitably concede retributivism's lack of descriptive power in failing
to accommodate bargain justice while seeking to restore its
prescriptive power.
consequentialism, Moore further explains:
A consequentialist is committed by her moral theory to saying that torture
of one person is justified whenever it is necessary to prevent the torture of
two or more. The agent-relative view [i.e., deontological view], even as here
modified [i.e, threshold deontology] is not committed to this proposition. To
justify torturing one innocent person requires... a very high threshold of
bad consequences ....
Id. at 721-22.
372. The threshold would not be met unless the equivalent of an entire city's
criminals deserving punishment failed to receive their punishment. See supra text
accompanying notes 366, 371.
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V. RESOLVING THE PROSECUTOR'S DILEMMA
Since retributivists cannot satisfactorily avoid the Prosecutor's
Dilemma,373 then they must resolve it.374 There are two principal
methods of resolution. First, retributivists might abandon entirely
some duties until there are no duties remaining which conflict. This
would require abandoning four of retributivism's central duties
discussed above.7 Shorn of these duties, the resulting theory would
scarcely be retributive at all and would suffer from the same criticisms
by which retributivists themselves condemn consequentialism.376
Second, retributivists might downgrade the status of some duties from
absolute to conditional. In the event that duties conflict, some duties
would give way to other duties. This method allows retributivism to
retain its duties (albeit in diluted form) but resolves conflicts by
prioritizing among its duties. By effecting the most minimal
modification of retributivism, prioritization is preferable to
abandoning them outright.
A. Prioritizing Among Retributivism's Duties: Negative v. Positive
Although there are competing conceptions of how to resolve moral
dilemmas,377 the preferred method among leading retributivists is the
373. Avoiding rather than resolving dilemmas (at least dilemmas simpliciter) is
problematic and unrealistic. See supra note 283. The Prosecutor's Dilemma may
quite easily be avoided-either cease the prosecution of criminals or eliminate
retributivism completely. But these options are neither satisfactory nor necessary.
For two unsuccessful attempts to avoid the Prosecutor's Dilemma, see supra Part
III.C. Part IV considered two alternative versions of retributivism. While threshold
retributivism fails to avoid the dilemma, consequentialist retributivism does avoid the
dilemma, but in an unsatisfactory way. Consequentialist retributivism avoids the
dilemma only by eliminating virtually all of retributivism's principles.
Consequentialist retributivism is a form of retributivism in name only. And
moreover, consequentialist retributivism cannot avoid variants of the Prosecutor's
Dilemma. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
374. For why moral dilemmas must be resolvied (if not avoided), see supra notes
284-89 and accompanying text.
375. Under this method, all five duties except the equality principle would have to
be abandoned. Eliminating any fewer than these four duties would still leave conflicts
both within, and among, retributivism's duties.
376. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
377. According to the "The Dilemmas Thesis," "[t]here are moral conflicts in
which the correct conclusion of moral deliberation" is that an agent is morally
obligated to adopt each of the incompatible alternatives, despite that it is impossible
to adopt them all. Gowans, supra note 254, at 49. Thus, for example, Sophie is
morally obligated to save both Jan and Eva, despite that it is impossible, under the
terms of the choice given to Sophie, to save both. And, under the "Dilemmas
Thesis," our retributivist prosecutor is morally obligated to punish both the One and
the Two, despite the impossibility of both accepting and not accepting the offer.
Under this approach, then, resolving a moral dilemma requires eliminating the
principle(s) in conflict giving rise to the dilemma. For a defense of this view, see
Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 53-71; McConell, supra note 283, at 36-44. For
arguments against this view, see Gowans, supra note 254, at 70-75, 83-84.
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prioritization of duties. Both Kant, the leading historical influence on
retributivism,378 and Moore, currently perhaps the leading retributivist
among legal scholars,3 79 agree that genuine moral dilemmas are
impossible."' But both agree that prioritizing among the duties in
In contrast, under "The Options Thesis," "[f]or every moral conflict, the
correct conclusion of moral deliberation" is that an agent is morally obligated to
adopt only one of the conflicting alternatives. Id. at 49. Thus, for example, Sophie is
only morally obligated to save either Jan or Eva, but not both. And a retributivist
prosecutor, facing the Prosecutor's Dilemma, would be morally obligated to either (i)
accept the offer and punish the Two, (ii) not accept the offer and punish the One, or
(iii) not accept the offer and punish neither the One nor the Two. Under the
"Options Thesis," moral dilemmas are transformed from situations in which no
matter what one does is wrong to no matter what one does is, if not right, at least,
permissible.
The Options Thesis is based in part on Kant's dictum that ought implies can.
Although the principle is often attributed to Kant, he never used quite those words.
See Sullivan, supra note 134, at 320 n.6 ("Kant is usually interpreted as holding that
,should'... implies 'can'.... Although he nowhere makes this claim in so many
words, this is clearly his doctrine."). Sullivan cites a number of passages from which
the principle has been cobbled. Id. (citing Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical
Reason 159 (Lewis White Beck ed., 1956) ("[W]e 'know that we can do [what the
moral law commands] because our reason acknowledges [that law] as its law and says
that we ought to do it"')); Kant, supra note 8, at 380 ("man 'must judge that he can do
what the law commands unconditionally that he ought to do"')). For discussions of
the principle, see Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship
342 (1984) (discussing John Rawls and H.L.A. Hart's use of the principle); William K.
Frankena, Obligation and Ability, in Philosophical Analysis: A Collection of Essays
148 (Max Black ed., 1950) ("[M]any moral philosophers.., say, in one way or
another, that 'ought' implies 'can.' Indeed, if there is anything on which philosophers
are agreed with plain men and with each other, and goodness knows there is very
little, it is Kant's dictum ...."). For criticism of Kant's dictum, see Sinnott-
Armstrong, supra note 266, at 113-26. According to Kant's dictum, we are under a
duty to do something only if we physically can do it. If we physically cannot do
something, then we are not under a duty to do it. Kant's dictum limits the application
of morality's absolute dictates to that which is possible. Thus, for example, since
Sophie cannot save both Jan and Eva, Sophie is not morally obligated to save both.
But since Sophie can save either one or the other, she is morally obligated to save one
or the other.
The difficulty with the Options Thesis is that it fails to resolve the resulting
dilemma of which of the incompatible alternatives to adopt. Id. at 56. For example,
must Sophie save Jan or Eva? Some Options Thesis defenders maintain that the
choice of which alternative to adopt is perhaps simply nonmoral. See Donagan,
Consistency, supra note 277, at 308 (the choice is not a moral, but a practical
problem); Marcus, supra note 283, at 34 (the choice is not moral but personal).
Whether described as practical or personal, however, a nonmoral decision as to which
alternative to adopt-e.g., which child Sophie should save-will inevitably be
arbitrary and unprincipled. And most commentators have argued against the
legitimacy of arbitrary dilemma resolution. See infra notes 409-15 and accompanying
text.
378. See supra note 132.
379. See Douglas Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 959,
960 (2000) ("No contemporary criminal theorist rivals Moore in his unqualified
enthusiasm for retribution.").
380. In a famous passage, Kant declares that conflicting moral obligations or duties
are inconceivable:
A conflict of duties (collisio officiorum s. obligtionum) would be a relation
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conflict is the preferred means to resolve apparent moral dilemmas.381
Whereas Kant prioritized perfect or narrow duties over imperfect or
wide duties,382 contemporary Kantians emphasize the priority of
negative duties over positive duties. 383 Although the perfect/imperfect
between them in which one would cancel the other (wholly or in part). But
since duty and obligation are concepts that express the objective practical
necessity of certain actions and two rules opposed to each other cannot be
necessary at the same time, if it is a duty to act in accordance with one rule,
to act in accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty but even contrary to
duty; so a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes
non colliduntur).
Kant, supra note 8, at 50. Kantian scholar Roger Sullivan explains Kant's position as
based on consistency as a paramount value:
[S]ince the ultimate moral norm commands us to act self-consistently, it is
"inconceivable," Kant writes, that we could be obligated to act
inconsistently. He therefore insists, as he must, that there cannot be a
genuine conflict between duties (ein Widerstreit der Pflichten), a conflict such
that we would have a duty to act at the same time on conflicting rules.
Sullivan, supra note 134, at 73 (quoting Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 8, at
50). For further discussion of Kant's denial of the possibility of genuine moral
dilemmas, see Gowans, supra note 254, at 187-92; Barbara Herman, Obligation and
Performance: A Kantian Account of Moral Conflict, in Identity, Character, and
Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology 314, 314-16 (Owen Flanagan & Amelie Rorty
eds., 1990); Hill, supra note 287, at 173, 187; Marcus, supra note 283, at 24.
Michael Moore agrees with Kant-there are no genuine moral dilemmas.
Michael Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2424, 2463-64 ("On that
issue [the existence of genuine moral dilemmas], I have aligned myself with Kant ('a
conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable')." (quoting Kant, supra note 8, at
50) (citation omitted)).
381. Kantian scholar H.J. Paton explains that for Kant, perfect or narrow duties
take priority over imperfect or wide positive duties:
Kant attaches great importance to the distinction between perfect and
imperfect duties, but he seems nowhere to define the distinction clearly ...
Perfect duties. .. admit of no exception in favour of inclination, and this
would suggest that imperfect duties do admit of such exceptions.
... In the case of perfect duties we are obliged to perform a definite act-
for example, to pay precisely the... [specific amount] which we owe. In the
case of imperfect duties we are bound to act only on a maxim: although we
ought to act on the maxim of benevolence, it is left to our discretion to
decide whom we ought to help. There is thus a 'latitude' or 'play-room' in
the case of imperfect duties, which are also called 'broad' or 'meritorious,' as
opposed to 'narrow' or 'strict' or 'rigorous,' duties. The last three adjectives
appear to be equivalent to 'perfect' when they are applied to duties.
Paton, supra note 275, at 147-48. Moore also recognizes that moral obligations may
be prioritized. Moore, supra note 380, at 2464 (at least in the case of incomparable
dilemmas a resolution "may exist in terms of a lexical priority between our
principles").
382. See supra note 381; see also Sullivan, supra note 134, at 51-54 (explaining
Kant's prioritization of narrow, perfect or strict duties over wide and imperfect duties
and the distinction between them). Simply stated, imperfect duties "permit one to
choose among several possible ways of fulfilling them[, but] perfect duties do not allow
that leeway." Bruce Russell, Duty, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 248,
249 (Peter Singer ed., 1991). For another account of the distinction between perfect
and imperfect duties, see Onora O'Neill, Kantian Ethics, in A Companion to Ethics,
175, 178 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999).
383. For Moore, "negative duties are much stricter than merely positive duties."
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duty distinction may imprecisely track the negative/positive duty
distinction, 3 4 most perfect duties are negative and most imperfect
duties are positive.385 Stated most simply, "[n]egative duties are duties
not to do certain things such as to kill or harm, while positive duties
are duties to act in certain ways, such as to relieve suffering or bring
aid." '386 Since negative duties are prohibitions against committing
certain acts, negative duties can be fulfilled by simply doing nothing.387
In contrast, positive duties can only be fulfilled by doing something.3 8
Thus, since negative duties take priority over positive duties, doing
nothing will take priority over doing something.
Resolving the Prosecutor's Dilemma via the prioritization rule
requires first identifying which of the five retributivist principles or
duties389 are positive and which are negative. The following three
duties are positive: punishing culpable wrongdoers, giving them their
just deserts, and honoring their right to punishment.39 ° These duties
are positive since only affirmative acts fulfill them; doing nothing
violates all three duties. And as positive duties, the priority rule
accords their fulfillment or violation secondary importance.
The two remaining duties39 contain both positive and negative
Moore, supra note 20, at 689 (discussing Phillipa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and
the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 Oxford Rev. 1, 5-15 (1967)). Surveying
contemporary deontology, Nancy Davis finds negative obligations to be more
fundamental than positive obligations. Davis, supra note 310, at 208-09. Despite
questioning the usefulness of the distinction in resolving all moral dilemmas, Walter
Sinnott-Amstrong acknowledges that Kantians regard negative duties as overriding
positive duties. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 82-85.
384. Sullivan, supra note 134, at 51 ("Our strict [perfect] duties may be interpreted
positively, such as the requirement to keep contracts, but they are fundamentally
negative....").
385. Russell, supra note 382, at 249 ("Most positive duties are imperfect; most
negative ones, perfect."). See Sullivan, supra note 134, at 73-74 (interpreting Kant's
priority rule to be that "[n]egative and strict [perfect] duties as a rule thus carry more
weight than positive duties").
386. Russell, supra note 382, at 249. Moore explains that "morality places negative
duties on us not to do or cause things like torture, whereas morality places positive
duties on us not to allow things like torture to be done where we can prevent it."
Moore, supra note 20, at 689. Moore suggests that the negative duty/positive duty
distinction is similar to the acting/allowing distinction. Id. (quoting Phillipa Foot, The
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 Oxford Rev. 1, 26 (1967)
(distinguishing "'between what one does or causes and what one merely allows"')).
That is, doing some act may violate a negative duty, whereas not doing an act but
allowing a state of affairs to occur may violate a positive duty. For a further
explanation of the acting/allowing distinction, see Davis, supra note 310, at 216.
387. While negative duties can be fulfilled by doing nothing, they can only be
violated by doing something.
388. While positive duties may only be fulfilled by doing something, they can be
violated by doing nothing.
389. See supra Part lI.B.
390. See supra Part II.B.1-3.
391. With three of the five duties identified as positive duties, see supra text
accompanying note 390, there are two duties (of the five) remaining: (i) to treat
persons as ends and not as mere means, and (ii) to treat persons equally. In general,
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components. The duty to treat persons as ends and not as mere
means392 consists of the positive duty to treat persons as ends and the
negative duty to not treat persons as mere means.393 The duty to treat
equally those culpable wrongdoers with equal desert also consists of
both a positive and negative duty.3 94 The positive duty may only be
fulfilled by the affirmative acts of punishing both the One and the
Two, and punishing them equally.395 The negative duty of not treating
them unequally can be fulfilled by doing nothing.
The second step, under the prioritization rule, is determining which,
if any, of the three options3 96 available to a retributivist prosecutor
under the Prosecutor's Dilemma satisfy all (i.e., both) of the negative
duties.3 97 Thus, the rule requires elimination of any option violating a
negative duty. Prioritization requires eliminating the option of
accepting the offer (and punishing only the Two) since it violates both
negative duties: (i) using the One as a mere means to obtain the
punishment of the Two violates the negative duty to not treat persons
as mere means 39 and, (ii) punishing the Two and not the One violates
the latter duty may be fulfilled either positively or negatively. See supra notes 252-53
and accompanying text. But under the terms of the Prosecutor's Dilemma, the duty
may only be fulfilled negatively. See supra Part II.C.3.
392. See supra Part II.B.4.
393. E.g., Paton, supra note 275, at 171-72 ("So far as we take the principle
negatively it forbids us to use rational agents merely as a means .... But we must
also take our principle positively: it bids us to act on the maxim of furthering the ends
of rational agents."). For further discussion of Kant's maxim as containing both a
positive and negative duty, see supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
394. See supra Parts II.B.5 and III.A.2.
395. But under the terms of the Prosecutor's Dilemma, the positive duty is
impossible to fulfill. See supra Part II.A.
396. For an explanation of the three, and only three, options available to a
retributivist prosecutor in the Prosecutor's Dilemma, see supra Part II.C.
397. According to the prioritization of fulfillment of negative duties over positive
duties, the one option which fulfills all of the applicable negative duties is the option
which must be taken even if it involves violating all of the positive duties. If there is
more than one option which satisfies all of the negative duties, then fulfillment of
positive duties becomes relevant under the prioritization rule. This is because the
prioritization rule only makes fulfillment of positive duties of secondary value, but not
completely irrelevant. See supra notes 381-85 and accompanying text. Thus, where
more than one option satisfies all of the negative duties, then (of those options) the
one which satisfies the greatest number of positive duties would be preferable. If no
option satisfies all of the negative duties, then the option which satisfies the greatest
number of negative duties is preferable. If there is no option which satisfies all of the
negative duties, but more than one option which satisfies an equal number of negative
duties, then (of those options) the one which satisfies the greatest number of positive
duties is preferable.
398. Retributivism purportedly treats culpable wrongdoers as ends (thereby
satisfying the positive component of the duty) by giving them the punishment that
they deserve. But they are used as mere means (thereby violating the negative
component of the duty) if their punishment or non-punishment is a means toward
some other purpose. See supra text accompanying notes 224-26. Accepting the offer
(and punishing only the Two) satisfies the positive component of the duty with
respect to the Two by giving them the punishment that they deserve. But punishing
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the negative duty to not treat persons unequally.3 99 The option of not
accepting the offer (and punishing only the One) satisfies the negative
duty to not treat persons as mere means since neither the One nor the
Two are used as a means to obtain the punishment of another.40 ° But
by violating the negative duty not to treat the One and Two
unequally,40 ' the option suffers elimination under the priority rule.40 2
The only remaining option-not accepting the offer and punish
neither the One nor the Two-does satisfy both negative duties. By
using neither the One nor the Two as mere means (nor in any way at
all), it satisfies the negative duty to not use persons as mere means.4 3
And by punishing neither the One nor the Two, that option satisfies
the negative duty to not treat the One and the Two unequally.4°
Prioritizing negative duties over positive duties resolves the
Prosecutor's Dilemma.4 5 Of the three options, the prioritization rule
requires that a retributivist prosecutor not accept the offer and punish
neither the One nor the Two. While that option violates all five of the
positive duties,40 6 it is the only option which fulfills all of the negative
duties. Though providing a determinate answer as to which option a
prosecutor must select, the resolution does so only by diluting the
only the Two fails to satisfy the positive component of the duty with respect to the
One by failing to give the One the punishment that she deserves. And, more
importantly, by accepting the offer and punishing only the Two a retributivist
prosecutor uses the One as a mere means-her non-punishment is a means by which
to obtain the punishment of the Two. Thus, accepting the offer and punishing only
the Two violates the negative component of the duty.
399. The option of accepting the offer affords punishment of the Two, but
precludes punishment of the One. By punishing the Two but not the One, the option
violates the negative duty not to treat them unequally.
400. See supra text accompanying note 247.
401. The option of not accepting the offer (and punishing only the One) foregoes
punishment of the Two. By affording punishment of the One but not the Two, the
option violates the negative duty not to treat them unequally.
402. Though neither accepting the offer nor not accepting the offer (and punishing
only the One) satisfies all of the negative duties, the latter option is preferable to the
former under the prioritization rule. While the former option violates all of the
negative duties, the latter option does satisfy one negative duty.
403. Not accepting the offer (and punishing none) uses neither the One nor the
Two as mere means to either secure the punishment of another or to attain some
societal benefit. Indeed, it fails to use them as means in any way at all.
404. Not accepting the offer (and punishing none) is the only option which satisfies
the negative duty to not treat the One and the Two unequally. Each of the other
options, in that each involves punishing either only the One or only the Two, violates
the negative duty to not treat the One and the Two unequally.
405. If the negative/positive duty distinction imprecisely tracks the
perfect/imperfect duty distinction, the appropriate resolution of the Prosecutor's
Dilemma may vary as a function of the employment of the former or latter
distinction.
406. Nonacceptance of the offer (and punishing none) violates the following five
positive duties with respect to both the One and the Two: (i) punishing them, (ii)
giving them their just deserts, (iii) honoring their right to punishment, (iv) treating
them affirmatively as ends, and (v) affirmatively, or positively, treating them equally.
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absolute or categorical status of retributivism's positive duties to that
of contingent duties. While technically restoring retributivism to
consistency, the resolution still fails to fulfill retributivism's positive
duties.
B. Deprioritizing the Equality Principle
Although it might lack the endorsement of retributivists and
contemporary Kantians, there are other ways to resolve the
Prosecutor's Dilemma. Deprioritizing the equality principle affords
adoption of one of the other two options-accepting the offer and
punishing the Two or not accepting the offer and punishing the
One.4 7 But deprioritizing the equality principle fails to completely
resolve the Prosecutor's Dilemma. A dilemma would still remain as
to whom should be punished-the One or the Two? Deprioritizing
the equality principle only eliminates one option-not accepting the
offer (and punishing neither the One nor the Two). It fails to provide
a basis for choosing to seek punishment of the One or the Two.408
In order to decide whom to punish-if someone is to be punished at
all-a retributivist prosecutor would need a principled, nonarbitrary
reason why one party should be punished and the other not. 9 While
persons may be fungible and interchangeable under utilitarianism,
they are not under a Kantian framework.410  Using random
407. Deprioritizing the equality principle eliminates the inconsistency between the
equality principle and retributivism's other principles. If the equality principle is no
longer absolute but merely conditional, it would be overridden when it conflicted with
the group of four principles. A retributivist prosecutor could thereby opt to either not
accept the offer (and punish only the One) or accept the offer (and punish only the
Two) without violating an absolute duty to treat the One and the Two equally.
408. And by failing to supply a basis for deciding whom to punish, deprioritization
of the equality principle fails to supply a basis for deciding whether to accept the offer
(and punish only the Two) or not accept the offer (and punish only the One).
409. Christopher W. Gowans, Introduction, in Moral Dilemmas 6, 27-28
(Christopher W. Gowans ed., 1987) (an arbitrary resolution of a dilemma is an
inadequate resolution); Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 60-61 (stating that since
persons are not interchangeable, the choice between persons for whom a duty should
be fulfilled and for whom it should be violated does matter and arbitrariness is
problematic). Thomas Nagel finds arbitrariness permissible when two choices are
even, but not when two choices appear different, yet absolutely required:
When two choices are very evenly balanced, it does not matter which choice
one makes, and arbitrariness is no problem. But when each seems right for
reasons that appear decisive and sufficient, arbitrariness means the lack of
reasons where reasons are needed, since either choice will mean acting
against some reasons without being able to claim that they are outweighed.
Nagel, supra note 276, at 128-29. If persons are not interchangeable under
retributivism, as they might be under utilitarianism, see infra note 410 and
accompanying text, then no dilemmatic choice could be evenly balanced and
arbitrariness will be problematic.
410. Rawls' views in contrasting utilitarianism with his theory of justice as fairness,
which he identifies as deontological or Kantian as opposed to utilitarian, Rawls, supra
note 310, at 30, are instructive. Compare id. at 3 ("Each person possesses an
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procedures41 such as flipping a coin,412 drawing straws or conducting a
lottery413 to decide whom to punish would be an arbitrary4 14 and
unprincipled means of decision and one that retributivists themselves
would find illegitimate. 415  But retributivism fails to supply a
principled, nonarbitrary rationale. 416  The same four principles
requiring punishment of the One also require punishment of the Two.
And punishment of only the One violates the same four principles as
does punishment of only the Two.
Since there is nothing within retributivism that affords a rationale
for deciding whom to punish, then such a rationale must originate
from without retributivism. But what could this supplement to
retributivism be? Apart from the possibility of the differing
consequences of punishing the One and the Two, a nonarbitrary basis
to differentiate among equally culpable and equally blameworthy
wrongdoers is lacking.417 Relying on the differing consequences of
punishing the One and the Two would, in effect, amount to adopting
consequentialist retributivism.41 8  Though consequentialist
retributivism would resolve the dilemma as to whom should be
punished-the Two 419 -its adoption would come at a heavy price.
4 20
inviolability founded on justice .. ") with id. at 27 ("Utilitarianism does not take
seriously the distinction between persons."). See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266,
at 56-57 (finding the argument that an arbitrary choice between persons is permissible
as utilitarian); id. at 76-77 (treating persons as fungible in a dilemmatic choice renders
utilitarianism implausible as a moral theory).
411. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 266, at 180 (a moral theory which endorses the
utilization of random procedures to resolve a dilemma renders the theory "not ...
very plausible").
412. Id. at 55-56 (a coin flip to resolve a dilemma is inadequate because it fails to
make one moral requirement or duty stronger than the opposing one); Marcus, supra
note 283, at 23 (tossing a coin is not a morally justified grounds for choosing what to
do in a moral dilemma situation).
413. Marcus, supra note 283, at 23 (conducting a lottery to determine what course
of action to take when confronted with a dilemma is morally unjustified). Kantian
scholar Roger Sullivan explains that Kant would have abhorred the use of
nonrational, arbitrary decision-making procedures such as the use of a lottery: "the
proposal is self-defeating, since it only postpones unequal treatment and does so in a
way Kant would have abhorred-by a completely nonrational decision process. Luck,
Kant wrote, 'cannot become a matter of universal legislation."' Sullivan, supra note
134, at 375 n.21 (citation omitted).
414. For an interesting account of a possible distinction between randomness and
arbitrariness, see Duxbury, supra note 35, at 46-47, 100-01.
415. For a general discussion of why Kant would exclude the element of luck from
moral judgments, see Daniel Statman, Introduction, in Moral Luck 1, 4 (Daniel
Statman ed., 1993).
416. This failing applies even to a version of retributivism without an absolute
equality principle.
417. Since the One and the Two are equally situated in all respects which are
relevant to retributivism, whatever basis utilized to support only punishing the One
would equally support punishing only the Two.
418. For an account of consequentialist retributivism, see supra Part IV.A.1.
419. Punishing the Two rather than the One would maximize the intrinsic good of
retributive punishment. See supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
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In addition, it could not avoid dilemmas arising from variants of the
Prosecutor's Dilemma.421 By excluding the differing consequences of
punishing only the One and only the Two, retributivism lacks a
principled, nonarbitrary means of deciding whom-between the One
and the Two-should be punished. And even by including the
differing consequences, retributivism lacks a satisfactory basis for
deciding.422 As a result, deprioritizing the equality principle is an
unsatisfactory solution to the Prosecutor's Dilemma.423
C. Practical Ramifications of the Resolution
While the theoretically sound resolution (at least according to
retributivists and modern Kantians4 24) of the Prosecutor's Dilemma is
to not accept the offer and punish neither the One nor the Two, this
resolution has the worst practical consequences for a retributivist
system of criminal justice. It leads retributivism into the reductio ad
absurdum of allowing culpable wrongdoers to escape prosecution and
punishment merely by tendering an immunity offer to a retributivist
prosecutor which generates a moral dilemma for retributivism. The
mere tender of such a dilemmatic immunity offer enables a culpable
wrongdoer to, in effect, self-immunize. Moreover, the tender of a
dilemmatic immunity offer allows the prisoner to not only immunize
herself but also her confederates. The prospect of a retributivist
system of punishment forced to withdraw from seeking punishment of
420. For an account of consequentialist retributivism's difficulties, see supra Part
IV.A.2-3.
421. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
422. While inclusion of the differing consequences of punishing the One and the
Two may provide a nonarbitrary basis for deciding whom to punish, it is not a
satisfactory basis because of the difficulties of consequentialist retributivism. See
supra Part IV.A.2-3.
423. First, allowing the equality principle, as a fundamental precept of justice, to be
overridden, is a substantial loss. Such a devaluing would allow retributivism to treat
similar cases dissimilarly and dissimilar cases similarly. Second, the equality principle
is the only retributivist principle to be unscathed by the Prosecutor's Dilemma. The
other four principles are internally inconsistent as applied to the Prosecutor's
Dilemma. If any of retributivism's principles are to remain intact, it should be the
equality principle. Third, devaluing the equality principle does not even fully resolve
the Prosecutor's Dilemma. Even if the option of punishing none is removed, the
dilemma remains as to whom-between the One and the Two-should be punished.
Without utilizing consequences, there is no principled, nonarbitrary means by which
to choose. Further, the utilization of consequences by retributivism is not only
seriously problematic but would not resolve variants of the Prosecutor's Dilemma.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, resolving the dilemma in this way does not
accord with the method endorsed by contemporary Kantians and retributivists to
resolve moral dilemmas.
424. See supra note 383 for the endorsement by modern Kantians of the
prioritization of negative duties over positive duties. For the application of the
priority rule to the Prosecutor's Dilemma, see supra notes 389-406 and accompanying
text.
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culpable wrongdoers, merely by receipt of a dilemmatic immunity
offer, recalls the plight of "Buridan's ass. 425
The Prosecutor's Dilemma places into the hands of prisoners a
more powerful bargaining tool than that used by prosecutors to create
the prisoner's dilemma.4 6  While the bargain justice proposals
initiated by prosecutors-enmeshing prisoners in the prisoner's
dilemma-lead "rational" prisoners to choose their worst aggregate
outcome,42 7 a prisoner-initiated proposal enmeshing a prosecutor into
the Prosecutor's Dilemma generates the best possible outcome for the
prisoners-immunity for all. But in the prisoner's dilemma, what is
the worst aggregate outcome for prisoners is perhaps the best
collective outcome for society and enhances the goals of the
consequentialist system of criminal justice under which it arises.428 In
contrast, in the Prosecutor's Dilemma, what is the best outcome for
the prisoners is perhaps the worst collective outcome for society42 9 and
undermines the retributivist system of criminal justice under which it
arises.
Thus, punishing none might be considered a worse resolution, as a
practical matter, than the other two options.43 As impractical as the
resolution may be for retributivism, without a resolution to the
Prosecutor's Dilemma retributivism remains internally inconsistent.
425. "Buridan's ass" is a philosophical term originally used to deride French
philosopher Jean Buridan's theory that freedom of action meant the "ability to defer
choice in the absence of a compelling reason to act one way or the other." Jack A.
Zupko, Buridan, Jean, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 107, 108 (Robert
Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999). In the example which came to be known as Buridan's ass
(attributed to the philosopher Baruch Spinoza), an ass (a creature similar to a
donkey), situated equidistant between two equally enticing bales of hay, starves to
death because it has no rational basis to eat from one bale of hay over the other. Id.
The term has come to be known as describing situations in which the choice of which
course of conduct to pursue is deferred until reason has determined which course is
preferable. Id.; Blackburn, supra note 249, at 52. The situation for a retributivist
prosecutor is even worse. While Buridan's ass has two equally enticing, or good,
options, a retributivist prosecutor has only bad options. No matter what option a
prosecutor chooses, retributivism's principles will be violated.
426. For a discussion of the prisoner's dilemma, see supra notes 25-26, 35-38 and
accompanying text.
427. For a ranking of the various aggregate outcomes for prisoners in the prisoner's
dilemma, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
428. This argument is premised on the notion that guilty offenders receiving
greater aggregate punishment, as long as it is not more than what is deserved, than
lesser aggregate punishment, promotes the consequentialist goals of incapacitation
and deterrence. For further discussion of how the prisoner's dilemma promotes
consequentialist goals, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
429. The nonpunishment of guilty offenders is an obvious detriment to societal
interests. Even under a retributivist perspective, the nonpunishment of guilty
offenders is problematic. It violates at least four retributivist principles. See supra
Part II.C.3.
430. But unlike consequentialism, it is unclear how these adverse practical
consequences could legitimately enter into the calculus of retributivist decision-
making.
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Either way-with or without the resolution-the incompatibility of
retributivism and bargain justice is no longer an indictment of the
latter, but rather is now an indictment of the former.
CONCLUSION
Bargain justice places retributivism at the crossroads. With its
condemnation of bargain justice, retributivism is unable to
accommodate and account for the mechanisms by which the vast
majority of defendants are rendered subject to punishment.
Retributivism risks irrelevance as a theory which can explain what
legal institutions of punishment actually do. Attempts to enhance its
descriptive power by forging a reconciliation with bargain justice only
serve to undermine retributivism's prescriptive power in delineating
the just conditions for the imposition of punishment.
The Prosecutor's Dilemma compounds retributivism's difficulties
with bargain justice. Despite withholding justification from
bargaining for punishments, retributivism cannot preclude prisoner-
initiated bargaining. A particular form of which-the Prosecutor's
Dilemma-reveals inconsistencies both within, and among, five of
retributivism's central principles. Although this dilemma, and
retributivism's internal inconsistency, may be resolved, the resolution
affords prisoners a greater advantage (the ability to, in effect, self-
immunize) over prosecutors than the advantages which prosecutors
enjoy over prisoners via the prisoner's dilemma. The resolution
perhaps reduces retributivism to the absurd-the mere tender of a
prisoner-initiated dilemmatic immunity offer forecloses retributivism
from justifying the punishment of either the prisoner or the
confederates the prisoner sought to betray. Without resolving the
Prosecutor's Dilemma, however, retributivism's prescription of the
just conditions for punishment is internally inconsistent.
As a result, the Prosecutor's Dilemma supplies an indirect defense
of bargain justice. The Prosecutor's Dilemma exposes as internally
inconsistent the very principles of retributivism which bargain justice
violates, and by which retributivists condemn bargain justice. Either
way-with or without the resolution of the Prosecutor's Dilemma-
the incompatibility of retributivism and bargain justice now renders
illegitimate not bargain justice, but rather retributivism.
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